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Preface
It is common to say that underdetermination gives us a reason to rethink
science— to curtail its authority in some way. This underdetermination is sometimes taken just to be the problem that theories might have empirically equivalent
rivals. It is sometimes taken just to be the Duhem-Quine problem that theories require auxiliary hypotheses in order to issue in testable predictions. It is sometimes
taken just to be the problem of induction (either Hume’s or Goodman’s). And so
one might suspect that ‘underdetermination’ is not one phenomenon at all, but
rather a crypto-omnivorous catch-all for phenomena that mitigate the authority of
science. The present project lays this worry to rest, I hope, by providing a framework within which all these worries can be seen as species of one genus. Within
the framework, many familiar worries about underdetermination appear in a new
light. Some underdetermination shows nothing interesting about science, and no
underdetermination undercuts the authority of science tout court.
I began this project with modest expectations, with a fallibilist but nonsceptical conception of science— by which I mean that we might be wrong about
any specific claim we make about the world, but that nevertheless scientific knowledge is possible. Some of what I say can be taken as motivation for this view;
see especially the general epistemic considerations of Ch II. I don’t think we need
underdetermination to arrive at this view, however. It suggests itself if we look to
the practice and history of science. And so when I say in what follows that underdetermination tells us nothing new about science, I mean that it tells us nothing
new given that we were already fallibilists.

ix

One may insist that ‘x knows p’ entails ‘x could not be wrong about p.’
Thus, fallibilism is tantamount to denying that we know anything, and ‘fallibilist
but non-sceptical’ is a contradiction. If one did insist on this, then I think underdetermination would provide one with great head-aches. Similarly, if one thinks
that science provides the unquestionable truth, then underdetermination should
give one a sour stomach. And so on.

x
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Underdetermination and the Claims of Science
by
P.D. Magnus
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
University of California, San Diego, 2002
Professor Paul M. Churchland, Chair

The underdetermination of theory by evidence is supposed to be a reason to rethink
science. It is not. Many authors claim that underdetermination has momentous
consequences for the status of scientific claims, but such claims are hidden in an
umbra of obscurity and a penumbra of equivocation. So many various phenomena
pass for ‘underdetermination’ that it’s tempting to think that it is no unified phenomenon at all, so I begin by providing a framework within which all these worries
can be seen as species of one genus: A claim of underdetermination involves (at
least implicitly) a set of rival theories, a standard of responsible judgment, and a
scope of circumstances in which responsible choice between the rivals is impossible.

Within this framework, I show that one variety of underdetermination motivated
modern scepticism and thus is a familiar problem at the heart of epistemology. I
survey arguments that infer from underdetermination to some reëvaluation of science: top-down arguments infer a priori from the ubiquity of underdetermination
to some conclusion about science; bottom-up arguments infer from specific instances
of underdetermination, to the claim that underdetermination is widespread, and
then to some conclusion about science. The top-down arguments either fail to deliver underdetermination of any great significance or (as with modern scepticism)
deliver some well-worn epistemic concern. The bottom-up arguments must rely on

xiv

cases. I consider several promising cases and find them to either be so specialized
that they cannot underwrite conclusions about science in general or not be underdetermined at all. Neither top-down nor bottom-up arguments can motivate any
deep reconsideration of science.

xv

I

Framing the Problem
“[If] science refuses to understand that there is something
which it cannot understand, or better still, that there
is something about which it clearly understands that it
cannot understand it— then all is confusion. For it is the
duty of human understanding to understand that there
are things which it cannot understand, and what those
things are.”
—Søren Kierkegaard, 1847 [Kie58, p. 177]
The claims of science enjoy a presumptive authority in our society. There
is already something odd about saying this, of course, since science does not speak
with its own mouth. The particular claims that are taken as authoritative are,
on any particular occasion, made by some scientist or other. Understanding some
claims as the claims of science presupposes that those scientists are proceeding in a
responsible way such that something distinguishes what they say about the world
from what dogmatic non-scientists say about it.
This is a familiar enough line of thought: There are limits to the rightful
authority of science. Neither scientists nor the laity properly understand those
limits. As a result, we are in a great muddle.
In the 20th century, such thoughts have been advanced under the banner
of underdetermination. Invoking this shibboleth, the worry may be put in this
way: The choice of scientific theories on the basis of evidence is underdetermined.

1

2
A successful scientific theory isn’t better in some compelling sense than its losing
rivals. Underdetermination should lead us to doubt the presumed authority of
science.
This conclusion is often taken to be an accepted result of post-Kuhnian
science studies. Putting the situation in bombastic terms, Philip Kitcher writes:
“Because massive underdetermination of belief by ‘objective’ factors came to seem
omnipresent, there opened up a vacuum into which social explanations of scientific
behavior could be inserted. Instead of an ordered abode of reason, science came to
figure as the smoke-filled backrooms of political brokering” [Kit93, p. 7]. Underdetermination made science seem like just another negotiated social arrangement.
Dale Jamieson writes that one major “source of indeterminism flows from
the underdetermination of theory by data. . . .While there may be grounds for preferring one of two empirically equivalent theories, there is no empirical fact of the
matter about which theory is true. . .”[Jam96, p. 39]. Jamieson has an obscure
way of putting the point, but it should be noted that he mentions underdetermination only as an aside. His central concern is elsewhere, and he does not dwell
on “the underdetermination of theory by data” because he supposes that it is an
established and understood phenomenon. Indeed, it has become quite common
to presume that ‘underdetermination’ is some well defined, even if unappreciated,
fact of our epistemic situation.
If there is to be an inference with underdetermination as its antecedent,
underdetermination must be brought out of the shadows. It must be laid out
cleanly and not be allowed to hide behind a rhetorical flourish. This chapter lays
out a formula for underdetermination and explores variations in its parameters.
Of course, bringing underdetermination into focus is not enough. The ultimate
question is whether we should reconsider the authority of science on account of
this underdetermination. It is too early to answer this ultimate question, however,
because it has not yet even been asked clearly.

3

1.1

A working definition
Consider an epistemic agent— a scientist— who is trying to decide whether

or not to believe a theory about the world. Say her choice is underdetermined if,
given the evidence she has and the other things she knows about the world, she is
unable to responsibly decide whether or not to believe the theory.
One might say immediately that this definition is too broad, because it is
an ordinary enough thing to be unable to decide between rival theories. One reason
there is enquiry at all is because, initially at least, there is no way to decide between
rival accounts. The point of enquiry is to gather evidence and make determination
possible. We might restrict the definition and say that underdetermination occurs
where no epistemic agent could ever make a decision between rival theories. This is
underdetermination with a philosophical sting, not mere ignorance to be redressed
by further investigation. However, this narrower definition turns on the notion of
decisions which could never be made and so, more generally, on the notion of what
could never be; these notions, in turn, are open to many interpretations.
We might suppose that possibility here is logical possibility. Underdetermination so understood would obtain, for instance, between logically equivalent
theories.1 Yet it is not at all clear why logically equivalent theories should even be
understood as rivals. Where theories are equivalent, we typically think of them as
one and the same theory.
We might instead suppose that the possibility here is natural or physical
possibility— what could actually occur given the laws that govern the universe.
This assumes, of course, that there really are laws that govern the universe. Perhaps for the sake of generality, we should not make so strong an assumption.
Further, some things may be allowed by the laws but remain for practical purposes impossible. Perhaps the deciding experiments would require the energy of
ten-thousand suns or arrangements so unlikely that they are unapt to occur even
once in the lifetime of the universe. Perhaps organizing the data would require
1

It may be logically impossible for any agent to decide even when the theories are logically distinct.
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a repository the size of Saturn and analyzing it would demand god-like computational powers. We may confine ourselves to practical possibility, but this would
relativize the discussion to some level of technical prowess.
Worried about counterfactuals, we may insist that an agent can resolve
a dispute only if she will in fact resolve it. This would save us from needing an
account of possibility, but at the cost of making underdetermination depend on
what will come to pass for us. This brings to the fore a different problem with the
definition we are considering: Why should underdetermination obtain only when
responsible decision is impossible for any querist? Although scientists should be
concerned if no conceivable person could decide between two rival theories, they
should be just as concerned if no member of their scientific community could ever
make the decision.2
How we define underdetermination will significantly effect what is to follow. A narrow, strict definition of underdetermination will make it out to be a
monolithic phenomenon. A more productive analysis will allow for underdetermination of various sorts, varying with the range of conditions across which no
responsible decision can be made between rival theories and the range of querists
for whom the decision is impossible. Call these the scope of the underdetermination. The widest scope takes in all logically possible circumstances and all logically possible scientists. Considering physically possible circumstances narrows
the scope. Considering only practically possible circumstances narrows the scope
further and allows for the eventuality that a decision might be underdetermined for
one community but not for another— perhaps the latter community has quantum
computers but the former does not.
We may thus represent a case of underdetermination by specifying a set
of rival theories, a scope over which decision between rivals is underdetermined,
and a standard for responsible theory choice. Varieties of underdetermination may
2
It may be that epistemic virtue can be given a methodologically individualistic treatment, or it
may be that there are irreducibly social dimensions. The point here is only that the possibility of
determination only by someone far from the scientific community would be small comfort to scientists.
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be characterized by differences in any of these elements.

1.2

Variations in the set of rivals
The general formula for underdetermination requires the specification of

a set of rival theories, of the theories between which the querist might choose.
Given the language of theory choice, one might suppose that certain constraints
ought to be placed on what can count as a set of rival theories.
In the first place, one might insist that each of the theories in the set of
rivals be one which the querist could seriously entertain and possibly choose. The
Theory of Relativity was not a rival to Aristotelianism for Galileo, one might say,
since entertaining the Theory of Relativity as a serious possibility was only possible
after developments that occurred in the 19th century. Following William James,
say that rivals are live options for you if “trained as you are, each hypothesis
makes some appeal, however small, to your belief” [Jam48, §I]. This first proposed
constraint can then be expressed as the requirement that each rival must be a live
option.
In the second place, one might insist that the set of rivals be exhaustive—
that the querist cannot help but choose one of them.3 Without such a constraint,
the set of rivals might be something so obscure as the set of unitarianism (‘God is an
undivided one’) and trinitarianism (‘God is three in one’). Insofar as the ultimate
nature of God is unknowable, the choice between these is underdetermined. The
intuition is that there is something unfair about this case, since a querist may
insist that there is no God. Again, a querist may choose to suspend belief. So
the set of rivals should contain not only unitarianism and trinitarianism, but also
atheism, agnosticism, pantheism, and whatever else.
In the third place, one might insist that the set of rivals be exclusive—
that the querist can choose at most one of them. This raises difficult questions
about theory identity and about how we can distinguish theories from one another.
3

This is to insist that the choice be forced, to use James’ terminology.
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1.2.1

Live options
Underdetermination arguments often aim to show that there are some

unappreciated rivals to the theories we presently esteem. Some attempt to do
this by providing an algorithm for generating such rivals.4 The arguments are not
predicated on the hope that scientists will find the algorithmically generated rivals
to be live options. John Earman, commenting on such a spurious rival, reflects a
common sentiment in saying “it is hard to get excited about this example” [Ear93,
p. 31].
Perhaps ‘underdetermination’ should be reserved for cases worth getting
excited about. If so, the rivalry between an actual theory and its algorithmicallygenerated, pedantic counterpart would not be underdetermined, since the generated variant is not a live option and hence is inadmissible as a rival. I might reply
that such a constraint on what will count as underdetermined opens the door for
individuals to believe whatever they want, since they might marshal their will toward killing off the other options and leaving only their preferred possibility. The
suggestion may be amended, then, to allow a community of responsible querists
to settle such matters in order to average over the willfulness of individuals. Laudan and Leplin make a suggestion rather like this one and say that the scientific
community should be relied upon to distinguish real from toy rivals [LL93, p. 12].
Whatever may be said for arguments based on algorithms for generating
toy rivals, they are commonly enough called ‘underdetermination’ arguments, and
so a general account of underdetermination should have something to say about
them. It may be that we find these sorts of cases uninteresting— we find them
to be cheap— but that is to say that a case of underdetermination has a different
significance if the set of rivals contains some esteemed theory and its toy rivals than
if the set of rivals contains two or more live options. I have yet to give an argument
for this differing significance, but stated as a conclusion about the significance of
4
Van Fraassen [van80] and Kukla [Kuk93] are among authors who make this sort of argument. I argue
in the next chapter that Descartes’ arguments in the First Meditation are also of this sort.
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different sorts of underdetermination it can only be formulated if we do not insist
that sets of rivals must contain only live options.5
1.2.2

Exhaustive choices
In order to avoid odd choices like the one between unitarianism and trini-

tarianism, the suggestion is that the set of rivals must exhaust possible choices.
This might be achieved by adding a ‘None of the above’ rival to every set of rivals.
Note, however, that many of the logically possible choices will not be live options
in the sense of the previous section. There may be particular scholars for whom
unitarianism and trinitarianism are the only live options, and for them underdetermination for that set of rivals may really be a source of consternation. That
choice does not confront a different querist, if atheism is a live choice for her. Relevant cases of underdetermination will usually be ones in which the set of rivals
contains all the rivals which are live options for the querists in question, although
that again is to distinguish between the significance of different cases and not to
exclude some cases from ‘underdetermination’ proper.
There is another reason not to insist that ‘real’ underdetermination must
involve mutually exhaustive rivals. The long-running contest between the wave and
particle theories of light was a legitimate scientific dispute. Although we recognize
in retrospect there were options besides wave and particle theories, an unspecified
‘None of the above’ was not and is not a serious option. An observation like the
celebrated Poisson bright spot worked to confirm the wave theory over the particle
theory, but how could it have worked to confirm or refute ‘None of the above’ ? The
catch-all hypothesis is underspecified, making it impossible to assess its relation
to evidence.6
5

Such an argument will have to wait for Ch III.
Salmon, expressing this issue in the context of Bayesian confirmation theory, argues that it is impossible to represent the likelihood of evidence given the catch-all hypothesis [Sal90].
6
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1.2.3

Exclusive choices: the problem of identical rivals
The third suggestion is that the set of rivals should be such that the agent

can only choose one of them— this is suggested even by just calling it the set of
rivals. This can be accomplished formally by taking the power set of the set of
rivals, disposing of the inconsistent elements, and considering underdetermination
with that set as the set of rivals. In practice, this formal trick wouldn’t be enough.7
Take a simple example of two atomic theories. The first is the usual theory
according to which ‘electrons’ are negatively-charged particles at the periphery of
atoms and ‘protons’ are positively-charged particles in the core of atoms. The
other maintains, contrarily, that ‘electrons’ are positively-charged particles in the
core of atoms and that ‘protons’ are negatively-charged particles at the periphery
of atoms. Suppose further that the latter theory attributes every feature to the
‘electron’ that the former attributes to the ‘proton’ and vice versa. The latter
theory includes the claim, for instance, that the ‘electron’ has the same mass as
the ‘neutron.’ How do these two fare as rivals?
It is tempting to say that these are not even distinct theories. The Russian
or French translations of our usual atomic theory are nevertheless the same theory
as the first theory we are considering. So, too, we might insist that the second
theory is just another formulation of the first— not in Russian or French, but in its
own obscurantist argot. If the two were merely translations of one another, then
we wouldn’t have distinct theories and a fortiori we would not have rival theories.
If this were so, it would make no sense to ask whether the choice between the two
was underdetermined; the answer would be trivially negative. If they were really
distinct, however, then the choice between them is plausibly underdetermined. So,
identifying underdetermination seems to turn on telling whether two theories are
merely notational variants.8
7

An early version of the material in this section section was presented at the Southern California
Philosophy Conference in October 2001. A later version was presented at the Philosophy of Science
Association meeting in November 2002 and will be published in the conference proceedings [Mag03].
8
Horwich considers such cases and claims on grounds of common usage that theories like the second
are false [Hor82]. Like the present suggestion, this avoids underdetermination between alleged rivals just
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Put the worry this way: We can’t reasonably say whether the choice
between two rival theories is underdetermined if the two putative rivals might only
be rival formulations of one theory. Identifying when putative rivals are merely
alternative formulations of the same theory is not an easy thing. If we give it
the somewhat paradoxical label the problem of identical rivals, then the worry is
that resolving the problem of identical rivals is a necessary condition for a serious
discussion of underdetermination.
Quine’s solution
This worry motivates Quine, who considers cases like this electron-proton
inversion and suggests, just as I have, that they be treated as two formulations of
one theory [Qui75, p. 319–20]. He generalizes from these cases and proposes that
“two formulations express the same theory if. . .there is a reconstrual of predicates
that transforms the one theory into a logical equivalent of the other” [Qui75,
p. 320].9 A reconstrual of predicates is a mapping from the predicates of one
language onto the open formulae of the other, such that each n-place predicate is
mapped onto a formulae with n free variables. In our example, the reconstrual is
straightforward: map the predicate electron onto the sentence ‘x is a proton’ and
v.v.
Quine goes on to consider “a less trivial case,” one which he attributes to
Poincaré— more on Poincaré in a moment. The example involves two cosmologies:
“Here we have one formulation of cosmology that represents space as infinite, and
another formulation that represents space as finite but depicts all objects shrinking
in proportion as they move away from the center” [Qui75, p. 322]. The latter
cosmology is like the tiled surface in MC Escher’s Circle Limit prints (figure 1.1).
Quine insists that these two cosmologies are alternative formulations of the same
theory just as our two ‘atomic theories’ were. He does not specify how this is
when we have a way to tell that alleged rivals are notational variants.
9
Quine also requires that the two formulations must be empirically equivalent. Nothing here turns
on that addition.
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so, but instead asserts that the reconstrual, although “less simple,” “presents no
serious challenge” [Qui75, p. 322]. Quine leaves this as an exercise for the reader,
but the reader may well be puzzled.
There is a serious— perhaps insurmountable— challenge which suggests
that Quine’s claim about these two cosmologies is simply false. The latter cosmology, we may expect, has a predicate ‘Point x is the center of the universe’ which is
satisfied by exactly one point. How are we to reconstrue this in the idiom the first
cosmology, an idiom in which no point enjoys such a unique status? If there is no
such reconstrual, then the two cosmologies are distinct theories even by Quine’s
own criterion.10
Moreover, the structure of the two cosmologies may be discernably different. It seems natural to suppose that figure 1.1 illustrates a cosmology like Quine’s
second. All the angels and devils depicted in the Escher print are interchangeable
with all the others; the smaller ones are smaller only on account of being further
from the center. Yet on an infinite Euclidean plane without distortions, for any
given hexagon there are six other hexagons that share a side and two vertices with
it and no hexagons that share only a vertex with it (as in figure 1.2a). In the
Escher print, a sextet of angels and devils combine to form a hexagonal figure.
For each such hexagon there are six hexagons that share a side with it (just as for
the Euclidean case), but six other hexagons share only a vertex (figure 1.2b). The
angels and devils need only look to see what’s around them to determine which
cosmology describes their universe. The two cases are discernably different.11
Although Quine’s example misfires, we can try to provide one more suited
to his purposes. Let two cosmologies be given in this way:
C1 Spacetime has some geometry G, and everything in spacetime follows such10
The fact that no observer in the second cosmology could determine which point satisfies this predicate is irrelevant. Saying the two theories are identical is stronger than saying that they practically
indistinguishable.
11
One might take this as a reason to think that figure 1.1 does not illustrate Quine’s second cosmology.
Regardless, it underscores the point that these cosmologies are substantially more complicated than Quine
admits.
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Figure 1.1: “Circle Limit IV.” Finite space in which objects shrink as they move
away from the center would be like this M.C. Escher illustration. c 2002 Cordon
Art - Baarn - Holland; www.mcescher.com. All rights reserved. Used by permission.
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a

b

Figure 1.2: (a) An undistorted Euclidean hexagon. Six other hexagons share a
side with it; zero share just a vertex. (b) Each hexagon in the Escher print shares
just a vertex with six other hexagons.
and-so inertial trajectories.
C2 Spacetime has some alternate geometry G∗ , and universal forces act on everything in spacetime such that all trajectories conform to C1 .
Here we may have one cosmology that represents the curved spacetime
of general relativity and another that represents a flat spacetime plus universal
forces. It looks as if C1 and C2 are identical on Quine’s criterion. We can take
any claim about geometry in C1 and map it onto a claim about physical geometry
in C2 , and so on. Of course, this rivalry provides the basis for Reichenbach’s
argument that geometry is underdetermined by physical theory. Several authors,
presuming the cosmologies to be distinct, have dared to argue that one is better
confirmed that the other!12 We cannot even take them seriously if the cosmologies
are not rival theories. Usefulness might distinguish one formulation from another,
but confirmation will not. Thus, it seems that consequences of Quine’s identity
criterion are altogether too strong.13
12
For Reichenbach’s argument, see [Rei58], [Rei51, ch. 8], and §4.1.2. For representative replies, see
[Gly80, ch. 9] and [Grü60].
13
Similar conclusions are drawn by Mühlhölzer, who concludes that “Quine’s criterion. . .blurs impor-
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Quine does not say where Poincaré offers his example, but Poincaré surely
does offer cases like it. He writes, for instance, of
two universes which are the image one of the other. With each object
P in the universe A, there corresponds, in the universe B, an object P 1
which is its image. The co-ordinates of this image P 1 are determinate
functions of the object P ; moreover, these functions may be of any kind
whatever. . .. [Poi52, p. 98]
Poincaré maintains not that the claim ‘We are in universe A’ and the claim ‘We
are in universe B’ are the same claim, formulated one in the language of A and
the other in the language of B; rather, he says that “these two universes will be
indistinguishable” [Poi52, p. 98]. He sees this as grounds for refusing to make any
claims about absolute space whatsoever. Thus, where Poincaré insists that the
choice of a theory about absolute geometry is underdetermined, Quine insists that
it cannot be underdetermined because all the empirically adequate ones would—
on final analysis— prove to be merely formulations of one theory.
The naturalist rejoinder
Quine’s criterion would allow a scientist to dispose of the electron-proton
inversion case, but she is unlikely to take it seriously without Quine’s help. Since
a scientist can dismiss that case without a formal justification, we might look to
scientists and to the scientific community to determine which formulations represent distinct theories. This follows the advice of Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin,
who counsel a policy of “deference to scientific judgment as to what constitutes a
theory” [LL93, p. 13].14
It is one thing to look at scientific practice and attempt to abstract from
it principles by which to guide our enquiry. We might use insights gleaned from
tant distinctions. . .” [Müh94, p. 123]. Quine’s criterion would also collapse other interesting rivalries,
such as solipsism vs. other minds (cf. §1.3.3) and multiple connection vs. massive reduplication (cf.
§4.1.3).
14
Laudan and Leplin make this suggestion as a way to determine which rival theories are serious
rivals, so it may not be fair to attribute its consequences to them when it is applied to theory identity.
Nevertheless, looking to the scientific community to resolve disputes about theory identity is a plausible
enough naturalist move.
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the bulk of science to shed light on some particular part of it. The proposal here
is another thing entirely: that we should take our cue from particular scientific
judgments. If we defer to science on each particular, we would not be able to dissent
from any scientific judgement. We could adduce no normative principle besides
‘Follow the scientific community in all things’— a principle trivially followed by
the scientific community even where it stumbles or goes astray. If scepticism is the
Scylla of epistemology, then quietism is its Charybdis. ‘Believe what you believe’
is of as little practical value to a deliberating agent as ‘Believe nothing.’
The suggestion may be seen as something more than quietism insofar as it
recommends for philosophers to defer to scientists. Advice to defer to experts may
be of use to deliberating agents who are not themselves experts. This might be a
blow to the egos of philosophers but perhaps it would be all well and good, if only
scientists had expertise on the identity of theories beyond the ken of philosophers.
However, scientists don’t centrally concern themselves with criteria of identity or
meaning. They employ and criticize particular theories, but they do not by and
large pay attention to theory as such. Moreover, there have been theories in the
history of science which at one time were considered rivals but which came to be
seen as alternate formulations of a single theory. The lesson of such episodes is
that deference to scientific judgment on these matters might lead us astray.
The case of matrix and wave mechanics
This point is best pressed home by considering a specific example. In
1926, two formulations of quantum mechanics were on offer: matrix mechanics
which had been introduced by Werner Heisenberg and others the year before and
wave mechanics formulated by Erwin Schrödinger. Schrödinger and Carl Eckart
independently published results which claimed to show that matrix mechanics and
wave mechanics were equivalent. Thus, matrix and wave mechanics were at most
rival formulations of one common theory. It is usual to say both that the two were
equivalent and that the papers by Schrödinger and Eckart provided valid reason for
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thinking so. A typical physics textbook claims that Schrödinger “showed that the
matrix and wave mechanics formulations give identical results and differ only in
their mathematical form” [TR93, p. 208]. Philosophers make similar claims, saying,
for example, “The early formulations of the theory, by Heisenberg and Schrödinger,
were, respectively, in terms of sequences and of functions; subsequently Schrödinger
established that. . . the two formulations were equivalent.” So, the two are treated
by almost everyone as being merely “formulations of the [singular] theory” [Hug89,
p. 45]. Such claims are so widespread as to count as common knowledge.15 The
connection with underdetermination has not gone unnoticed: Philip Kitcher uses
the notion that the two are merely rival formulations to deny that the choice
between them was underdetermined [Kit01a, p. 195] [Kit01b, p. 35], as do Wilson
[Wil80, p. 217] and Sklar [Skl85d]. Yet, as Norwood Russell Hanson remarked, “the
unguarded statement that Wave and Matrix Mechanics are equivalent physical
theories is so unsound, historically and even conceptually, that a re-examination
of the issue might still be tolerable” [Han63, p. 113].
F.A. Muller employs the structural view of theories in such a reëxamination
and, like Hanson, concludes that Schrödinger’s 1926 paper did not show what it
is so often taken to show.16 Even the usual account concedes that matrix and
wave mechanics were associated with different ontologies— the former quite deliberately involved no commitment to unobserved states of particles, whereas the
latter treated particles as quivering puddings of mass and charge.17 This difference in ontology is not merely a matter of labels. Because waves are distributed
in space, wave mechanics has the resources to express spatial relations. Apply this
to a concrete case and consider a charged particle detector that occupies some
specified region of space and an electron that turns up in it. Since waves disperse
over time, wave mechanics predicts that the detector should not detect the entire
15

Muller, who dubs the view the Equivalence Myth, provides a no doubt incomplete list of almost fifty
sources that promulgate it [Mul97, p. 37].
16
Muller cites Hanson as someone who “denies the equivalence, but unfortunately for all the wrong
reasons” [Mul97, p. 37, fn. 4]. This is probably unfair, but I make no attempt here to resuscitate Hanson’s
reasoning.
17
In Muller’s phrase, “tiny jelly-like lumps of vibrating charged matter” [Mul97, p. 229].
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charge of the electron. Only part of the electron wave will be in the detector, and
only that part would be detected. Since there is no straightforward way to represent spatial coordinates in matrix mechanics, contrariwise, matrix mechanics does
not yield this prediction. Muller [Mul97, p. 227] notes this prediction might have
been tested, allowing the opportunity to distinguish empirically between wave and
matrix mechanics. Rather than being mere window dressing, the differing ontologies reflect differences in expressive power and empirical upshot. With the further
notion of wave collapse— the supposition that the wave becomes localized when
it is observed— wave mechanics would not yield the critical prediction. Be that
as it may, the notion of wave collapse had not been introduced at the time of
Schrödinger’s alleged equivalence proof.18
This historical episode holds an important telling point against the naturalist criterion for theory identity. Scientists can believe that two theories are
merely rival formulations of one theory even when they have insufficient reason
for doing so. This may be self-fulfilling; if further development of each rival is
directed toward making the supposed identity more explicit, then successors of the
two rivals may be formulations of some one theory even if the initial rivals were
not. Surely, it is also possible for two rivals to be rival formulations of one theory
even though scientists do not know that to be the case.
Taking stock
Muller’s work using the structural conception of theories provides an example of how specific questions of theory equivalence may be resolved, so one might
think that it shows how the problem of identical rivals may be solved in general.
This structural conception (called variously the semantic or model-theoretic conception) requires specifying the theory as a class of set-theoretical structures (or
models). Critics have charged that this formal requirement elides important fea18

One may say that Schrödinger’s theory of waves qua matter waves was simply falsified by subsequent
developments.
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tures of scientific theories,19 and some advocates of the semantic conception argue
for treating theories as ‘models’ in an informal, non-mathematical sense.20 Where
models are not or cannot be specified set-theoretically, Muller’s approach can find
no purchase. Thus relying on the structural conception here would be to replace
one dispute with another.
Without attempting to decide between the structural view and its many
rivals,21 I remind the reader that theories are products of human craftsmanship.
Not only do theories have histories, but theory itself has a history. Whatever it
is now, it came to be that way and may come to be different. Philosophers can
accompany an account of theory with a call to represent theories in that way,22 but
theory as scientists meet it is red in tooth and claw. Closer examination of episodes
like the dissolving rivalry between wave and matrix mechanics might allow us to
adduce principles of theory identity and non-identity— principles informed by and
applicable in practice. Let me simply observe that questions of theory identity are
unresolved and that their resolution would demand considerable further work.
Above, we encountered the worry that solving the problem of identical
rivals was a precondition for talking seriously about underdetermination. Absent
such a resolution, what can we say about underdetermination? Any two theory
formulations which a scientist takes to be distinct can be considered as rivals for the
purpose of asking if the choice between them is underdetermined. This enquiry
might be fruitful in one of two ways. First, if the choice between rivals can be
shown not to be underdetermined, then the theories must be distinct. Even if we
don’t know necessary and sufficient conditions for theory identity, we do know some
sufficient conditions for non-identity— empirical inequivalence, for one. Second,
if the alleged underdetermination can be shown to have no serious consequences,
19

For instance, see [Car83, p. 159–61].
Giere, for instance, argues for the “model-theoretic view” and allows models that are “prototypes or
exemplars” [Gie94, p. 283, fn. 3].
21
Formal work has also been done on the identity conditions of theories within state-space semantics
[Chu98], but one is hard-pressed to see how the theories considered above could be reconstrued as patterns
of activations in neural networks.
22
As does [Sup68].
20
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then nothing turns on whether the rivals are actually distinct. Even if the electronproton inversion case involved distinct theories in some sense, it would be hard to
get excited about the underdetermination between them.
It is possible, for all that has been said so far, that there will be some
cases of underdetermination with considerable consequences. We might then be
pushed to consider whether the apparent underdetermination obtains between distinct theories— pushed, that is, to consider the problem of identical rivals. In
subsequent chapters, I aim to show that this possibility is not realized. For now,
it’s enough to note that the mere possibility should does not doom our enquiry
into underdetermination.
I do not deny that a criterion of theory identity would be a nice thing to
have. Problems of theory individuation, of which the problem of identical rivals
is a special case, are interesting in their own right. Resolving them, however, can
only come as the result of a careful examination of the history of science— an
examination which must be left for some other time. I draw the modest conclusion
that this open question need not give us much pause when we come to consider
underdetermination.

1.3

Variations in scope
As explained above, we might organize variations in scope according to

senses of possibility. These variations are the concern of the next section. In the
subsequent section, I offer a different way that variation in scope may organized:
Time. I then consider whether cases of very wide or very narrow scope are importantly different than other cases. Before moving on, there are two general remarks
to be made about scope.
First, recall that scope is defined as the range of conditions across which
no responsible decision can be made between rival theories and the range of querists
for whom the decision is impossible. The range of querists may be constrained in
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terms of what querists need to know in order to make determination or in terms of
what they would need to be able to do. In either case, the range of querists may be
expressed as a range of conditions. Suppose, for example, that a theory choice is
underdetermined for querists who lack some important background theory or who
lack the know-how to build a complicated experimental apparatus. This might
equivalently be expressed by saying that the theory choice is underdetermined
across conditions in which the background theory is not antecedently known or in
which the apparatus is unavailable. Scope for any case of underdetermination can
thus always be given as a set of circumstances, without loss of generality.23
Second— for a fixed set of rival theories and a fixed standard— if the
theory choice is underdetermined with respect to some scope, then it will also be
underdetermined for any strictly narrower scope. Conversely, if it is not underdetermined for some scope, then it will not be underdetermined for any strictly
wider scope.
This may seem counterintuitive, since one can easily imagine cases that
might seem to contradict it. Consider two rival theories, call them Head and Heels.
Suppose there are only two possible items of evidence that bear on the question,
EHead which supports Head over Heels to some degree and EHeels which supports
Heels over Head to the same degree. If a scientist knows both EHead and EHeels , her
choice between Head and Heels is underdetermined. Yet if she knows only EHead ,
her choice is determined in favor of Head. It looks as if the underdetermination
is eliminated given a narrower scope. However, the case where she can decide
is not one of narrower scope, but of less evidence. The scope for the case of
underdetermination includes conditions in which she has either no evidence or both
items of evidence. The circumstance of having only the one item of evidence and
of her judgement coming up Head is not in the scope at all. Here, a circumstance
can be expressed as a set of available evidence. The scope is then not a set of
23
Background knowledge might instead be included in the standards for responsible choice; include
among the standards that one may responsibly assume such-and-so theory.
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all logically
possible circumstances

all naturally
possible circumstances
all practically
possible circumstances
the present
state of enquiry
the state of
one querist

Figure 1.3: Scopes associated with various senses of possibility make for nested
varieties of underdetermination.
evidence, but a set of sets of evidence.24
1.3.1

Variations in possibility
Many classes of underdetermination that have been of considerable con-

cern to philosophers of science may be generated by specifying a sense of possibility.
Considering cases which are underdetermined for a scope constrained by empirical
possibility yields the kind of underdetermination that motivates Bas van Fraassen’s
arguments for constructive empiricism.25 Varieties of scope generated in this way
can be nested, as shown in figure 1.3.
Cases of maximal scope are those where rival theories would be favored
24

Specifying a circumstance may involve more that just giving a set of evidence. As noted above,
it may involve specifying capabilities of the scientific community. In general, it will involve specifying
whatever features of a situation make a theory choice underdetermined for the agents who are in it.
25
There is reason to be suspicious of the notion of ‘empirical’ or ‘observational’ possibility, but I save
those for the discussion of empirical equivalence in Ch III.

21
to the same degree by any imaginable body of evidence. Cases that are underdetermined with a scope of all naturally possible circumstances may be harder to
identify, since our identifying them requires that we have an accurate account of
what is naturally possible. Such cases are interesting because they preclude saying
that all theory choice is underdetermined; to have identified such a case, we must
already have accepted a theory of sufficient power to specify what is naturally
possible. Background theories can thus underwrite claims of underdetermination,
but they also presume determination.
For any set of rival theories, there are background theories which— if
scientists held them— would allow scientists to distinguish between the rivals.
Consider the case where there are two rival theories T1 and T2 and scientists make
some observation O. If they know (T1 → O) and (T2 → ¬O), then they can decide that T1 and not T2 is the better theory. Of course, suitable revision of the
rival theories would repeat the underdetermination at the level of theory cum
background theory. If the choice between T1 and T2 is underdetermined without
the background theory, then the choice between T1 &(T1 → O)&(T2 → ¬O) and
T2 &(T1 → ¬O)&(T2 → O) will be underdetermined regardless. If the underdetermination is averted on grounds that (T1 → O) and (T1 → ¬O) are themselves
entailed by some background theory B, then repeat for the rivalry between T1 &B
and T2 &B 0 for some doctored background theory B 0 — and so on until the relevant
background theories are exhausted.
The implications of this argument demand careful attention, but one
especially concerns us now.26 A theory choice may be described in any number of
ways. Described as a choice between T1 and T2 , this choice is underdetermined for a
scope which contains circumstances in which scientists have not learned the potent
background theory. Described as a choice between T1 plus the potent background
and T2 , the choice may be underdetermined for a much wider scope. Therefore,
the scope for which a theory choice is underdetermined depends on how the set
26

I will have cause to revisit the argument in §3.3.2. References accompany that discussion.
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of rivals is characterized (and also on the standard for acceptable determination.)
So, whether a case of underdetermination is of maximal scope may depend on how
it is described. Whether rivalry between theories is importantly underdetermined
or momentarily undecided is a matter of degree. The distinction is best thought
of as representing a continuum. At one end is inescapable underdetermination. At
the other end is the normal situation of inquiry underway. In the middle are cases
of varying tractability.
1.3.2

Variations in time
Scope might be constrained so as to include only certain times. It may be

that some question about the future— for instance, what I will eat for lunch on my
80th birthday— is undecidable given present evidence. The choice between rivals—
a sandwich, soup, nothing. . .— is underdetermined for a scope that includes only
our present and past circumstances.27 For a scope that includes sufficiently distant
future circumstances, however, the choice is not underdetermined for the trivial
reason that among the range of conditions contained in the scope are conditions
under which querists could watch what comes to pass. On my 80th birthday, they
should have little trouble resolving the issue.
Other variations with regard to time will have other consequences, but
the general lesson drawn above still holds: removing times from the scope of a
case of underdetermination will always leave a case of underdetermination; adding
times to the scope of a case which is not underdetermined will never make the
case underdetermined. Yet no general relationship exists between cases of underdetermination with scopes of specified possibility and cases with scopes specified
by time. This can be shown by considering the possible permutations:
1. Cartesian evil demon scenarios are underdetermined for a scope that contains
all logically possible circumstances and times, because no evidence could ever
27

The example shouldn’t be thought of as being about free will. The world is a complicated place, my
80th birthday is many years in the future, and lunches are not the concern of fundamental theories.
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resolve them. (See Ch II.)
2. The choice between ‘Emeralds are green’ and ‘Emeralds are gruetomorrow ’ is
underdetermined given a scope of all logically possible evidence from our
past and present, because no evidence before the predicate’s expiration date
could resolve it.28 Including future evidence, however, resolves the underdetermination.
3. Relativity, a natural constraint, entails underdetermination about the global
structure of spacetime. The underdetermination holds for all time but not
for all logically possible evidence. We can imagine evidence which would
resolve the matter, but constrained by the laws of physics we could never in
all of time gather such evidence. (See §4.1.4.)
4. The choice between theories of what I will eat for lunch on my 80th birthday
is not underdetermined either for all times or for all logically possible evidence. Including sufficient parts of the future would allow for determination,
as would the construction of logically possible but physically problematic
chronoscopes.
This distinction mongering hasn’t shown anything much about these examples.
What it has shown is that variations of scope with respect to possibility and with
respect to time are distinct.
So far, varying scope with respect to time has been treated as a matter
of constraining which times observers would be allowed to watch from. Even if the
choice between some rival theories might be underdetermined at any finite time,
we may further wonder if determination would be possible given the totality of
eventual evidence. For example, consider a group of geometers trying to determine
the value of pi. Suppose they entertain all real numbers as rival theories. They
quickly eliminate many of the rivals, narrowing the choice down to one between
28

A thing is ‘gruetomorrow ’ if it has been green in the past and is green today, but will be blue tomorrow
and henceforth.
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numbers from 3.1415 to 3.1416. Given further enquiry, they can narrow this range
further. Given any finite amount of enquiry whatsoever, there will still be an
interval containing infinitely many rival theories. In the limit as the length of
their enquiry approaches infinity, however, they decide on the one true theory.
For a scope which contains all possible circumstances at all times, the choice is
underdetermined. The underdetermination is only eliminated for a larger scope,
one which contains a synoptic circumstance which sums over all of the times. This
limit of enquiry is not possible for any actual querists, however, so these imagined
mathematicians would be best advised to decide what degree of precision they
need and adjust the set of rivals accordingly; for any finite degree of precision, the
determination can be made in some finite time. The scientific community never
reaches the end of science, so there is something odd about adding a circumstance
which contains as evidence all other possible circumstances.
1.3.3

Maximal scope: agnosticism and fideism
Theory choices which are underdetermined with a maximal scope— ones

for which responsible choice would be impossible in any logically possible circumstances at any time— demand special attention. They evoke two conflicting intuitions; call one agnostic and the other fideist.29 The agnostic intuition is that,
since the choice is forever beyond determination, one ought forever to suspend
judgement about which of the rivals is true. The fideist intuition is that one might
freely believe one of the rivals even now, since further enquiry will have no bearing on the question either way. The agnostic impulse is, in effect, to insist that
the same standard for responsible choice that holds in cases of narrow scope underdetermination should hold even when it makes a theory choice undetermined
with maximal scope; the only responsible thing to do in cases of maximal scope is
to be indifferent between the rivals. Contrarily, the fideist suggests that where a
theory choice is underdetermined with maximal scope given the usual standards
29
In the discussion that follows, ‘agnosticism’ and ‘fideism’ are meant only to pick out views about
how to respond to underdetermination— any religious overtones are incidental.
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of responsible choice, one ought to suspend the usual standards in favor of the
standard ‘Do what you will.’ On this alternate standard, the choice need not be
underdetermined.30
Agnosticism and other minds
An example may help clarify these intuitions. Let the set of rivals contain one theory according to which only you the reader have a mind and another
according to which you and most other human beings have minds. The rivalry
between these two theories amounts to the familiar problem of other minds and is
arguably underdetermined with maximal scope, since the two rivals would lead us
to expect exactly the same course of events in the world. The underdetermination
does not entail that the theory choice has no practical consequences, but rather
that the consequences are not of the sort that can be used to test either theory. If
you believe that you would have moral duties to people that you would not have
to automatons, then there is a practical difference between the two. From one
theory, it follows that you have a duty not to commit murder; from the other, it
follows that murder is of a kind with smashing a television. Further experience will
not contradict you in either case, but you may well act differently if you believe
one rather than the other. How would you act if, taking the agnostic position,
you remained indifferent between the two possibilities? How would you order your
affairs if you lived with a real and persistent doubt as to whether other humans
had mental lives like you have? It is tempting to think that you would become
what the rest of us would call a sociopath. Sincere agnosticism about other minds,
like solipsism, carries at least the hint of madness. Given your willingness to say
that other people have experiences just as you do, doesn’t it mean you are willing
to relax your epistemic scruples on this matter?
If so, then the fideist wins the point. The agnostic may respond by
arguing that the problem is not underdetermined. She may say: The madness of
30

One may object that the will has no role in determining belief. I take this up in §1.6.2, below.
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suspending judgement on this matter shows that the choice is not underdetermined
even on ordinary standards, since any reasonable standard would allow you to
choose the sane choice over the mad one.31 Thus, the agnostic admits that there
is an intuition regarding other minds but maintains that the intuition does not
speak to the issue of underdetermination.
Cognitive habit
Moreover, the agnostic continues, fideism would do unintended harm.
Good querists realize that reflective and deliberate application of standards is not
enough. They try to develop habits of applying the standards of responsible theory
choice; they cultivate these inclinations, so that they would feel uncomfortable
accepting claims for which no good reasons can be adduced. They also place
themselves in a social order that enforces the standards for responsible theory
choice, they willingly put themselves in a situation where they would be chastised
for capricious belief. The fideist only suspends the usual standard when a theory
choice is underdetermined for maximal scope, to be sure, but he must thus work
to weaken his and the community’s habitual application of the usual standard.
Suppose the decision between two theories is underdetermined for a maximal scope
and that the fideist prefers to believe one rather than the other. If he ever has
occasion to consider his choice, he will need to steel himself against his habituated
unease; he will need to suppress the reaction which he cultivates in usual cases.
Perhaps in reflective moments he will apply the usual standards as well as any
querist. In more mundane moments, though, his habits will be weaker than those
of the agnostics who spent no energy weakening theirs. There may well come a
time when he will blunder where they might apply the usual standard by force of
habit.
The fideist may reply to the agnostic’s argument: It is an empirical question as to whether querists are best served by relying on brute habit. Perhaps
31
Thomas Reid’s arguments for the existence of the external world, given in the next chapter, may be
applied here mutatis mutandis.
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for the bulk of enquiry and for the bulk of querists, for normal scientists doing
normal science, this will be the case. Those who are of stronger character can
distinguish between cases, however. They will recognize the differences between
cases underdetermined with maximal scope where they may believe as they will
and cases underdetermined for narrower scope. Why should such stronger types
be held back from exercising their strong character?
The agnostic replies in turn: It is doubtful that anyone has such a strong
character, but that is— as you say— an empirical matter. Even if some scientists
do have such a character, they should not exercise it. As it is said: “Be careful that
the exercise of your freedom does not become a stumbling block to the weak.”32
Other scientists would either decide that they, too, could believe as they chose or
be forced to admit that they had weak cognitive constitutions. If the former, then
their habits would be weakened. If the latter, then they would be disheartened,
and an unhealthy social division would be drawn among scientists. Thus if any
scientists are such that their habits will be significantly eroded by fideism, then
the whole community should embrace agnosticism.
The fideist replies, of course, but we can leave them to the dialogue. There
are open questions of the degree to which habit formation is a good way to instill
the usual standards of reasonable theory choice, the degree to which fideism would
undercut these habits, and the degree to which fideism for a few would disrupt
the community. These are questions which must be answered by methodological
reflection and psychological data.
Fideism and narrower scope
The fideist intuition is strongest in cases, like the alleged underdetermination about other minds, where the scope is maximal. The fideist may further
wish to suspend the usual standards of responsibility for choices which are underdetermined with a narrower scope— for instance, a scope of all naturally possible
32

1Corinthians, 8:9.
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circumstances as defined by some well-confirmed background theory. This would
exacerbate the problem of poor habits, since choices which are subject to the usual
standards may closely resemble ones which are exempted from the standards.
Consider that Special Relativity entails that an observer cannot be affected by events outside her past light cone.33 Supposing that she can only responsibly make theory choices on the basis of events to which she has some causal
connection, specific claims about events outside her past light cone will be underdetermined for her with a scope constrained by what is possible given Special
Relativity. Consider two events, call them Hop and Skip. Suppose that Hop was,
from our observer’s frame of reference, one thousand years in the past and six
inches inside the surface of her past light cone and that Skip was, again from the
observer’s frame of reference, simultaneous with Hop but six inches outside the
surface of her past light cone.
Following the fideism here on offer, she may believe whatever she likes
about Skip but not so with Hop which is a mere foot away— even if Hop is some
small event which would be practically impossible for her to discern. This is subject to the same worries about personal habit and social norms as fideism applied
to cases of maximal scope, but perhaps she can will her belief about Skip while
reminding herself that she has this freedom only because of Special Relativity,
without being less apt to notice errors in reasoning about Hop, and without harming the social order. Insofar as she can do that, however, she is encouraged to treat
Special Relativity as an inevitable and immutable constraint on possibility. If she
seriously allowed for the possibility that it might be false, she would treat Skip
as of a kind with Hop, both as events that she could not discern. Thus, fideist
treatment of a particular claim about Skip would undercut her ability to be a
fallibilist about the background theories that specify the relevant sense of natural
possibility. Since she only needs to protect her willful judgement about Skip, she
could allow for theory changes that would further constrain the relevant sense of
33

The entailment presumes a little beyond just Relativity, but the complications are incidental to the
argument here.
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Figure 1.4: The observer may be effected now by Hop, but not by Skip, since the
latter is outside the observer’s past light cone
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possibility. Since responsible change in theory may as easily open new possibilities
as close them, however, this half-hearted fallibilism offers little comfort.
The fideist approach may be applied to cases of still narrower scope, but
the problems only increase. Further problems arise and— for a theory choice underdetermined only with a scope so narrow that it excludes recognized, practical
possibilities— agnosticism clearly wins out. Imagine, as an example of such a case,
the question of whether there are serious side effects associated with an exotic drug.
A large-scale, clinical trial would resolve the question, but it is underdetermined
with a scope that includes only circumstances where the trial has not been performed.34 If we have not performed the trial, we are not in a position to say
whether the drug has side effects. Yet, it would be perverse to decide that it does
have side effects if we merely find the drug distasteful. Here the fideist intuition
has no sway. More generally, it would be perverse to will to believe regarding a
matter that would be open to investigation if only we would will to investigate.
The fideist suggestion was to substitute the standard ‘Believe what you will’ for
the usual standard in some special cases, but invoking that standard in cases that
might be resolved by ordinary investigation is— in effect— to insist that it should
be the usual standard.
To summarize the action surrounding fideism: There is an intuition that
in cases underdetermined with maximal scope it would be permissible to believe
anything, since the course of events would never force one to alter the willed belief.
Such a practice may have deleterious consequences for individuals and for the
community, but whether it does is an open and at least partly empirical question.
The only plausible fideism regards cases of very wide scope, so underdetermination
with middling and narrower scope will require a different response regardless.
34
The question could be decided without a clinical trial, for instance with a study of a population that
took the drug recreationally. The scope of the underdetermination, then, must also exclude circumstances
where such populations exist.
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1.3.4

Very narrow scope
Where evidence is yet to be found but we have no reason to believe that we

couldn’t find it, underdetermination describes the normal state of science wherein
some experiments are yet to be done and some data is yet to be collected. Our usual
understanding of science in which there are open questions which may be answered
by further study thus makes room for a certain kind of underdetermination: cases
in which the scope includes our present circumstance but does not include some
circumstance wherein we’ve done further study.
Legitimate controversies exhibit underdetermination of this kind. Consider the schematic example of two theories, a dominant theory Alt and a weaker
rival Neu. In the beginning, scientists responsibly judge Alt to be superior to Neu.
As new evidence is collected, however, Alt faces anomalies. Scientists begin to
responsibly disagree as to whether Alt should be preserved or thrown over. More
evidence is collected, new arguments are made, and Neu emerges victorious.35
The choice between Alt and Neu is underdetermined with a scope including circumstances in which the anomalies are known but in which the decisive
evidence in favor of Neu is not known. Instances of this schema are commonplace
in the history of science. In the Kuhnian idiom: One paradigm dominates, anomalies mount up, the paradigm enters crisis, and then the crisis is resolved by the
shift to a new paradigm.36 There are questions which seem settled now, which
evidence can reopen, and which further evidence would settle again.
Narrow scope underdetermination of this kind is present wherever there is
ignorance that might be overcome and wherever there is legitimate controversy. Yet
who would ever deny that ignorance and controversy are real features of science?
For fallibilists, this kind of underdetermination doesn’t suggest any reëvaluation
of the claims of science.
35
The situation is somewhat more complicated if Neu is only formulated in response to the anomalies
threatening Alt; cf. §4.2.2.
36
Crises can also be resolved if new resources are developed within the prior paradigm. In the schematic
case, Alt may emerge victorious if the anomalies can be resolved.
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1.4

Variations in standards
A choice between theories is underdetermined for a particular commu-

nity when its members are unable to responsibly decide which of the theories to
accept.37 In the simplest case, there is not enough of the right kind of evidence
available to decide in favor of one theory or another. The theory choice is straightforwardly underdetermined by the standard of empirical adequacy. Imagine a more
complicated case in which the community accepts as a standard that the simpler
theory should be accepted, ceteris paribus. Let the two theories be Unum and
Quorum. One member of the community chooses to believe Unum because it
posits fewer entities than its rival Quorum. Another member of the community
chooses to believe Quorum because, although it posits more entities than Unum,
it describes the interactions of entities more elegantly than Unum does. The first
querist applies the usual formulation of parsimony and insists that they should
not posit entities needlessly. The second insists that the additional entities are
not needless, since without them the dynamics of the theory would be needlessly
complex. The standard of simplicity seems ambiguous between their interpretations of it, and so it seems plausible to say that the case is underdetermined given
merely the standard of ‘simplicity’ even if it is not underdetermined given either
the standard of parsimony or the standard of elegance.38
It might seem, then, as if there are two forms of underdetermination: the
simpler form in which a well-articulated standard is insufficient to decide matters and another form of underdetermination which stems from the ambiguity of
standards. Note, however, that the difference is one of degree and not one in kind,
since intermediate cases of all sorts can be constructed. Imagine two theories Recto
and Verso which both enjoy empirical success in some applications but which encounter anomalies in others; suppose that Recto succeeds most dramatically just
where Verso fails, and vice versa. The criterion of empirical success is equivocal
37
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That is, when the choice is underdetermined for some scope that includes their present circumstances.
This problem with simplicity arises for a concrete case in §4.1.3.
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without being ambiguous. Everyone may agree that it speaks in favor of both
theories, but insofar as the theories are incompatible they must admit that it is
insufficient to decide which of the theories we should accept. The standards may
be made more specific, of course. A standard which places greater importance on
the applications which Recto successful executes will favor Recto univocally.39
In the abstract, it will always be possible to specify more discerning
standards which would decide univocally between rivals. Let the rival theories
be Chaulk and Cheese. The choice between them may be underdetermined for
our preferred standards, but be that as it may it will certainly be underdetermined given only the standard encapsulated in the rule ‘Believe either Chaulk or
Cheese.’ Contrarily, it will assuredly not be underdetermined for the standard
‘Believe Chaulk, but shun Cheese.’ Note, too, that the former standard leaves the
choice underdetermined with maximal scope while the latter allows determination
in any circumstances whatsoever.
This means that any theory choice is, in a sense, underdetermined in every
circumstance, but also that the same theory choice is not, in another sense, underdetermined even given our present circumstance. This is no paradox, since the
underdetermination present or absent is underdetermination relative to different
standards. Yet one might still hope to discover which sense of ‘underdetermined’
is the real sense. The real sense, one might think, is the one that takes rationality
as the relevant standard. This approach is fundamentally misguided. One sense of
‘underdetermined’ may be more important for us because it arises from standards
which are important to us, but which standards are important to us may itself be
a matter of debate. There is no absolute sense of rationality to be had.
There may thus be cases in which querists can not agree on a theory choice
because they are applying different standards. This may be like the case of Unum
and Quorum which was underdetermined because the two querists appealed to
different conceptions of simplicity. It could be worse than that, perhaps, since the
39

This theme returns in §4.3.
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adherents of Unum and Quorum at least shared a commitment to an ambiguous
common standard. We may imagine cases in which querists share no relevant
standards at all. Although such confrontations are imaginable in some sense,
actual querists always share an array of commitments and implicit standards. I
leave this for now as a bold assertion. Using modern scepticism about the external
world as a foil, I return to this claim in the next chapter to explore the role of
standards in determining a case of underdetermination.

1.5

Top-down and Bottom-up arguments
The structure developed in this chapter organizes cases of underdeter-

mination. We can already see the disparate phenomena that pass as underdetermination as varieties of a well-defined genus. It remains to be shown how
underdetermination is supposed to yield a conclusion about science. The schema
for underdetermination is not yet a schema for underdetermination arguments. A
further distinction will be helpful.
Top-down arguments begin with ubiquitous underdetermination— either
as a premise or an intermediate conclusion. This ubiquitous underdetermination
is then argued to have some importance for our thinking about science. Paradigmatic underdetermination worries like the problem of empirically equivalent rivals
and the problem of reliance on auxilliary hypotheses (the so-called Duhem-Quine
problem) are top-down arguments. They and their kin will be the addressed in Ch
III.
Bottom-up arguments begin from concrete cases of underdetermination—
perhaps one, perhaps a few, perhaps a broad sample of cases. Since some cases are
underdetermined, is there any reason why others should not be? Philosophers have
often fixated on the underdetermination of the metrical or topological structure of
space, with the suggestion that the lesson of geometry tells us something important
about all of science. This and other bottom-up moves will the subject of Ch IV.

35

1.6
1.6.1

Three asides
Aside: underdetermination and ontology
The scheme developed here doesn’t make an explicit place for disputes

about scientific realism, maugre the many authors who take underdetermination
to be an anti-realist weapon against realism.40 The issue may pitch a tent in
many camps, I suggest, but it is not at root an ontological problem. The worry
of underdetermination is that we may be unable to responsibly decide between
rival theories. The claim of realism is (to a first approximation) that theories
we have responsibly decided on are true or approximately true. Thus the latter
seems to presuppose the former; realism supposes we have decided on a theory, and
thus that underdetermination worries can be answered. Even given a victorious
theory, though, there is the subsequent question of whether its ontology is the
true ontology. Here there are problems of determining what ontology accompanies
the theory, and these might without too much injury to the language be called an
underdetermination problem. Nevertheless, this underdetermination of ontology by
theory is not the problem that I am concerned with addressing here.41 Anti-realists
may argue from the underdetermination of theory by evidence to the conclusion
that we might responsibly have decided on different theories; they may argue from
the underdetermination of ontology by theory to the conclusion that our best theory
can be understood as saying different things about the world; but it would suffice
for them to argue that even a univocal ontology is not one we should believe. So
overcoming underdetermination is not sufficient for realism. It is not necessary
either, if a sly account of approximate truth might save realism in the face of
rampant underdetermination.42 Determination is neither the sine qua non or the
40

Though not all authors collapse these issues. Laudan, for instance, rejects claims of both underdetermination and realism.
41
For the general claim that there is no function from claims about the world to ontologies, see [Qui69];
for an argument that this the situation in contemporary physics, see [Jon91]. The idea that ontological
relativity might count as a ‘underdetermination’ was suggested to me by Jeffrey Barrett.
42
The sly account need not be an irresponsible one. I have no pretheoretic notion of ‘approximate
truth’— it is a term of art and may bear exotic definition. There is a pretheoretic intuition that science
gets something right about the world, and that might spur one toward realism.
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cum qua of realism. There are connections, no doubt, but for the realist everything
about science connects to realism. I may remark on the connection at times, but
I will offer no further apology for denying it pride of place.
1.6.2

Aside: the role of decision and choice
The initial characterization of underdetermination makes reference to an

agent’s decision to accept one of the rival theories, by which I mean the same
thing as the agent’s making a theory choice. Furthermore, underdetermination is
taken to be instanced in homely examples of belief choice as much as in rarified
examples of scientific theory choice. One might object to this language of choice on
the following grounds: Belief is not a matter of choice. A person believes whatever
she believes, and it makes no sense to think of her as making an explicit choice in
the matter. Argument may lead her to some conclusion; if she believes it, well and
good; if she does not believe it, then there is no sense in saying she should choose
to do so.43
There is a sense of ‘belief’ in which belief is not amenable to choice, and
the argument above is spot on regarding belief in that sense. However, there is a
perfectly ordinary sense of belief in which it misses the mark. A belief framed as
a proposition is something that a querist may choose to accept or reject. She has
a certain intuition, a hunch, an inclination, but nothing about those dispositions
requires her to accept a particular sentence as cashing out that intuition. Further,
to believe a claim in the sense of accepting it is more than just to say it or have a
disposition to say it— to accept a claim is to take responsibility for it, to stand by
it, to stake one’s reputation on it. This is a commitment to action, in part, and is
as much a choice as any decision to act. Throughout what follows, talk of theory
choice and belief choice should be understood in this sense.
43

Consonant with this objection, one might say that it is impossible to will to believe anything.
Believing is a matter of conviction, which ipso facto means being convinced. Perhaps, then, the objector
must presume against fideism.
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1.6.3

Aside: the units of epistemology
Even if one allows that theory choice is something that actually occurs, it

may be taken in any of several senses. Return to our imagined rivals Chaulk and
Cheese. A scientist might take Cheese as a guide to further research, even staking
the prospects of her career on how well it fares. Although this is consistent with
her believing Cheese in a strong sense, her commitment might instead reflect the
fact that she only has time enough to pursue one of the two rivals. She realizes
that if she were to split her time then her chance of finding dramatic evidence
relevant to either theory would be greatly reduced. If she were making funding
decisions, perhaps she would divide resources evenly between Chaulk researchers
and Cheese researchers. Her funding decision would depend on whether there were
enough resources to effectively fund both research programmes; the choice for the
community mirrors her own choice in this respect. If theory choice is taken to
include practical choices made to maximize the return on limited resources, like
our scientist’s choice of Cheese, then responsible theory choice is compatible with
the rivals’ being equally plausible.
We should not take this too far. Scientists agreeing on a powerful background theory is not merely an austerity measure adopted in lean times. As Kuhn
tried to show, it is the condition of normal science [Kuh70]. Science progresses best
when there is agreement about a great many things. These grounds of agreement
are, in Kuhn’s account, paradigms. Although paradigm is notoriously a cryptoomnivorous category that is at once over-blown and obscure, there is something
right in the Kuhnian insight. Exclusive selections of a theory, paradigm, or research programme over its rivals are a central feature of science. They may not,
in general, be dismissed as economic conveniences.
Yet we ought not press this Kuhnian point too far, either. As Mill reminds
us, for any strong opinion, “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently,
and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” [Mil74,
pp. 96–97]. Considering scientific knowledge specifically, Mill writes:
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[O]n every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth
depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead of
heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown
why that other theory cannot be the true one; and until this is shown,
and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds
of our opinion. [Mil74, p. 98]44
Note that although Mill thinks that we should discuss our opinions, he thinks that
we may nevertheless form opinions. He does not advocate accepting things only
provisionally and for some projects. It is possible that scientists and perhaps even
the scientific community should pursue certain theories single-mindedly, allowing
that such choices are to be openly debated. There is, no doubt, a balance to be
struck between Kuhnian and Millian concerns— but I will not attempt to strike it
here.
Fully resolving this issue would require a developed enquiry into the units
of epistemology, a catalog of ways in which scientists and the scientific community
can relate to theory. It would detail the possible variations of believing a theory
in relation to accepting it, assuming it, entertaining it, and so on. Providing such
a thing would be a serious undertaking and would lead us far afield of underdetermination. This need for a descriptive epistemology lurks in the shadows behind
what follows. Where I do not mention it, I have endeavoured to assure that the
arguments do not turn on ambiguities. In some places, reflection on underdetermination will yield interesting constraints on the units of epistemology. I leave the
matter until we arrive at those places.

44
It’s possible to read Mill in this passage as invoking worries about underdetermination. I will revisit
Mill’s account of science in §4.3.2.

II

Underdetermination and
Aspirations of Certainty
“I. . . remember having scarlet fever. . . and that was the
first time I really hallucinated. I was in the bedroom, and
I could hear my parents in the kitchen and the refrigerator was blowing up and killing them all. It’s remained
with me, as if I’m still in that room. I still have certain
dreams that cling, which I’d swear are real because my
senses and my whole body seem to have experienced them.
That’s always been the problem, not knowing what’s real
and what isn’t.”
—Terry Gilliam [Chr99, p. 1]
In this chapter, I explore the connection between underdetermination and
scepticism. This exploration has three related, but potentially conflicting aims.
First, I provide a reading of Descartes’ sceptical arguments in the Meditations.
The sceptical scenarios, I suggest, are rivals that underwrite claims of underdetermination. Second, I consider Thomas Reid’s reaction to Cartesian scepticism.
In this regard, it is critical to understand how subsequent thinkers like Reid have
understood Descartes’ arguments. Third, I use Descartes and Reid to illustrate
the contrast between two types of underdetermination. From one starting point,
confronting underdetermination is a winner-take-all, do-or-die struggle for knowledge; from the other, we can begin to distinguish varieties of underdetermination
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and to recognize that different sorts of underdetermination call for different replies.
There is a danger that the historical characters will become idealized when they
are considered as abstract exemplars. Nevertheless, I hope to provide a plausible
interpretation of Descartes and Reid— as far as I can— and I will be explicit where
I self-consciously side-step historical subtleties.
In the Meditations,1 Descartes appeals to underdetermination to motivate
methodological scepticism.2 If we begin in this way, the consequences for epistemology are dire. In the next two sections, I will survey the Cartesian arguments
and their consequences. In the three sections following, I will employ Thomas
Reid’s reply to scepticism as a reply to Cartesian epistemology. I will then argue
that the fate of Cartesian epistemology motivates a different sort of enquiry, one
typified by Reid.

2.1

Cartesian underdetermination
Descartes has the objective of escaping mere opinion and building his

beliefs on the foundation of certain knowledge. He hopes to find some way to
responsibly separate mere belief from certain knowledge, but he quickly admits that
there is no hope trying to scrutinize his beliefs one at a time. Rather, he hopes
to problematize them collectively. Since most of his beliefs come from sensory
experience, he attempts to discredit sensory evidence tout court.
Descartes begins in this way:
Yet although the senses occasionally deceive us with respect to objects
which are very small or in the distance, there are many other beliefs
about which doubt is quite impossible, even though they are derived
from the senses— for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands,
and so on. Again, how could it be denied that these hands or this
whole body are mine? [MFP, AT VII 18]
1

Passages are from the translation in Cottingham, et al. [Des85] (cited as MFP) except where the
translation is my own (cited as MFP†). Page references follow the Adam-Tannery edition.
2
It is almost commonplace to say that Descartes’ arguments amount to claims of underdetermination,
but all but one author that I know of say this only in passing.A singular exception is Stanford [Sta01].
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We may be deceived by the senses under particular circumstances, but there are
some things which would be perceived reliably if anything could be. That is, some
judgements made on the basis of sensory input seem so secure that to discredit
them would be to discredit sensory input as a source of knowledge. Descartes
suggests that the belief that he is sitting by the fire in his dressing gown writing
the Meditations is one such belief. Indeed, if his senses could deceive him about
this, then it seems they could deceive him about anything. Let us call this theory
T1 :
(T1 ) Descartes is sitting by the fire in his dressing gown writing some philosophical
remarks.
Descartes immediately asks what reason he could have for denying this claim.
He frames the question without further discussion, but it is a critical turn in the
argument. He does not attempt to summon up doubt by a willful refusal to believe,
but rather by adducing reasons not to believe. These reasons take a specific form,
the form of explanations of his experience which do not suppose the room, the
fireplace, or any of the objects referred to in T1 . His strategy is to propose rival
theories3 ; he will subsequently argue that the choice between T1 and its rivals is
underdetermined and thus that his assertion of T1 is prima facie unjustified.
Descartes first notes that lunatics assent to crazy things as readily as he
assents to T1 . Perhaps, he suggests, he is one of
the insane, whose brains have been so shaken by a persistent vapour
of black bile that they firmly assert that they are kings when they are
paupers, that they are dressed in purple clothes when they are naked,
that their heads are made of clay, that they are gourds, or that they
are made of glass. [MFP†, AT VII 19]
We may call this T2 :
(T2 ) Descartes’ brain is impaired in some way such that he assents to T1 .
3

In a restrictive sense of ‘theory’ which allows only the sort that practicing scientists would readily
entertain, these are not theories at all. I have argued for a less-restrictive sense in §1.2.1 above, and
‘theory’ is used here to highlight the epistemic analogy with scientific cases. If it is too objectionable,
one might read ‘account’ throughout.
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He quickly dismisses T2 , saying of the insane that “these men are mad,
and I would seem no less mad if I were to take them as my exemplar” [MFP†,
AT VII 19]. In saying this, Descartes rejects T2 as a rival to T1 on the grounds
that he would be mad to accept it. Yet, the very proposal of T2 is that Descartes
is mad. There are, then, two possibilities. If Descartes has sufficient ground
for rejecting T2 , then he has acknowledged a general imperative: Do not believe
madness. This imperative might be used to defuse scepticism, and indeed it is so
used by Thomas Reid. I will return to this point when I take up Reid’s response to
the sceptic (§2.3). Alternatively, if Descartes lacks sufficient ground for rejecting
T2 , then this scenario alone is sufficient to demonstrate that his belief in T1 is
underdetermined. Regardless, Descartes immediately offers another hypothesis,
one which has received more attention.4
Say of lunatics what you will, Descartes suggests, “As if I were not a
man who sleeps at night and regularly has all the same experiences while asleep as
madmen do when awake— indeed sometimes even more improbable ones” [MFP,
AT VII 19]. This we may call T3 :
(T3 ) Descartes is asleep in bed and dreaming that T1 .
Descartes can find no immediate evidence that leads him directly to prefer T1 over
T3 ; he adds, “I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which
being awake can be distinguished from being asleep” [MFP, AT VII 19]. From
this underdetermination, Descartes concludes “that physics, astronomy, medicine,
and all the other disciplines which depend on the study of composite things, are
doubtful. . .” [MFP, AT VII 20]. On the basis of the dream argument, Descartes
offers an answer to the question which ultimately interests us here: What is the
status of scientific claims in light of concerns about underdetermination? Dubious,
Descartes says.
4
Although commentators such as Popkin have not recognized the argument from madness as a separate
sceptical scenario [Pop60, pp. 199-200], this point is noted by contemporaries of Descartes (such as
Bourdin, in the Seventh Objections [MFP, AT VII 457]) and recent scholars (such as Janet Broughton
[Bro02, pp. 21–2]).
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Cogito
ergo sum.

Figure 2.1: Was Descartes imagining that he was dreaming or dreaming that he
was awake? How could he tell?
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Pressing the point further, Descartes suggests that everything he seems
to perceive might be presented to him by God or some evil demon. Call this T4 :5
(T4 ) Descartes is deceived by some malevolent agent into believing that T1 .
This sort of scenario, Descartes thinks, is sufficient to cast doubt on empirical
science and even mathematics. Although the evil demon has often been understood
as a straight-forward sceptical argument, it is important to note that Descartes
posits “some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning” [MFP, AT VII
22–3] only after concluding that all his beliefs are open to doubt [AT VII 21–
2]. Descartes’ original scenario comes as a dilemma: If there were an omnipotent
creator God, then it would be within God’s power to deceive him. If there were not,
then he is the product of some imperfect thing and so must be that much further
from perfect knowledge. It is possible, then, to distinguish two sceptical scenarios:
that Descartes is deceived by some powerful agency (T4 ) and that Descartes is the
product of imperfect processes that have left him erroneously believing things like
T1 (what Broughton calls “the ‘fate or chance’ argument” [Bro02, p. 22]). After
considering this dilemma, Descartes introduces the evil demon as a heuristic to
keep himself from sliding back into ungrounded belief. He does think the heuristic
is sufficient for that task, and so the evil demon was later seen as a cornerstone of
Cartesian scepticism.
On the basis of the sceptical scenarios, Descartes concludes,
I. . . am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former
beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised; and this is not
a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but is based on powerful and
well thought-out reasons. So in future I must withhold my assent from
these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from obvious falsehoods,
if I want to discover any certainty. [MFP, AT VII 21–2]
This is a strong conclusion and turns on the implicit methodological premise that
we should suspend belief in the face of any underdetermination.
5
I have expressed T4 in such a way as to include 20th-century brain-in-a-vat and Neo-in-the-Matrix
scenarios along with deceiving Gods and evil demons.
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Before turning to the consequences of methodological scepticism, we should
specify the scope of Cartesian underdetermination. We who are not Descartes may
easily decide between T1 and T3 , for instance. We need only look at him and see
if he is awake or asleep. The “I” of the Meditations is not strictly Descartes, of
course, and the reader is invited to imagine similar rival theories. Consider the
theory U1 :
(U1 ) You are now reading a dissertation on the subject of underdetermination.
Now let U2 , U3 , and U4 be defined just as T2 , T3 , and T4 above, substituting
yourself for Descartes and U1 for T1 . You are as impotent to decide between U ’s
as Descartes was to decide between T ’s. The scope of underdetermination for
particular rival theories of this type is thus in some sense rather narrow. It holds
only for a particular querist enjoying particular experiences. Nevertheless, given
an agent, the arguments give us procedures for constructing rival theories such that
underdetermination confronts that agent in the circumstances the agent actually
faces.

2.2

From scepticism to quietism
Famously, Descartes scepticism is methodological— it’s meant as an in-

strument for discerning what he should believe, rather than as real and abiding
doubt. And so he claims to escape scepticism by the end of the Meditations. Each
of T1 –T4 entail Descartes’ existence, thus although he cannot know which is true he
can know that he exists. From this knowledge, by a train of reasoning, he claims
to prove the existence of a good and perfect God. Since this God is no deceiver,
Descartes explains,
Despite the high degree of doubt and uncertainty involved here, the
very fact that God is not a deceiver, and the consequent impossibility
of there being any falsity in my opinions which cannot be corrected by
some other faculty supplied by God, offers me a sure hope that I can
attain the truth even in these matters. [MFP, AT VII 80]
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To see how this defuses underdetermination, suppose Descartes assents to T1 . If T1
is true, the sceptical worries were unfounded. Conversely, if T1 is false then God
must have provided Descartes with some way of discovering its falsehood. Since
Descartes could determine T1 to be false, its rivalry with T3 (say) becomes the
less potent form of underdetermination which can be resolved by mere persistence.
The scope narrows to the point that he will be able to escape it. Obviously T1
must be either true or false, and in either case the underdetermination is defused.
Descartes does not stop at defusing underdetermination; he further uses
it to separate claims according to how reliably we may know them. Descartes
hopes to have shown that one’s knowledge that oneself exists and that there is a
perfect God are not vulnerable to underdetermination in the same way as one’s
knowledge of other things and, further, that one’s knowledge of the external world
is underdetermined relative to sceptical scenarios (like the dream hypothesis) which
are insufficient to undercut one’s knowledge of mathematics. This allows Descartes
to construct a hierarchy of claims. Cogito and Deus are known with immediate
certainty, mathematics with less immediacy, and empirical science with still less
certainty. In this light, we can understand Descartes’ remark in the Synopsis that
the arguments of the Meditations are not valuable because of what they prove—
. . .namely that there really is a world, and that human beings have
bodies and so on— since no sane person has ever seriously doubted
these things. The point is that in considering these arguments we come
to realize that they are not as solid or as transparent as the arguments
which lead us to knowledge of our own minds and of God, so that
the latter are the most certain and evident of all possible objects of
knowledge. . . . [MFP, AT VII 15–6]
It may seem from this remark as if Descartes is not about to take scepticism
seriously, as if the underdetermination and radical doubt only serve as a heuristic
for revealing the hierarchy of knowledge. Even if this is the better reading of
Descartes, he has often been read as taking scepticism seriously. My concern here
is with that perhaps imagined Descartes who has influenced so much subsequent
philosophy.
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Yet even in this passage where Descartes admits that the argument against
underdetermination is not “as solid or as transparent” as arguments for claims
higher in the resulting hierarchy, he does not suggest that the arguments are insufficient for the task. That is, he still supposes that the arguments do prove that the
world exists, even if he feels no obligation to prove that conclusion. In the First
Meditation, Descartes does not stop when he notes that no person doubts the existence of the world, but instead offers sceptical scenarios to motivate doubt. If these
doubts are hard to take seriously, he says, it is because beliefs about the external
world are like pleasant dreams from which we are loathe to be woken [MFP, AT
VII 23]. Thus, the rhetoric in the body of the Meditations suggests that Descartes
took scepticism seriously and believed he had an answer to it. Descartes appeals to
putative underdetermination to argue for a hierarchy of things we can know— that
much is clear— but I do not insist on the reading of Descartes on which underdetermination motivates serious scepticism against the reading on which scepticism
is invoked as a foil but never treated as a serious threat. Resolving that question
would require historical scholarship beyond my ken and would lead us away from
the thread I hope to tease out.
Questions of what Descartes actually thought to one side, he has often
been read as an earnest sceptic. Reading him in this way and balking at the
epistemological centrality of a benevolent God, subsequent writers have charged
Descartes with providing no way out of First Meditation underdetermination. If
we refuse to believe anything that cannot be proven beyond all doubt, then we
will in the end believe nothing. It is commonplace to insist that methodological
scepticism taken seriously matures into real scepticism. Descartes’ contemporaries,
nouveaux Pyrrhoniens such as Mersenne and Gassendi,
showed over and over again that the standard sceptical difficulties could
be raised against the constructive achievements of Descartes, and, using
the Cartesian method of doubt, everything that appeared after the
cogito could be challenged. Descartes had either taken scepticism too
seriously, or not seriously enough. He had either inadvertently joined
their number, or he had not established his philosophy on a foundation
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so solid that it could not be shaken by some of the standard gambits
from the arsenal of Sextus Empiricus. [Pop60, p. 213]
The sentiment voiced by Mersenne and Gassendi is echoed by contemporary writers as diverse as Philip Kitcher and Paul Ricoeur.6 Kitcher writes: “Sceptics who
insist that we begin from no assumptions are inviting us to play a mug’s game.
Descartes’s lack of success in generating an account of nature that would survive all
possible doubt was in no way the result of deficiencies of intellect or imagination”
[Kit93, p. 135, italics in original]. Ricoeur puts the point this way: “. . .nothing
resists the most fantastic hypothesis, at least as long as one remains within the
problematic defined by the search for a certainty that would be an absolute guarantee against all doubt” [Ric92, p. 16]. On this common reading of Descartes,
eventual scepticism is built into the Cartesian starting point.
Descartes’ admirable aim is to establish something “in the sciences that
would hereafter be firm and lasting” [MFP†, AT VII 17]. He has before given
up beliefs that he had held firmly, so his confidence in a belief is insufficient to
assure that it will last. The very possibility of giving up a belief threatens its
persistence. Thus, he sets out to withhold assent from beliefs wherever possible,
“from opinions which are not certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from
those which are patently false” [MFP, AT VII 18]. There is something odd about
this starting point, something which can perhaps be made clearer by considering
a similar project. Suppose I were to reason in this way:
I have often fallen and scuffed myself in the past. Many of the places
that I supposed were firm ground subsequently slipped or fell out from
under me. From this moment on I refuse to walk any further. I will
examine the matter and not move again until I decide on some step
which I can make without any hesitation whatsoever. Where I can
imagine a misstep, I will not step.
Unless I have reason to believe I am in a minefield, this methodological paralysis
seems wholly unmotivated. My ordinary ways of stepping work well enough, oc6
A great many philosophers between the time of Mersenne and the time of Kitcher have also interpreted Descartes in this way. I discuss Thomas Reid at length below and leave the reader to enumerate
further examples.
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casions when I have fallen notwithstanding. My ordinary ways of believing work
well enough, too, so scepticism seems no more practical than paralysis.
This analogy is too quick. First, it makes too much of moderate success.
My ordinary ways of believing may do well enough, but what is done well enough
for daily life may not stand to stricter tests. Enquiry in general and science in
particular are predicated on the assumption that ordinary ways of believing can
be improved. It is important to note, however, that (unlike the Cartesian method)
typical enquiry begins against a background of ordinary ways of believing and
revises rather than replaces ordinary belief.
Second, the parody of reasoning is unfair to Descartes. He insists, “I
cannot possibly go too far in my distrustful attitude. This is because the task now
in hand does not involve action but merely the acquisition of knowledge” [MFP, AT
VII 22]. Practical belief is not at issue, only theoretical belief. In the Discourse on
Method 7 , Descartes provides “moral rules” which a querist should observe after he
has undertaken but before he has emerged from the method of doubt. Descartes’
first maxim:
. . .to obey the laws and customs of my country, holding constantly to
the religion in which by God’s grace I had been instructed from my
childhood, and governing myself in all other matters according to the
most moderate and least extreme opinions— the opinions commonly
accepted in practice by the most sensible of those with whom I should
have to live. For I had begun at this time to count my own opinions
as worthless, because I wished to submit them all to examination, and
so was sure I could do no better than follow those of the most sensible
men. [DoM, p. 23]
Descartes will continue as an ordinary Frenchman would, even as he attempts to
doubt everything an ordinary Frenchman believes. Thus, methodological scepticism can never ripen into real scepticism. If Descartes cannot escape methodological doubt, he will go on in the French fashion indefinitely.
7

Henceforth, DoM. Numbering follows the pagination of the French original. Passages are from the
translation in Cottingham, et al. [Des85]
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One might worry, since the moral rule is meant to govern matters of
conduct rather than matters of belief, that it is really beside the point.8 The rule,
one might think, reflects abiding doubts about moral knowledge rather than the
doubts about theoretical knowledge that Descartes thinks he lays to rest in MFP.
Yet this suggestion is at odds with Descartes’ own declaration that the moral rules
are a “provisional code” to guide him in the interim between adopting the method
of doubt and emerging from it [DoM, p. 22]. If it was for moral matters that his
method could not settle, then the code would not be provisional. Yet one may
still note the rule governs action and not belief. This is true, but Descartes sees a
connection between action and belief: Our actions reveal our beliefs more reliably
than our own second-order beliefs. I’ll return to this point in §2.4.2.
If we set out as Cartesians and conclude with Mersenne, Gassendi, Kitcher,
Ricoeur, and who-all else that God cannot save us from scepticism, we do not wind
up as sceptics. Instead, if we follow Descartes’ advice, we wind up following the
conventions into which we were raised. Yet we were following these conventions before we ever heard of Descartes! Methodological doubt, if undischarged, ripens into
dogmatic quietism— and what use is an epistemology that leads only to quietism?
Since Descartes thought he could escape scepticism, he did not dwell
on the question of where he would remain if he failed to do so. Nevertheless,
his method prescribes provisional scepticism within the context of the project and
provisional credulity outside of it. If a querist emerges from doubt, she replaces
provisionally-believed popular opinion with a panoply of absolute truths. If she
does not, then she lives as her fellows live and has no resources to critique the
circumstances in which she finds herself.9 Ordinary enquiry may lead to piecemeal
revision of prior beliefs, but Cartesian enquiry is an all-or-nothing affair.
8
9

I am indebted to Don Rutherford and Sam Rickless for making me see the weight of this worry.
At least, no resources from her unfinished Cartesian enquiries.
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2.3

Thomas Reid’s appeal to Common Sense
If we are to steer between scepticism and quietism, we must escape the

problematic of the First Meditation. This section begins by examining Thomas
Reid’s response to Descartes and the Cartesian system.10 Reid identifies his target
explicitly as “the Cartesian system” [Inq, ch. 7, p. 204]. A brief sketch of Reid’s
opening salvo: Reasoning in the Cartesian way allows us to formulate sceptical
arguments that discredit sense perception, but reason is one of our faculties just
as perception is. Each is a way in which we naturally form beliefs. Why should we
trust the faculty of reason if we refuse to trust the faculty of perception? Reason
cannot prove the reliability of our senses, but neither can we observe the reliability
of reason by means of the senses. If we are to trust either, we ought to trust both.
By reason, we believe the consequent of a conditional given the conditional and its antecedent. By Common Sense, we believe that there are men in the
street when we see them emerge from a coach. Each warrants beliefs in a certain
way, and neither can do the work of the other. Reid uses the phrase ‘Common
Sense’ to mean these faculties besides reason— our senses, our memory, and so on.
Reid insists that the belief in an external world is something he is led to
as “the immediate effect of his constitution” [Inq, ch. 6 §20, p. 183]. He explains:
The sceptic asks me, Why do you believe the existence of the external
object which you perceive? This belief, sir, is none of my manufacture;
it came from the mint of Nature; it bears her image and superscription;
and, if it is not right, the fault is not mine: I even took it upon trust,
and without suspicion. [Inq, ch. 6 §20, p. 183]
He trusts in his faculties, trusts that properly applied they will lead to the truth.
His appeal to “the Almighty” [Inq, ch. 5 §7, p. 127; also ch. 6 §20, 184] may
seem like Descartes’ conclusion that we can trust our faculties because they are
endowed upon us by a benevolent God the creator. Recall that for Descartes this
trust is the conclusion of an argument meant to escape scepticism. Indeed, both
10
Similar responses appear in Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind of 1764 (henceforth Inq) and his
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of 1785 (henceforth EIP). Page references follow Reid’s Philosophical
Works [Rei67].
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Reid and Descartes hold that perception is a source of epistemic authority separate
from reason. However, there are several important differences between them. For
Reid, trust in our faculties comes at the beginning of enquiry. If we do not begin by
placing some trust in our senses, he thinks, we will be impotent against the sceptic.
Descartes supposes that conflicts between perceptions should be adjudicated by
reason, but not the reverse. Reid insists that reason and perception are both to
be trusted and should serve as correctives for one another.
2.3.1

Madness
Clearly with Descartes in mind, Reid says of the sceptic, “though in other

respects he may be a very good man, as a man may be who believes he is made of
glass; yet, surely he hath a soft place in his understanding, and hath been hurt by
much thinking” [Inq, ch. 5 §7, p. 127]. He says elsewhere that while the sceptic is
in ways like a madman, in other ways he does not differ from anyone else:
A remarkable deviation from them [the principles of common sense],
arising from a disorder in the constitution, is what we call lunacy; as
when a man believes that he is made of glass. When a man suffers
himself to be reasoned out of the principles of common sense, by metaphysical arguments, we may call this metaphysical lunacy; which differs
from other species of the distemper in this, that it is not continued, but
intermittent: it is apt to seize the patient in solitary and speculative
moments; but, when he enters into society, Common Sense recovers her
authority.11 [Inq, ch. 7.4, p. 209]
We may call this argument by Reid the argument from madness. Schematically, it
proceeds in this way:
1. Believing P would be mad.
2. Therefore, (one should believe) not-P .
11

Reid makes this point in the context of considering Cartesian doubt explicitly: “Can any man prove
that his consciousness may not deceive him? No man can; nor can we give a better reason for trusting
it, than that every man, while his mind is sound, is determined, by the constitution of his nature, to give
implicit belief to it, and to laugh at or pity the man who doubts its testimony” [Inq, ch. 1 §3, p. 100].
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Figure 2.2: Reid argues that a serious sceptic would be as mad as a man who
thought he was a gourd.
As I argued above, if Descartes is serious that the existence of madmen is no
ground for doubt, then he is committed to the maxim that one ought not emulate
madmen.12 This maxim legitimizes the argument against madness and, Reid suggests, is enough to quash hyperbolic doubt. The Cartesian may freely admit that
the existence of madmen does constitute grounds for doubt, but this means that
if the method of doubt is to be motivated at all, we need nothing so grandiose as
the evil demon scenario.
One may object: ‘Madness’ is familiar in a pejorative use, applied to
views that we find uncongenial— views which we judge are not to be believed. As
such, insofar as the argument is valid the ‘one should believe’ in the conclusion
is more about social acceptability than about epistemic justification. It is more
12

One might extrapolate a similar maxim from his statement in the Synopsis that the arguments are
not interesting for what they prove, since no sane person would doubt the conclusion [MFP, AT VII
15–6, cited above].
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like ‘one should not chew with one’s mouth open’ than ‘one should not believe a
contradiction.’ Even if we could make out the argument as one we would want to
endorse, the sceptic is free to deny its validity. He need not pay any great price to
deny inferences of this form. If the sceptic lives without incurring sanction from
the community, then his is a benign form of madness and this argument would be
insufficient to shake him from it.
2.3.2

Cognitive commitment
This observation points us toward a different strand of Reid’s argument.

He suggests that by accepting the authority of reason, the Cartesian accepts the
authority of our natural faculties. If one is in the business of accepting the authority of natural faculties, and if one concedes that perception is one of the natural
faculties, then it makes no sense to attempt radical doubt with respect to the
perceivable world. The Cartesian might deny that accepting reason demands accepting the authority of other faculties, but giving reason this special status is
notoriously difficult to motivate.13
Reid’s argument here might be seen as an instance of a general argument
form. Let’s call it the argument from cognitive commitment. Schematically, we
may express it in this way:
1. You accept judgments A, B, C . . . because they are justified by inferential
form F .
2. The contentious claim P is underwritten by F .
3. You should accept P or reject A, B, C . . .
Parity of reasoning arguments follow this same structure. As is often observed,
however, one man’s modus ponens is another man’s reductio— the matter turns on
13

Fallibility cannot be what raises reason above perception— we often make mistakes in reasoning,
too. As Reid says, “Our senses, our memory, and our reason, are all limited and imperfect— this is the
lot of humanity” [EIP, ess. 1 ch. 22, p.335]. Even Descartes notoriously seems to admit that T4 should
undermine our confidence in reason and inference.
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whether P is verum or absurdum. If Reid’s diagnosis is correct and the Cartesian
sceptic accepts reason on the grounds that it is a natural faculty, then the sceptic
is faced with a choice of either accepting the senses on the grounds that they too
are a natural faculty or rejecting even reason.14
The argument from cognitive commitment doesn’t issue in a categorical
conclusion. It is not a direct proof and it lacks deductive certainty. Instead, it is
like a relative consistency proof. In set theory, mathematicians prove that ZFC is
consistent if ZF is consistent, but they cannot prove that ZFC is consistent tout
court.15 Most do in fact believe that ZF is consistent, but Gödel’s incompleteness
theorem shows that there can be no direct proof of its consistency. Similarly, Reid
argues that we should trust our senses if we trust our reason, but that does not
show that we should trust our reason. Reid does in fact trust both, but admits
that there is no proof that we should trust either.
I argued at the end of §2.2 that Descartes’ method, employed thoroughly,
ends not in doubt but in quietism. Reid escapes doubt, perhaps, but does so by
trusting his faculties. Yet if he trusted whatever he had been taught and exorcised
any spectre of doubt, then he too would end up in quietism. If this were so, Reid
would be no better a model than Descartes. Is this merely dogmatism, preserving
a precious worldview by appeals to Common Sense? I think not. Common Sense,
unlike unrepentant dogmatism, allows room for criticism. Our senses have a positive presumption, in that seeing is grounds for believing, but the presumption is
defeasible. I’ll spend the remainder of this chapter elaborating this middle way
between faith and proof.

2.4

Three further replies to the sceptic
“It has often been argued that absolute scepticism is selfcontradictory; but this is a mistake. . . .[T]here are no such

14

It is possible for the sceptic to claim that reason is to be accepted on different grounds than its status
as a natural faculty, but what other rationale might he offer?
15
ZFC is the theory formed by adding the axiom of choice to the axioms of Zermelo-Frankel (ZF) set
theory.
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beings as absolute sceptics.”
—C.S. Peirce, 1869 [Pei92, p. 56]
As we have seen, Reid’s appeal to Common Sense— construed either as
an argument from madness or as an argument from cognitive commitment— is not
a direct answer to the determined sceptic. He concedes: “Perhaps the sceptic will
agree to distrust reason, rather than give any credit to perception” [Inq, ch. 6 §20,
p. 183]. Although Reid can offer no utterly compelling reasons why the sceptic
should not do this, he goes on to offer three reasons why he and “the sober part
of mankind” would not follow the sceptic in doing so.
First, Reid insists that he is unable to disbelieve all that he perceives.
Even the sceptic, “may struggle hard to disbelieve the informations of his senses,
as a man does to swim against a torrent: but, ah! it is in vain. . . . For, after all,
when his strength is spent in the fruitless attempt, he will be carried down the
torrent with the common herd of believers” [Inq, ch. 6 §20, p. 184]. It is no use
for the sceptic to insist we should doubt everything if it is impossible to do so.
There are more recent arguments as well that scepticism is impossible. Indeed,
I find scepticism to be a psychological trick beyond my ken. Nevertheless, some
people claim to be able to suspend judgement about everything. From what has
been said so far, who am I and who is Reid to argue with their self reports?
Second, Reid suggests that actually doubting the world, were such a thing
possible, would only lead to disaster. Suppose, Reid says, “I resolve not to believe
my senses. I break my nose against a post that comes in my way; I step into a dirty
kennel; and, after twenty such wise rational actions, I am taken up and clapped
in a madhouse” [Inq, ch. 6 §20, p. 184]. There is a commitment in practice to
the existence of an external world that contains many of the snares and pitfalls in
which realists believe.
Third, Reid notes that scepticism about the world can only arise after
many years of living in the world; the doubt is only possible after a long history
of trust. He puts the point this way: “I gave implicit belief to the informations
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of Nature by my senses, for a considerable part of my life, before I had learned so
much logic as to be able to start a doubt concerning them” [Inq, ch. 6 §20, p. 184].
The track record of perception has been good, and without perception we would
never have come so far as to be able to entertain the possibility of doubt. If we
put trust in our critical skills, why not also in the circumstances which fostered
those skills?
If the sceptic persists in doubting after such reasons, Reid thinks that
there is no ultimate argument with which to force assent.
2.4.1

Impotence
In the first of the three further replies, Reid alleges that scepticism is

in some sense impossible. This argument from impotence turns on a psychological
claim. Suppose Reid is right that I am utterly incapable of denying the existence of
an external world. This doesn’t show that my belief in it is justified. Nevertheless,
it does give me a reason to accept that belief.
Consider a parallel case: The fact that perpetual motion is impossible
does not show that I ought not build a perpetual motion machine, in the sense
that it would be wrong for me to do so. It seems plausible to say that neither right
nor wrong attach to building such a machine. Nevertheless, this fact convinces
me that I should not spend time attempting to invent perpetual motion machines,
even though they would be very useful if only they were possible. The force of this
‘ought’ is both rhetorical and rational. If I come to be convinced that perpetual
motion is impossible, I will also come to give up any research into it. Not only will
this reason convince me, it is reasonable for me to be convinced.16
The existence of the external world may be thought of similarly. The
fact that I cannot help but believe in an external world provides me with a reason
not to attempt withholding assent. That said, it remains to be explained how I
16

The argument may be answered by claiming that, whereas this is only a prudential reason, decisions
about what to believe should be made on the basis of epistemic reasons; it may also be rejected for a host
of other reasons. I develop one especially salient objection below and, so doing, leave others undeveloped.
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can know which beliefs I cannot help but accept. Some people claim to be able to
withhold assent from the belief in an external world. Perhaps such gifted sceptics
are different from the rest of us, but how could we know? Other people at other
times have claimed that they could not but believe other, more controversial things.
Perhaps the devout interlocutor will say that it is impossible not to believe in God,
or the mathematically-retrograde interlocutor will say that it is impossible to deny
the truth of the parallel postulate. Not only would I insist that it is in my power
to doubt these things, I would suggest that their assessment of their own abilities
reflects only a lack of imagination or determination. It is open to the sceptic to
give the same reply, insisting that Reid’s belief that he cannot doubt the existence
of the world reflects only a lack of imagination.
The argument from impotence fails, then, not for a lack of rhetorical or
justificatory force. Instead, the problem is that it turns on a premise about some
matter of fact. Worse, this matter of fact is of a sort that is difficult to establish
and of a sort that— we observe easily enough— people are apt to get wrong. Any
interlocutor may respond to the argument from impotence merely by denying the
premise, and after they have done so there is little more to be said.
2.4.2

Practice
In the second of the three further replies, Reid insists that sincere scepti-

cism would undercut practical engagement with the world and thus suggests that
the so-called sceptic betrays a belief in the real world by managing his affairs just
as common folk do. We have already seen a prepared Cartesian reply to this argument: Methodological doubt is about belief but not about action. Following
Descartes’ methods, one would navigate the world just as believers do even before emerging from doubt [DoM, p. 23]. Reid anticipates such a reply, however,
insisting: “If a man pretends to be a sceptic with regard to the informations of
sense, and yet prudently keeps out of harm’s way as other men do, he must excuse
my suspicion, that he either acts the hypocrite, or imposes upon himself” [Inq,

59
ch. 6 §20, p. 184]. Surprisingly, Descartes makes a similar point. Discussing how
to decide what his countrymen believe, he writes:
I thought too that in order to discover what opinions they really held I
had to attend to what they did rather than what they said. . . .[M]any
people do not know what they believe, since believing something and
knowing that one believes it are different acts of thinking, and the one
often occurs without the other. [DoM, p. 23]
We should judge people by their actions, Descartes suggests, because their actions
most reveal what they believe. It is hard to see how he could assert this but deny
Reid’s suggestion that the ordinary practices of people who are able to navigate
the world indicate that they know their way around in the world and that they
believe that there is a world.
This argument from practical commitment issues in a conditional conclusion much as the argument from cognitive commitment does. The sceptic may
challenge the form of the inference, of course, by arguing that behaving much as
common folk do does not suppose believing as common folk do. Perhaps some
sense could be made out of the sceptical lifestyle which does not presuppose an
implicit belief in the external world, but it doesn’t look as if even Descartes would
allow for such a possibility. If a sceptic concedes that her practice implies certain
beliefs, then she is left with a choice of abstaining from her practice or accepting
the beliefs. The argument from practical commitment cannot force her choice, but
it makes her pay a higher price if she remains a sceptic.17
2.4.3

Cognitive commitment— a variant
In the last of the three further replies, Reid observes that sceptics lived as

ordinary folk for many years and their scepticism can only be motivated in light of
things they had learned in the course of ordinary life. The very observations which
motivate scepticism come from trusting memory and the senses. This variant of
17

Although applied here against scepticism, the argument from practice is quite general; cf. the
discussion of constructive empiricism in §3.1.3.
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Figure 2.3: Reid argues that the sceptic, were he determined and consistent, would
meet with tragedy.
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the argument from cognitive commitment leaves the Cartesian sceptic in a bind.
Descartes says that there are madmen, that he has dreamed, and so on. Without
these observations, he cannot make the case for underdetermination. Without
the underdetermination, why distrust the senses rather than trusting them? The
arguments of the First Meditation are meant to make the case for methodological
scepticism, not to presume it!18 Absent such an argument, we trust perception
as prima facie warrant to believe in the things perceived. In appealing to our
past experience with dreams, Descartes implicitly asks us to trust our memory
and senses— but our belief as to whether we are awake or dreaming will only be
underdetermined if we give up trusting our senses once the rival hypotheses are
spelled out.

2.5

Standards and Common Sense
Reid’s arguments will provide no comfort to the Cartesian, since Descartes

is not merely trying to determine what he should believe. As both Kitcher and
Ricoeur observe, it is the Cartesian standard which makes scepticism inescapable
(citations in §2.2, above). Descartes wants to know what he can believe with certainty, what he can believe without risk of needing to revise his beliefs, what he
can know infallibly, and what he can know to be true without any antecedent commitments. These desiderata are distinct, but it seems fair to say that Descartes
pursues them all. It’s essential to distinguish the Cartesian desiderata in an attempt to find which among them traps the Cartesian in scepticism. The fault of
Cartesian epistemology, we will see, is that it trusts nothing.
18

One might instead think that for Descartes methodological scepticism is presumed. The sceptical
scenarios would then serve as exercises to help us shake off our obdurate belief in an external world,
rather than as arguments to convince us that we should shake it off. Regardless of what Descartes’
intention might have been, Reid and many later commentators see the sceptical scenarios as arguments
for scepticism.
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2.5.1

Certainty
Blaming Descartes’ standard for the bind Cartesianism gets us into is not

enough, because Descartes has a number of motivations and his standards might
be explicated in several different ways. The problem is the insistence on certainty
in some sense, but certainty is a difficult notion to pin down. Let us ask instead
what distinguishes Descartes’ standards from Reid’s.
First try: Both Kitcher and Ricoeur suggest that Descartes’ error was
in searching for beliefs that could survive all doubt. Yet, as the discussion of
the argument from impotence showed, even Reid thought that there were some
claims which we could not doubt. Whether there are such claims is ultimately an
empirical question about human psychology which might go either way, for all one
can say a priori. Descartes might have gone astray insofar as he saw inability to
doubt as the touchstone of truth, but that criterion might point towards or away
from scepticism. It is not yet the rotten core of the Cartesian standard.
Second try: The Cartesian standard demands contributions that will
“hereafter be firm and lasting” [MFP†, AT VII 17, cited above]. Yet Reid also
thinks that some elements of science will remain in place indefinitely; he writes
that mechanics, astronomy, and optics are “really sciences built upon laws of nature which universally obtain. What is discovered in them is no longer a matter
of dispute: future ages may add to it; but, till the course of nature be changed,
what is already established can never be overturned” [Inq, ch. 1 §3, pp. 99–100].
Rhetoric about parts of science that will remain unchanged reflects an overly strong
conception of scientific progress, but that conception of progress does not entail
scepticism. Just as we may have reason now to believe some proposition P , we
might have reason now to believe “We will always have sufficient grounds to believe
P .” Call this latter claim BP . Believing BP doesn’t mean we must ignore legitimate reasons to stop believing P , should they arise— and those reasons would be
reasons to stop believing BP , too. Whether we should believe BP for any P is an

63
empirical question.19 Again, we must look further.
Another try: The Cartesian standard demands infallibility; claims must
be such that they could not possibly be false. Reid insists, contrawise, “human
judgements ought always to be formed with an humble sense of our fallibility in
judging” [EIP, ess. 7 ch. 4, p 485]. It is now commonplace to observe that none of
our judgements is infallible— that anything we do believe might, in the end, prove
false. It is possible to infer fallible knowledge from fallible premises, but infallible
knowledge requires either infallible premises or— better still— no premises at all.
The aspect of the Cartesian standard that Reid rejects most centrally, I suggest,
is the aim to secure knowledge that relies in no way on our prior commitments.
There are certain things we must trust, Reid insists, and no good epistemology can
begin from systematic mistrust.
2.5.2

Trust
There is a certain paranoia in the Cartesian standard.20 The senses do

sometimes mislead us— this is uncontroversial— but Descartes writes that “from
time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust
completely those who have deceived us even once” [MFP, AT VII 18]. Yet trust
is rarely, if ever, a matter of trusting completely; to trust our senses is merely to
take (e.g.) seeing something as a prima facie ground for believing it is as we see
it. ‘Seeing is believing’ is at best a ceteris paribus law. In this way, a modicum
of unreliability is compatible with trust. Consider, as an analogy, that I trust my
officemate, Ryan; if he says Q then I take that as grounds for believing Q. If he were
systematically wrong about certain sorts of things, I would stop trusting him on
those matters; I have learned not to trust his taste in movies, for instance.21 Were
he in error merely about some one claim or other, then I would not cease to trust
19
Since BP entails P , we should probably never be more confident of the former than we are of the
latter.
20
As Nick Jolley once suggested to me, “There is something neurotic about Cartesian empistemology.”
21
The subjectivity of taste is not the issue. I have learned not to believe him when he says that I will
enjoy some movie or other.
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him. I have had a longer acquaintance with my senses than I have had with Ryan,
and I trust them even though they sometimes mislead me. Reid himself makes the
analogy between our trust in reliable witnesses and our trust in our senses, between
testimony in the literal sense and the testimony of the senses [Inq, ch. 6 §24, pp.
194–200]. The Cartesian standard is overly strict not merely because it demands
certainty, but also because it forbids placing real trust in anything. Trust, both in
observation and in other scientists, plays a critical rôle in scientific enquiry.22
Despite the shipwreck of Cartesianism, the history of epistemology is filled
with projects organized around strict standards. Kant, for instance, aims to establish a system which will persist in an “unchangeable state” [Kan96, p. Bxxxviii].
Without such a system, Kant argues in a famous passage,
there always remains this scandal for philosophy and human reason
in general: that we have to accept merely on faith the existence of
things outside us (even if they provide us with all the material we have
for cognition, even those of our inner sense); and that, if it occurs to
someone to doubt their existence, we have no satisfactory proof with
which to oppose him. (p. Bxxxix fn., italics in original)
Reid offers a way of answering the sceptic which is neither a strict proof nor an
appeal to mere faith. If we are to be satisfied with this, however, we must admit
that where it leaves us is no scandal for philosophy.
Reid’s argument begins with the observation that reason and perception
are natural faculties and, as such, merit prima facie credence. Descartes denies
this, or at least seems to deny it, when he adopts the method of doubt. Reid
explains:
If a sceptic should build his scepticism upon this foundation, that all
our reasoning and judging powers are fallacious in their nature, or
should resolve at least to withhold assent until it be proved that they
are not, it would be impossible by argument to beat him out of this
stronghold; and he must even be left to enjoy his scepticism.23 [EIP,
ess. 6 ch. 5.7, p. 447]
22

See the work of Steve Shapin, e.g. [Sha94].
Reid applies the point to Descartes in the passage immediately following the one quoted here. He
quickly interweaves it with the argument from impotence, making it easy to mistake for another instance
of that same argument.
23
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The point here is not that scepticism is impossible. Rather, scepticism involves
an unreasonable standard of evidence: Assent should be withheld from a belief
until it can be proven infallibly. Reid admits to the sceptic that this standard of
evidence, applied consistently, demands withholding assent from any belief whatsoever. What Reid suggests is an alternative standard of evidence: Beliefs formed
on the basis of natural faculties such as reason, perception, memory, and so on
should be given a positive presumption of truth. When we reason to a conclusion
that we have no other grounds to reject, we accept the argument. When we see a
cat sitting on a table and have no reason to suspect dreams or animatronics, we
accept that there is a cat. If indeed these are our natural faculties, this is an obvious standard. As Reid puts it, we trust our faculties. How could we do otherwise?
How else would we form beliefs besides the ways in which we form beliefs?
This argument, rather than being merely psychological or practical, is
fundamentally rational. It involves a claim about how one should responsibly
apportion belief and doubt. To make this clearer, consider how this argument
may be deployed to resolve underdetermination. As you have the experiences
you are having now, you might believe that you are reading my dissertation, that
it is the torment of some evil demon, or whatever else; you may believe any of
the theories {U1 , U2 , U3 , U4 } as defined in §2.1. No subsequent experience could
convince you beyond all possible doubt of U1 rather than U4 .24 So, the scope
of this underdetermination takes in all evidence that you might ever collect. Reid
accepts this exposition, in effect, but argues that Descartes has presumed an unfair
standard of what should count as a responsible decision between rival theories.
Recall from the previous chapter that to specify a case of underdetermination we must specify a set of rival theories and a scope over which decision
between the rivals is underdetermined, but also a standard for what would count as
responsible decision. As Reid admits, it is always possible for a sceptic to insist on
the strictest standard. In such a case, it will not be possible to dislodge the scep24

Here discounting the argument from impotence.
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tic with rational arguments alone— what counts as reasonable is just one of the
things in dispute! By appealing to the sceptic’s own commitments, both practical
and cognitive, Reid tries to show that the sceptic ought not accept such a strict
standard. The commitments serve as an arational starting point. It might be nice
to make a stronger reply than this, since the sceptic is always free to struggle in
an effort to throw off these prior commitments. What would a stronger reply be
like? We could argue that the sceptic’s struggle is doomed to failure, but this is a
claim about the sceptic’s incapacities. This claim itself relies on a matter of fact
about which it is possible to be sceptical. We could instead argue that the sceptic
should in some binding sense accept these commitments, but that proof will itself
suppose a standard of proof. Not only are Reid’s arguments workable tools, then,
but we would be hard-pressed to find better ones.
With a standard by which we trust in neither any beliefs nor any processes
of belief formation, underdetermination is ubiquitous and uniform. It may be
formulated as a worry about madness, dreaming, or demonic deception, but the
epistemic upshot is the same in any case. Only relative to a different standard will
it be possible to say anything else about underdetermination. The standard need
not be too liberal, it need only allow for appeal to some of our prior commitments.
Although they can be applied widely, Reid-style arguments will not always be applicable. It may be that there are no commitments shared by disputants
that are sufficient to settle the dispute. This shouldn’t be a reason for despair. As
Reid shows, the commitments can be very general and need not be controversial of
themselves. Thus, the strategy holds out hope for resolving cases of underdetermination in science. Scientists, as scientists, share a host of commitments. Indeed, as
an agent engaged in satisfying her human needs, a New York cabby shares many
commitments with an Azande tribesman. Although these considerations cannot
in principle settle all disputes, they may go a long way toward settling actual disputes among actual people. They may be short-circuited if some people give up the
pivotal commitments, but actual people would not do so with the same willingness
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as imagined sceptics; these things are commitments, after all, just because people
are antecedently committed to them.

III

Top-Down Arguments
“Mr. Palomar has not yet managed to understand. The
explanations offered are all a bit dubious, conditioned
by hypotheses, wavering among various alternatives; and
this is only natural, since these are rumors that pass from
mouth to mouth, while science, which should confirm or
deny them, is apparently uncertain, approximate. Things
being as they are, then, Mr. Palomar has decided to
confine himself to watching, to establishing down to the
slightest detail what little he sees, sticking to the immediate ideas that what he sees suggests.”
—Mr. Palomar, Italo Calvino [pp. 61–2]
This chapter is concerned with top-down arguments that begin with
universal underdetermination and move to object lessons about science. Often,
philosophers are presumed to have provided compelling arguments for underdetermination. An author may write that some other author has demonstrated that
all theory choice is underdetermined, and the present author draws out epistemic
consequences of this result. The critical moment of these arguments is the part all
too often relegated to a reference in a footnote. What sort of inference justifies the
claim that all theory choice is underdetermined? What features is the allegedly
ubiquitous underdetermination going to have?
Several families of top-down arguments merit attention. The first alleges
that every scientific theory has empirically equivalent rivals such that neither the
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theory nor the rivals may be justifiably believed. Cartesian sceptical arguments
are members of this family, and another member appears vividly in debates over
constructive empiricism. The Cartesian menace was met in the previous chapter;
in §3.1, I will develop Reid’s replies to Descartes as resources against the constructive empiricist. Then a more general discussion of empirical equivalence is in
order (§3.2). A second family of top-down arguments appeals to the interpretative
flexibility of theories in an aim to show that they can never be unproblematically
confirmed or disconfirmed. These arguments are usually attributed to Duhem and
Quine. The flexibility may come from reliance on auxiliary assumptions (§3.3) or
from the possibility of meaning change (§3.4). A third family of argument rests on
the possibility of denying recalcitrant observations (§3.5).

3.1

From underdetermination to empiricism
Contemporary constructive empiricism is motivated by a worry about

underdetermination. Admittedly, the founding and most well-known constructive
empiricist— Bas van Fraassen— rarely appeals to ‘underdetermination’ explicitly.
Yet, other authors have noted his implicit reliance on underdetermination (e.g.,
Churchland [Chu85, p. 37] and Kukla [Kuk98, p. 59]), and van Fraassen himself
does mention it in key places (viz., [van80, p. 59] and [van85, p. 248]). In the
next section, I will sketch the constructive empiricist’s use of underdetermination.
In the two subsequent sections, I apply two of Thomas Reid’s answers to the
sceptic as answers to the constructive empiricist. The constructive empiricist’s
underdetermination is one species of the genus empirical equivalence; much of
what is to be said about constructive empiricism will carry over directly to the
discussion of empirical equivalence that follows after it.

70
3.1.1

Constructive empiricism
Scientific theories describe a world that has observable parts and unob-

servable parts. We can check a theory’s account of the former by direct observation,
but the latter are more esoteric. We might say, on the basis of our observation,
that the theory is empirically adequate, that it correctly renders the observable
part of the world. We might say instead that the theory is true, that the whole
theory matches up to the world. The latter claim is much stronger than the former, so as a matter of elementary probability theory the latter is generally less
probable. Thus, there is a risk involved in believing that the theory is true that
is not involved in believing that it is empirically adequate.1 Rationality does not
define exactly how risk-tolerant we should be, so it does not fix whether we should
believe the theory or believe only that it is empirically adequate. Van Fraassen
is careful not to say that belief in unobservable entities is irrational, but rather
he says that it is not compelled by rationality. Thus, he thinks, he is within the
bounds of reason in refusing to believe in them.
The constructive empiricist accepts but does not believe scientific theories.
Acceptance in this sense involves cognitive and practical components. Cognitively,
it involves belief that theories are empirically adequate— that the theory holds of
the entities that have been observed, and also that it will hold of entities observed
in the future. Practically, it involves the commitment to use the theory as a guide
for future research, to employ the resources of the theory in guiding action, and so
on. Van Fraassen explains:
While the only belief involved in acceptance. . . is the belief that the
theory is empirically adequate, more than belief is involved. To accept
a theory is to make a commitment, a commitment to the further confrontation of new phenomena within the framework of that theory, a
commitment to a research programme, and a wager that all relevant
phenomena can be accounted for without giving up that theory. . . .
Commitments are not true or false; they are vindicated or not vindicated in the course of human history. [van80, p. 88]
1
For this reason, Teller refers to van Fraassen’s use of underdetermination as “ ‘the pointless epistemic
risk’ argument” [Tel01, p. 128].
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If van Fraassen is right, standards of responsible belief underdetermine belief—
the scope for this underdetermination includes all observationally possible circumstances. (Observational possibility is hard to define, but allow it for the nonce.
I return to the issue below.) It is permissible to believe that a theory T is true,
but similarly permissible to believe only that it is empirically adequate. The set
of rivals thus at least contains ‘T is true’ and ‘T is empirically adequate.’ Note,
as van Fraassen is well aware, that we can add the further rival: ‘T has been empirically adequate so far.’ The underdetermination remains between these three
rivals. Rationality, van Fraassen thinks, permits but does not compel believing
any of the three. Thus, if van Fraassen is correct, it is just as reasonable to believe
only that the theory has been correct about observables as it is to believe that it
will be correct. Thus, one might permissibly be a sceptic about all things except
phenomena that have actually confronted us. Given that scepticism is permitted
on this view, we may expect Thomas Reid’s replies to the sceptic to apply here.
Indeed, the arguments from cognitive commitment and practice can readily be
pressed into service against constructive empiricism.2
The argument from cognitive commitment, recall, appeals to grounds of
justification that the sceptical interlocutor already accepts, if only implicitly, and
aims to show that those principles support the contentious beliefs. (See §2.3.2
in the previous chapter.) The rhetorical aim is to make the interlocutor choose
between his scepticism and the inferential commitment. Against the constructive
empiricist, the aim is to show that reasonable inference principles do lead to belief
in unobservables and that standards of theory choice don’t allow as much slack as
the empiricist thinks they do. A general argument of this form has entered recent
literature touted as the Galilean Strategy. I take this up in §3.1.2.
The argument from practice maintains that the interlocutor who acts for
all the world as if he believed certain things should be taken as believing them.
(See §2.4.2 in the previous chapter.) Indeed, if the empiricist makes every practical
2

The arguments from madness and impotence might be applied, but would be vulnerable to the same
objections here as when applied to Cartesian scepticism.
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decision just as if a theory were true— really true— then one should be dubious
of his alleged agnosticism. He must excuse our suspicion “that he either acts the
hypocrite, or imposes upon himself” [Rei67, p. 184]. I treat this more carefully in
§3.1.3.
3.1.2

Cognitive commitment and the Galilean Strategy
In Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy 3 , Philip Kitcher offers a defense

of realism from nearly half-a-dozen arguments against it. Against constructivists
and empiricists, on matters both semantic and epistemic, he deploys the Galilean
Strategy— a move to show that methods of settling questions about unobjectionable, observable matters should be relied on to settle questions about controversial,
unobservable matters.4 I approach the Strategy here as a response to constructive
empiricism, but concerns explored below may be raised with respect to the rest.
Kitcher outlines an argument from empiricist premises to the rejection
of methods that putatively inform us about unobservables: We should only rely
on methods that we can check independently. We can only check matters that we
can observe. So, we should only rely on methods insofar as they inform us about
observables. Therefore, we should remain agnostic about conclusions regarding
unobservables.5 Cast in different terms, the argument is aimed to show that beliefs
about unobservables are underdetermined in a way that beliefs about observables
are not because methods for fixing beliefs about unobservables cannot be checked.
Kitcher notes that this argument has a long pedigree and sees Bas van
Fraassen as its contemporary champion. [RR, p. 166 fn. 27] In a recent paper, van
Fraassen writes the following:
If you see a reflection of a tree in the water, you can also look at the
tree and gather information about the geometric relations between the
tree, the reflection, and your vantage point. The invariances in those
3

[Kit01a], henceforth RR. This section is, in its essentials, my [Mag].
He also develops the Galilean Strategy in less detail elsewhere; cf. [Kit01b, ch. 2].
5
Kitcher calls this argument EEA. He provides the argument in six steps, but nothing here turns on
my truncating it as I have done. [RR, pp. 161–2]
4
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relations are precisely what warrant the assertion that the reflection
is a picture of the tree. If you say similarly about the microscope’s
images that they are pictures of e.g. paramecia, then you are asserting
that there are certain invariant geometric relations between the object,
image, and vantage point. But now you are postulating that these
relations hold, rather than gathering information about whether that
is so. [van01, p. 160]
This is not yet an anti-realist conclusion. To show that we ought not believe in
paramecia, one would need to show that we ought not postulate paramecia— something van Fraassen does not try to show. Rather than claiming that postulating
paramecia is irrational, van Fraassen insists that it is not compelled by rationality.
We may believe in paramecia or we may remain agnostic, as we choose. The former
exposes us to the risk of being wrong when we might have avoided error, and the
latter exposes us to the risk of not believing a truth that we might have believed.
As William James observes, our obligations to gather truth and avoid error are
continually in conflict.6 Van Fraassen only insists that avoiding potential error
by remaining agnostic about unobservables is permissible. Thus, Kitcher would
need to do more than defeat the argument above in order to sway the constructive
empiricist. He needs to provide a positive argument that empiricists should give
up their agnosticism.
Indeed, Kitcher provides a positive argument. Examining the argumentative strategies that Galileo employed in convincing his contemporaries to believe
what they could see in telescopes, he argues that they had good reason (as van
Fraassen might put it) to postulate the moons of Jupiter, the rings of Saturn, and
all the rest. Moreover, he claims that an analogue of Galileo’s argument gives us
good reason to accept other methods that inform us about unobservables.
6

[Jam48, §VII]. Longino similarly contrasts the “knowledge-extending mission” of science with “its
critical mission” [Lon90, p. 34].
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The Galilean Strategy
In 1610, Galileo was faced with the problem of justifying the telescope
as an instrument. One could see points of light when looking through the device
toward Jupiter, but he had to show that the lights were moons and not some
artifact of the telescope itself. He did this “by showing that the telescope would
deliver conclusions that could be verified using methods that his contemporaries,
including his critics, would accept” [RR, p. 173]. He could take it out on a balcony,
point it at a distant building, and anyone could see detail through it that they
could only make out from a lesser distance with their naked eyes; this readily
showed that the telescope was good for discerning details of structures in Northern
Italy. After such tests, Kitcher notes, none of Galileo’s interlocutors worried that
the telescope would not work for such applications in the vicinity of London or
Amsterdam. Within the terrestrial realm, there was no reason to draw a distinction
between these places. As Kitcher writes: “Galileo’s central problem was to make
the celestial-terrestrial distinction appear as irrelevant as the difference between
London. . . and Venice” [RR, p. 174].
Kitcher analyzes Galileo’s answer to this problem into two parts. First,
Galileo exploited the vagueness of the boundary between the observable and the
unobservable to show that the telescope was reliable beyond the bounds of what
was straight-forwardly observable. Where only sharp-eyed observers could distinguish a fine detail unaided, both they and folks of ordinary acuity could make it
out with the telescope. The deliverances of the telescope were thus shown to be
continuous with the deliverances of plain vision— the unobservable was shown to
be continuous with the observable. Importantly, this could be done for astronomical phenomena. Already, the boundary between the terrestrial and the celestial
was softening. Second, Galileo argued directly against that boundary by cataloguing changes in the allegedly immutable heavens. Kitcher summarizes the action:
“Combining these two arguments with his ability to distribute telescopes that
would generate an increasingly more consistent set of astronomical observations,
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Galileo was able to convince his peers that there was no more basis for thinking
that the instrument was unreliable in the heavens than for believing it inept in
some as yet untried part of the earth” [RR, p. 174].
Kitcher is not centrally concerned with the telescope; he derives from
Galileo’s argument an argumentative schema that he dubs the Galilean Strategy.
He generalizes in this way:
Methods of justification, like Galileo’s telescope, can only be validated
by examining the conclusions about observables to which they lead. It
does not follow that the only conclusions licensed by those methods
are conclusions about observables— any more than Galileo’s demonstrations on buildings and ships only show that the telescope is reliable
in Venice. We need to consider whether there are good reasons for
distinguishing a method’s usage in its application to observables from
its usage in application to unobservables. [RR, p. 175]
To distinguish it from the particular arguments made by Galileo, let’s call the
Galilean Strategy ‘GS’. Take some method M that provides the correct answers
for matters we can check independently. GS may be summarized by the following
schema:
GS1 M provides correct answers up to and along the vague boundary between
matters we can check independently of M and ones that we cannot check.
GS2 Prevailing reasons for thinking that the boundary might make a difference
to the reliability of M are mistaken.
.˙. M provides the correct answers for matters that we cannot check independently of M .
GS and the empiricist
There is an obvious way to employ GS against the constructive empiricist.
To begin, Galileo’s own arguments will do. Telescopes provide us a way of learning
about the moons of Jupiter, the rings of Saturn, and many things more distant and
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exotic.7 A trivial variant of Galileo’s argument might motivate belief in entities
visible through optical microscopes: paramecia, cells, cellular organelles, and so on.
We can use magnifying glasses and microscopes to clearly see things that we could
otherwise see only with careful scrutiny, we can use them to see features which
only our sharp-eyed friends can make out, and so on. The empiricist may resist
these cases— distant things seen through the telescope could be made observable
to everyone merely by bringing them closer, but this is not possible with the
microscope. The empiricist may look to Hacking, who notes that the move “from
a magnifying glass to even a low powered microscope is the passage from what we
might be able to observe with the eye unaided, to what we could not observe except
with instruments” [Hac85, p. 135]. Nevertheless, there are intermediate cases for
which we can confirm the things seen with the microscope. Hacking provides
the example of microscopic metal grids used for reidentifying particular bodies
on microscope slides. Grids of ordinary size are photographically reduced and
metalized using techniques which operate also in the macroscopic realm. [Hac85,
pp. 146–7] We can imagine making a series of grids, the largest clearly observable
to the average person without any magnification and the smallest unobservable
to even the keenest eyes. This series of cases would show that the microscope is
reliable at and through the limits of what the average person can observe using
only their unaided vision. (GS1 is satisfied for the optical microscope.) There is
no reason to believe that the operation of the microscope changes when we point
it at things just beyond the acuity of our sharp-eyed friends. (GS2 is satisfied.)
Thus, we draw the Galilean inference: Things we see in the microscope are really
there.
Van Fraassen urges agnosticism about the deliverance of microscopes, but
concedes, “. . .I really don’t mind very much if you reject this option for the optical
microscope. I will be happy if you agree to it for the electron microscope. . . .The
7
Van Fraassen allows that the moons of Jupiter are observable, since an astronaut in the vicinity of
Jupiter would be able to see them without a telescope. [van80, p. 16] This is problematic, as Kitcher
notes. [Kit93, p. 152–3] Should Galileo’s contemporaries have objected by noting the then speculative
nature of space travel?
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point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat
different way from the way I draw it. The point would be lost only if no such line
drawing is considered relevant to our understanding of science” [van01, pp. 162–3].
So a constructive empiricist can agree, in light of GS, that there are paramecia
and distant moons. Yet the genie of postulation, once let out of the bottle, is not
so easily put back in.
Once we believe in the features that we can see with an optical microscope,
we can employ GS again. The gross features that can be discerned with an electron
microscope can be discerned with an optical microscope, and we can check them
against each other up to the limits of optical magnification.8 (GS1 is satisfied
for the electron microscope.) There is no good reason to think that the electron
microscope betrays us just beyond the limits of what we can check. (GS2 is
satisfied.) So we should believe in things we can see with electron microscopes.
Similar strategies can be used to extend the boundary of the observable whenever a
new instrument has overlapping applications with one already vindicated by GS.9
The constructive empiricist may reply that the boundary between the
observable and the unobservable, vague though it may be, is principled and that
this principle gives us a reason to presume that the boundary between matters
we can check and matters we cannot is relevant. Suppose that the principle is to
acknowledge only entities and properties that are amenable to direct, unaided perception.10 Believing in paramecia would violate this principle and an application of
GS directs us to believe in paramecia, so the constructive empiricist raises a worry
about GS. Note that the premise GS2 only asserts that prevailing arguments are
insufficient to show that cases we cannot check would be different from cases that
we can check. Why should the burden of proof lie that way? The constructive
empiricist may insist that GS2 is insufficient and that there must instead be some
positive reason to suppose that cases we cannot check would be like cases that we
8

Hacking provides an illustration of electron microscopy being checked in this way. [Hac85, p. 144]
As Hacking notes, light microscopes and electron microscopes are both congeries of related instruments. Using GS to vindicate the whole motley would require a great deal more than I can say here.
10
This is van Fraassen’s preferred version of the distinction. [van80, p. 10]
9
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can check. If we accept this demand— and I can see no compelling reason not to—
GS requires an extra premise:
GS3 There is some significant positive reason to think that the success of M on
matters we can check generalizes to matters that we cannot check.
Whereas GS2 obtains when we have no reason to think M will fail beyond
the limit of the observable, GS3 obtains only when we have some reason to think M
will succeed.11 To apply GS3, we need to show that there is continuity among the
various applications of the method M . We might do this by marshalling systematic,
theoretical resources. When M is an instrument, though, we can begin with the
homey observation that it is the same instrument used in the same way in both
cases. A microscope is the same observable, material object when used to view the
date on a penny and when used to look at paramecia. Even where different lenses
are used, the lenses may be made from the same glass and ground in the same way.
The very material of the instrument provides continuity between cases where it is
used to look at observables and cases where it is used to look at unobservables.
As Kitcher notes, Galileo’s defense of the telescope involved relevant formulations of GS1 and GS2, but also an effort “to distribute telescopes that would
generate an increasingly more consistent set of astronomical observations” [RR,
p. 174, cited above]. Demonstrating the consistency of the instrument was a way
of showing that telescopic observations of observables and unobservables were due
to similar causes and thus that GS3 was satisfied. Whereas Kitcher offers this as
a move in addition to GS, it is plausibly seen as supporting a further premise of
GS.12
11
The problem of induction might be invoked as a reason to deny GS3 for any M , but both the realist
and the constructive empiricist should resist such a move. The constructive empiricist must show that
GS3 fails especially at the boundary between the observable and the unobservable, but the problem of
induction plagues the unobserved as much as the unobservable.
12
The fact that it was part of Galileo’s strategy gives some reason to try and see it as part of the
Galilean Strategy.
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Success and truth
Kitcher does not apply GS in the way I developed in the previous section.
Rather, he considers the realist inference from the success of a theory to the truth
of that theory. A querist may entertain theories about matters which are temporarily unobservable to her; some theories will prove successful, others will not.
Later, she can check for herself or confer with others to learn which theories were
true and which false. She will find— Kitcher suggests— a strong, positive correlation between success and truth. Just as Galileo’s interlocutors could view distant
buildings through the telescope and later check the results, the querist notes which
theories are successful and later checks to see that those are true. Taking inference
from success to truth as M , GS1 is satisfied. It takes this form:
GS1k Inferring truth from success provides correct answers up to and along the
vague boundary between the observable and the unobservable.
Of course, ‘success’ must be understood in a rather strict way. If the
querist’s only goal is to give up smoking, then the correlation with truth will
not be robust. ‘Smoking is bad for me’ might facilitate success, but so would ‘Evil
aliens will smite me if I light up again.’ Kitcher constrains the type of success under
consideration in several ways. First, he considers only success at prediction and at
guiding intervention. Second, success must be over a large domain of applications
that require fine-grained identification. Third, success must be at error-intolerant
tasks. Finally, success should not be secured by compensatory errors. [RR, p. 179]
Each restriction bars a way that the success-to-truth inference can fail. Consider
a situation in which most any strategy would lead to a successful outcome, in
which actual effort would be required in order to fail. In such situations, false
theories might still support successful prediction and intervention. These cases are
excluded by insisting that the task must be error-intolerant. The other conditions
similarly exclude potential counter-examples to the correlation between success
and truth. Supposing that all the major counter-examples have been excluded,
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GS2 is satisfied for the inference from success understood in this way to truth.13
We might rewrite it perspicuously in this way:
GS2k Whatever reasons we may have for thinking the inference from success to
truth would fail when applied to unobservables do not apply to the ‘success’
considered in GS1k.
Kitcher concludes from the instantiation of GS that we can infer the truth or
approximate truth of scientific theories from their success.
Kitcher’s application of GS has affinities with familiar realist arguments
that reach this same conclusion. Realists claim that the best explanation of the
success of science is the approximate truth of scientific theories. Yet anti-realists
reject inference to the best explanation. Realists reply that such abductive explanation is critical to science, even the bits of science that concern observables.
Thus, one might argue that GS1 is satisfied for inference to the best explanation.
Yet, the anti-realist replies, abductive inference in science is to the best causal
explanation. Truth is not the cause of a theory’s success. Peter Lipton explains:
“. . .while scientific explanations are typically causal, the truth explanation is not.
It is ‘logical’: the truth of the theory entails the truth of its observed logical consequences, but it does not cause it” [Lip94, p. 93]. This gives us good reason to think
that the inference to the best explanation that we can check is different from the
inference to the best explantation that we cannot check, so GS2 is not satisfied.
As such, GS will not underwrite inference to the best explanation.14
Yet Kitcher does not employ GS to defend inference to the best explanation. Rather, he defends the inference from success to truth directly. Unlike
degenerate debates about abductive warrant, his argument does not rely on an
intermediate principle of inference that empiricists already deny. The empiricist
13

If there are further counter-examples, further monster-barring can ensure that GS2 is satisfied for
some version of the realist inference.
14
Realists also claim that if the theories of science were not at least approximately true, then the
success of science would be a miracle. Even if GS could be employed to support inferences from ‘P would
be a miracle’ to ‘¬P’, the realist would have no comfort. Empiricists like van Fraassen insist that false
theories could be successful even absent divine intervention.
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might deny the legitimacy of GS, but it both has a straight-forward plausibility
and is informed by venerable, scientific practice. An obvious objection to GS can
be answered by strengthening its assumptions— adding GS3. It takes this form:
GS3k There is some significant positive reason to think that the reliability of
success-to-truth inferences about observables generalizes to inferences about
unobservables.
Supposing this three-premise version of GS, the anti-realist can only eschew the success-to-truth rule by showing that one or more of the premises is not
satisfied. It may be obvious that the empiricist’s best target is GS3. When telescopes and microscopes are pointed at observables or unobservables, they are the
same material instrument; as I argued above, this provides prima facie reason to
think GS3 is satisfied. Yet in the case of successful theories, the theories are not
instruments made of the same stuff as one another. They are not made of anything
at all. Thus, the presumption of continuity of cases for the microscope cannot be
extended to the success-to-truth inference.15 Why should we suppose that successful theories, even in a narrowly-defined sense, form a unified class of phenomena?
Without some positive argument that what holds of successful theories of one sort
will hold of other successful theories, the empiricist may refuse to generalize and
thus reject the application of GS.
The realist may resist the burden of proof represented by GS3. Just as
the difference between the Earth and sky was as irrelevant to the operation of
the telescope as the difference between Venice and London— Kitcher suggests—
the difference between the observable and unobservable is irrelevant until proven
relevant. Kitcher hopes to claim the high ground and set the presumption in favor
of realism, but this begs the question against the empiricist. The Venice-London
rhetoric does not show that GS3 is the wrong standard, since of course the difference between Italy and England was considered irrelevant to optics for positive
15
Insofar as theories are linguistic and instruments are causal devices, this parallels the objection that
abductive inference to truth is not the same as abductive inference to causal explanation.
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reasons and not merely because no one could say why it should be relevant.16
Do we have comparable reasons to think that the success-veracity correlation will
generalize? Kitcher says in summary:
In a nutshell, realists think that everyday experience supports a correlation between success and truth. They deny that empiricists can
simply stipulate the limits of reliability of this correlation. Rather,
those limits are to be charted in light of our best overall views about
the ways in which the world works. [RR, p. 178]
Yet if GS3 is required for the application of GS, the empiricist need not stipulate
anything; reliability is to argued for rather than presumed, and it is the realist
who must provide positive reasons for thinking the correlation will remain reliable.
Kitcher has realist intuitions, but van Fraassen has empiricist intuitions. More
will be needed than that. It will not do for the realist to say that whether the
boundary of the observable is relevant or not is “to be charted in light of overall
views” about the world, because the empiricist and realist will cleave to different
views.
To conclude: GS is insufficient to support the realists’ beloved connection
between success and truth. Yet thankfully, the success-to-truth inference is not
required to diminish the force of underdetermination. Careful application of GS
provides grounds for believing in unobservables from the amoeba to the moons of
Jupiter.
3.1.3

Practice: Does acceptance collapse into belief ?
There is a strong intuition that a belief that makes no difference is more

an affectation or pose than it is a genuine belief. This intuition is reflected in
many modern discussions of scepticism.17 Indeed, van Fraassen acknowledges the
intuition. Reiterating the practical and theoretical commitments of constructive
empiricism, he reflects,
16

Galileo and his contemporaries believed that the laws of physics would be invariant across space.
More simply, travelling around doesn’t seem to effect the behavior of light.
17
See the citations from Descartes and Reid in the previous chapter. Similar intuitions are expressed
by Hume.

83
Suppose that in addition to all this I say that I do not believe the
theory to be true. Suppose that I am agnostic about whether it is true;
it may, as far as I am concerned, be false in respects that do not affect
its empirical adequacy. That may certainly sound a bit hollow; what
is that reservation? Is it just a bit of lip service to a, you might say,
pious agnosticism? [van01, p. 165]
Arthur Fine suggests that constructive empiricism is, at its heart, pragmatism.18
This pragmatism sees science as aiming at reliability and “believing a theory reliable amounts to trusting it in all our practical and intellectual endeavors” [Fin01,
p. 112]. On this reading, there is nothing at stake in belief beyond the reliability
of our theories. Thus, the constructive empiricist’s protestations not to believe
theories amount to nothing. Not surprisingly, van Fraassen resists Fine’s characterization. He calls for an account of the units of epistemology (a “descriptive
epistemology”) which would detail the possible doxastic states ranging from full
belief, to commitment, to incredulity [van01, p. 165]. Absent such an account, he
thinks,
. . .we can say this much. If two propositions are different to the extent
that one could be true without the other, and we realize this, then it is
possible to believe one without believing the other. If it is possible to
distinguish between the observable and the non-observable, then it is
possible to distinguish between empirical adequacy and truth. [van01,
p. 166]
Of course, van Fraassen is right to insist that one might believe only that a theory
is empirically adequate. The question, rather, is whether one can do that while
comporting oneself in all respects just as if the theory were true. For this worry
about “lip service to a. . . pious agnosticism” to be answered, the constructive empiricist must show what practical difference is made by his refusal to believe. This
need not wait on a well-developed account of the units of epistemology, because
it need not involve cataloging all the differences between belief and acceptance.
What one wants is a suggestion of even one difference.
18

Specifically, pragmatism after the fashion of John Dewey, where Dewey is to be understood as neither
a relativist nor a realist.
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As an historical aside, there is a case to be made that this use of Reid’s
argument from practice is not one that Reid himself would accept. Considering
scientific speculation, he writes, “Let hypotheses be put to any of these uses as far
as they can serve. Let them suggest experiment, or direct our inquiries: but let
just induction alone govern our belief” [EIP, ess. 2 ch. 3, pp. 251].19 Yet even here
there seems to be a distinction between hypotheses guiding us as far as they can
serve and hypotheses guiding us tout court. Thus, I think even Reid may concede
that a claim that guides action in all respects should be counted as a belief.20
This suggests that the commitment that comes from accepting the theories is weaker than the commitment that comes from believing them because the
former is more narrow than the latter in this way: Acceptance involves commitment to a theory as a research programme, but belief involves commitment to
using the theory as a guide for action always and everywhere. The notion is that
although belief and acceptance might look the same in the lab, we conduct our
daily lives where the two come apart— outside of the lab and beyond the reach
of research programmes. There are reasons to be dubious of this suggestion. For
one, realists need not be committed to taking our best theories as guides for action
always and everywhere. A realist may admit freely that some theories, although
true, are too cumbersome to be used in practical applications. To use a well-heeled
example, star charts are still produced as if the universe were geocentric; we know
that it is not, but more precise charts would make navigation more rather than
less difficult. Beyond its inherent implausibility, this suggestion would be a poor
reading of van Fraassen. He writes:
If I accept a theory then I believe that it is empirically adequate, and I
also commit myself to seeing nature through that theory’s eyes. Thus,
in addition to that belief in the theory’s empirical adequacy, there is a
pragmatic aspect to acceptance. Nature is confronted and/or appreciated within that theoretical framework, the theory guides experimental
19

The citation is from Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of 1785 and the page reference from
his Philosophical Works [Rei67].
20
One might instead simply say that there is a tension between Reid on hypotheses and Reid against
the sceptic. Even though there may be some tension, I think the issue is rather more subtle— I will
return to Reid’s treatment of scientific hypotheses in the next chapter (§4.3.2).
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design and new projects for observation, new theories are required to be
compatible with it, and so forth. These assertions express commitment
rather than belief, though there is obviously some sort of coherence connection between a commitment and opinion about its chances of being
vindicated. The accepted theory is thus the guide both to theoretical
and practical life. [van01, p. 164]
Perhaps I am reading this passage too strongly; perhaps there is still some practical
difference between acceptance and belief.
Imagine the constructive empiricist points to a way that his life is different
from the realist’s. This difference might be a matter of mere preference, such that
standards of scientific judgement would not decide the matter. The constructive
empiricist faces a dilemma, however. If the difference is so small as to be of no
consequence, then it may be insufficient to distinguish acceptance from belief.
Conversely, if the difference is significant, then standards of reasonable judgement
may well favor one over the other. Can the constructive empiricist resolve this
dilemma? Without knowing what difference constructive empiricism would make
to our lives, it is unclear how to answer that question. The burden is on the
empiricist, I think, to show some difference that empiricism makes in his life. And
then we shall see.
The units of epistemology
The argument above was meant to show that we need not have a full
account of the units of epistemology to see whether constructive empiricism is
defeated by the argument from practice and, thus, that van Fraassen’s call for
“descriptive epistemology” is an argumentative non sequitur. I have neither shown
nor did I mean to show that an enquiry in the units of epistemology would lack
value. Surely, as van Fraassen notes, belief is not merely a binary variable associated with propositions— not merely a matter of propositions being in or out of
a belief box. There are several puzzles about what choosing a theory from a set
of rivals might mean. One puzzle involves the difference between belief as binary
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(one believes or does not) and degree of belief as a continuous variable (one has
confidence p such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1).
Another puzzle involves the difference between believing a claim and accepting it for practical purposes. It is certainly possible to accept a claim for
some purposes without believing it— it may be expedient and close enough but
not strictly true. It is also possible to believe a claim without employing it in
putatively relevant contexts— the truth may be computationally intractable, insufficiently specific, or simply too much trouble. The example of a navigator’s star
charts illustrates both; that is, the charts are drawn as if the stars were on a
sphere with the Earth at the middle by people who believe that the stars are in
a complicated three-dimensional arrangement and that the Earth orbits the Sun.
One begins to solve this puzzle by noting, first, that if I accept a claim only for
some purposes then my reliance on it should be confined to pursuing those purposes regardless of the claim’s expediency when I am pursuing other purposes and,
second, that if I believe a claim then I will rely on it except when it is too cumbersome.Although working posits may displace beliefs in application, working posits
are presumptively local while beliefs are presumptively global. Of course, this is
at best the beginning of an answer. Evaluating whether an agent believes a claim
seems to require assessing the truth of counter-factuals like this: Would the agent
rely on the claim in such-and-so contexts if it were feasible to do so? Questions like
these can be hard, perhaps impossible, to answer. Where the constraints on feasibility are formal, computational constraints, the antecedent of the counter-factual
might be seen as entailing a contradiction.
The puzzle of how belief relates to practice in the details is an interesting
and important one. The argument from practice relies not on the details, but only
on a gross feature of this relation. Resolving the puzzle would require an account
of the units of epistemology of the sort that van Fraassen demands. The argument
from practice, rather than requiring such an account, puts a constraint on what
it might look like. A developed account of the units of epistemology should not
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distinguish between cognitive commitments that could make no possible practical
difference, regardless of whatever else the account says about the relation between
cognition and practice. The demand for an enquiry in the units of epistemology,
although legitimate, does not save constructive empiricism.
These remarks are at best preliminary. Since the topic here is underdetermination, I beg the reader’s forgiveness for not tilting at all the windmills.

3.2

The road from empirical equivalence
The inference to constructive empiricism can be seen as just one of many

arguments from empirical or observational equivalence. Indeed, the ‘problem of
underdetermination’ is sometimes used interchangeably with the ‘problem of empirically equivalent theories.’21 The crux of underdetermination qua empirical
equivalence may be expressed as a syllogism in the figure Celarent:
1. No theory with empirically equivalent rivals merits belief.
2. All theories have empirically equivalent rivals.
3. .˙. No theory merits belief.
The conclusion of this argument is the promise of underdetermination. The major premise concerns what merits belief, so let’s call it the belief assumption and
abbreviate it EEbel. The minor premise guarantees the existence of suitable rivals, so let’s call it the rival assumption and abbreviate it EEriv. Rewriting the
argument in a less scholastic form:
EEriv Every theory has indefinitely many empirically equivalent rivals.
EEbel There is no good reason to believe a theory over its empirically equivalent
rivals.
21
This short-sightedness is distinct from but usually accompanies the view that underdetermination
is merely a play in the game between realists and anti-realists. I have said something about that other
conflation already in §1.6.1.
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.˙. Therefore, there are never decisive reasons to believe any theory; that is, theory
choice is always underdetermined.
This may readily be assimilated to the framework developed in Ch I. EEriv states
that for any theory there are rival theories of a particular sort. This gives us a
set of rivals for the underdetermination scenario. EEbel states that permissible
standards of judgement are insufficient to distinguish between empirically equivalent theories. The conclusion brings these two together. The choice among the set
of rivals in EEriv is (by EEbel) underdetermined. The implicit scope here is all
observationally-possible circumstances— as we’ll soon see, difficulties delineating
observationally possible circumstances are legion. The ultimate conclusion that
we may accept but not believe successful theories turns on a substantive principle
about what we should do in the face of such underdetermination. It assumes that
agnosticism is the appropriate response to underdetermination. (On agnosticism,
see §1.3.3.)
The conclusion of the argument does not entail that an arbitrary pet
theory can be held come what may, of course, since there may be preferable rivals
which are empirically differentiable from the pet theory. Yet, the conclusion does
entail the ubiquity of a certain sort of underdetermination. If belief in theories is
unjustified, then it is not the appropriate honorific to confer upon our best theories.
We may responsibly believe in the empirical adequacy of our best theories, though
not in the theories themselves. Crudely put: Underdetermination is everywhere,
therefore we should not believe any of the theories to which we commit ourselves.
Without pursuing niceties, I will suppose that the argument is either
valid or can be made valid without substantial revision. I argue instead that
the argument is unsound; its premises are, if not false, at least not true in any
straightforward sense.22
22

My general conclusions accord with Laudan and Leplin [LL91].
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3.2.1

Cheap proofs
One might attempt to disprove EEriv on formal grounds. Consider a

theory T and suppose that the set of T ’s empirically equivalent rivals is finitely
specifiable. We could then replace T with the theory E(T ) which is true if either T
or one of its empirically equivalent rivals in true.23 The possibility of E(T ) shows
that EEriv is not true for the general case, since E(T ) would have no empirically
equivalent rivals. EEriv will also fail for any theory lacking non-empirical content.
Regardless, most theories of interest do have non-empirical content. Similarly, it
seems farfetched that the rivals to complicated, scientific theories will be finitely
specifiable.
One might instead attempt to provide a formal proof of EEriv by providing an algorithm which, for any theory T that has non-empirical content, generates
an empirically equivalent rival T 0 . A typical algorithm is one that defines T 0 to
mean that everything appears as if T were true but nevertheless T is false. By
definition, appearances would not decide between T and T 0 .24 Some authors have
objected to algorithms of this sort on the grounds that T 0 is not really a theory
(e.g., [LL91, pp. 456–7] [LL93, p. 11]). Various criteria have been proposed for distinguishing real theories from pseudo-theories. Consider a couple: One proposed
criterion is that real theories should be non-parasitic; T 0 is parasitic in the sense
that it is defined in terms of T . However, we might express T 0 in a way such
that it is non-parasitic. We need only substitute whatever details appear in T for
the mention of T in the definition of T 0 . A second proposed criterion is that real
theories are the sort of thing that scientists take seriously; scientists don’t take
possibilities like T 0 seriously. This criterion is poorly motivated. Without some
explanation as to why scientists don’t take T 0 seriously, we can’t say whether they
discount it for legitimately scientific reasons. The mere fact that some behavior is
common among scientists should not be taken as a normative justification for that
23
24

If the set of rivals were finite, then E(T ) would be the disjunction of the rivals.
Kukla refers to this algorithm as “Van Fraassen’s favorite” [Kuk98, p. 59].
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behavior— scientists make mistakes.25
The attempt to debar T 0 as a pseudo-theory harkens back to the halcyon
days of logical empiricism, when rivals could be dispatched by the charge that they
were pseudo-scientific, so we might exhume other criteria to exclude variants of T 0
from consideration.26 I suggest that we instead permit theories like T 0 as potential
rivals, allowing that underdetermination of some sort may obtain between T and
T 0 .27 If EEriv is proven in this way, however, EEbel becomes implausible. Recall
the case of Cartesian underdetermination from Ch II. It will suffice to contrast
the theory that we live in houses on Earth, that we read books, and so on (call
this T ) with the theory that it merely appears as if this were so (T 0 ). It is not
clear that even Descartes would have taken T 0 seriously, since each of his sceptical
rivals proposes some mechanism by which it comes to appear as if T were true:
madness, dreams, or malign agency. Nevertheless, T and T 0 are in some sense
empirically equivalent theories— if we cannot decide between them now, then no
further empirical enquiry will drive a wedge between them. Yet we do have good
reasons for believing in our lives on Earth rather than in some grand dissimulation.
(Recall Reid’s arguments from §§2.3–2.5.) If EEbel denies that, then it is false.
Even if we were genuinely worried by Cartesian concerns, the reduction
of underdetermination to such a familiar problem can tell us something. It tells
us that no revolutionary rethinking of science will follow from underdetermination
of this kind. The reason is two-fold: First, Cartesian scepticism has been openly
debated for centuries. It seems plausible to think that our present thinking about
science already accomodates such classic worries. Second, Cartesian scepticism
says nothing especially about science. All knowledge is on the chopping block.
As Kyle Stanford suggests, “empirical equivalents have proved to be a Devil’s
bargain for advocates of underdetermination— providing convincing evidence of
an underdetermination predicament only where they have transformed the problem
25

See the example of wave and matrix mechanics discussed in §1.2.3.
See also Kukla [Kuk98, pp. 66–80], who surveys other criteria and vigorously defends the theoretical
legitimacy of rivals like T 0 .
27
This reflects the conclusions of §1.2.
26
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into one or another familiar philosophical puzzle” [Sta01, p. S11].28
3.2.2

Characterizing the empirical
Note that the notion of empirical equivalence either defines or is defined

by a notion of empirical difference— two theories are empirically-differentiable
if they make different claims about some observables. Thus, making sense of
EEriv requires specifying the boundary of what is observable.29 The observable,
as van Fraassen defines it, is what can be detected by unaided human perception.
Theories are empirically equivalent if they agree on all the observables or, in the
model-theoretic idiom, if they share an empirical substructure. There are problems
even with determining the extension of ‘observable’ in this sense. Electrons are
not observable, because neither you nor I can see, hear, or taste them. Concede,
for the sake of discussion, that there is thus some empirically equivalent rival
physics that does not posit electrons. As Paul Churchland [Chu85, pp. 43–4] notes,
creatures with electron microscopes for eyes could see electrons and, one supposes,
if they were constructive empiricists then they would believe in electrons. Well and
good for them, van Fraassen replies, but we may “assume that we (the epistemic
community) are all humans, and no one of us is really a person from Krypton, like
the comics’ Superman, who could see Lois Lane’s pink underwear when she was
fully dressed” [van85, p. 254].
The point is that these creatures are only troubling insofar as we imagine
watching them without admitting them into the epistemic community. We imagine
recognizing them as observers and scientists, yet we also imagine the indignity that,
by the rules of constructive empiricism, they are allowed to believe in things in
which we are not allowed to believe. Thus, we imagine them as legitimate members
of the scientific community at the very moment that we consider them as outsiders
to the scientific community— van Fraassen writes, “The example as given tempts
28

I turn to Stanford’s positive argument in §4.2.2.
Noting this connection, Churchland identifies ‘empirically equivalent’ and ‘empirical adequacy’ as
“cognate relative” terms [Chu85, p. 38].
29
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us to confuse two cases” [van85, p. 256]. I think van Fraassen misdiagnoses the
problem; any such confusion is inessential to the example. Although humans have
not got electron microscopes for eyes now, engineers might develop such upgrades.
Suppose, for the sake of discussion, that in the year 2025 I will have my left eye
replaced with an eye that can see electrons. The constructive empiricist believes
that atomic theory will be empirically adequate for all observations. It will be
adequate only if there are in fact electrons because, beginning in 2025, a member
of the community (viz., me) will make direct observations of electrons. Thus, it
seems to follow that the constructive empiricist should believe in electrons.
Churchland’s version of the thought experiment turns on an analogy between imagined outsiders with natural electron-eyes and we scientists with our
electron microscopes. Van Fraassen objects that the analogy begs the question
by supposing that we with our microscopes are alike “in all relevant respects” to
the outsiders [van85, p. 257]. Since that similarity can only be judged on the
basis of our scientific theories about microscopes and outsiders, the constructive
empiricist who believes only that those theories are empirically adequate will say
only that our situation and theirs is empirically indistinguishable. Thus, with our
electron microscopes, “all the observable phenomena are as if we are observing”
electrons [van85, p. 258]. Yet this response does not address the revised version
of the thought experiment, since it would be perverse to tell to me in 2025, when
I have my electron-eye, that I cannot really see with it and that it is only as if I
could. If you could say that to me then, what stops us from saying that now to
people whose keen vision is due to laser eye surgery?
The constructive empiricist is free to object that “we (the epistemic community) are all humans” and that humans cannot see electrons [van85, p. 254,
cited above]. If I see electrons after 2025, then I am no longer (fully) human. This
might be plausible, especially if we imagine the electron-eye as extracted from
a genetically-engineered electric fish. Yet the relevant question is not whether I
would still be human but whether I would still be part of the epistemic community.
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I see no compelling reason to suppose that having an electron detector installed
in one eye socket should make me ineligible for participation in the epistemic enterprise. In any case, the same point can be made without imagining surgical
modification. Blind people who employ seeing-eye dogs, I suppose, are justified in
considering them as sources of observations and not merely as instruments. Thus,
we may imagine that in 2025 I will have a sensing-electron fish that extends the
boundary of what I can observe.
The constructive empiricist may still reply: The mere possibility of these
scenarios is insufficient to show anything. Empirical adequacy is not about what
would obtain in exotic, counter-factual circumstances. It is about what, in fact,
will happen in the course of history. As van Fraassen explains, “empirical adequacy
concerns actual phenomena: what does happen, and not, what would happen under different circumstances” [van80, p. 60]. This reply lacks force because we are
not spectators to history and because what will happen is sensitive to our choices.
Whether I have an electron-eye in 2025 will depend in part on whether we try
to develop the technology and whether we dedicate resources to the effort. The
constructive empiricist believes only that atomic theory is empirically adequate; determining whether the empirical adequacy of atomic theory implies the existence of
electrons requires determining whether electrons will in time be observable; the answer to this latter question depends on our choices; thus, whether the constructive
empiricist should believe in electrons depends on our choices. Therefore, whether
we should believe that electrons exist, for the constructive empiricist, will depend
in part on how much we want to observe them. For any empirically adequate
theory, we could try to revise the human organism or the scientific community in
such a way that the entities in that theory would be observable.
The constructive empiricist already allows a considerable rôle for volition
in belief choice; on van Fraassen’s account, querists must decide how much risk to
accept and thus whether to believe theories (very risky) or merely believe them
to be empirically adequate (less risky). He thinks that querists must decide who
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counts as their epistemic community. Yet as I’ve tried to show, querists must
also decide what technological program to pursue and in this way decide how the
chosen epistemic community will develop. We ask the constructive empiricist, ‘Do
electrons exist?’ He must reply ‘It depends. How much do we want them to exist?’
This glib response should not be misunderstood as a promise of constructivist wishfulfillment. An entity would not be observable merely because we wanted it, but
only if that motivated us to reengineer ourselves such that we could observe it. This
does not show that empiricism is untenable, but it does show that it makes possible
a kind of round-about wish fulfillment. This possibility makes empiricism rather
more bizarre than the empiricists’ rhetoric of epistemic modesty would suggest.
Unhappy with this situation, the empiricist might suggest a different principle by which to divide observables from unobservables. The most basic optical
microscopes operate on principles similar to the human eye, but higher power optical microscopes and electron microscopes do not. One may think that observable
entities are ones that can be detected using processes analogous to the ones used in
direct, unaided perception. In a careful development of this criterion, Sara Vollmer
concludes that “the observation of any entity that utilizes the physical principle
of the scattering of a wave and the application of an inverse Fourier transform
to form an image of the object can have the same epistemological status as the
observation of any other entity made in this way” [Vol00, p. 365]. This does provide some boundary— individual electrons are unobservable on this criterion— but
“whenever we observe by this principle of scattered waves, whether by telescope,
optical microscope, electron microscope, or x-ray crystallography, we observe in a
way that is of a kind with ordinary visual observation” [Vol00, p. 363]. Things
visible through electron microscopes are van Fraassen’s paradigm case of the unobservable; yet if the distinction is drawn in this way, they will count as observable.
Moreover, whether unaided, human perception is confined to “the application of
an inverse Fourier transform” depends on what human organisms are like; this, as
I have argued, depends in part on our own choices.
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Observability historicized
One may concede that observability includes all the detections we might
make with instruments and that this is historically variable. Empirical equivalence
could then be indexed to our present capabilities. Consider a present theory T
and suppose that it is (now) empirically equivalent to a rival T 0 . Our choice
between these theories is (now) underdetermined. In the future, our capabilities
may change in ways that allow us to decide between them— the choice would cease
to be underdetermined.30 So the scope of the underdetermination includes our
prior circumstances, present circumstances, and some but not all possible future
circumstances.31 Although in some future circumstance we may look back and see
how the choice between T and T 0 should have been made, one intuition is that we
should take no comfort in that possibility.
Numerous examples of this sort can be found in the history of science.
In the early 19th century, it seemed impossible to discern the composition of the
stars. Many theories of stellar composition would have been empirically equivalent. Yet with the development of spectrographic methods, the theories became
nonequivalent and it was possible to determine what stars were made of. The
situation led C.S. Peirce to declare,
The history of science affords illustrations enough of the folly of saying
that this, that, or the other can never be found out. Auguste Comte
said that it was clearly impossible for man ever to learn anything of
the chemical constitution of the fixed stars, but before his book had
reached its readers the discovery which he had announced as impossible
had been made.32
Even though scientists in 18th or early 19th century would have been wrong to
think that the matter could never be found out in some timeless sense, they could
30

Laudan and Leplin take empirical equivalence or nonequivalence to be a timeless relation between
theories and thus conclude that the variability of what is observable completely undercuts empirical
equivalence [LL91, pp. 452–3] [LL93, p. 9].
31
Note that van Fraassen’s empiricist scruples make him eschew modality [van80, p. 197]. Considering
only our actual future, though, would reintroduce the problems of choice discussed above.
32
[HW29, §6.556] as quoted in [Res98, p. 187]; see also [Pei97, p. 273]. Interestingly, Comte celebrated
the alleged impossibility [Sch95, pp. 262–3].

96
not say how it would be found out or what the composition of stars would turn out
to be. Should the scientists have despaired at the (transient) empirical equivalence?
John Earman suggests that they should have,
For it is cold comfort to tell the scientists who were in the former
epistemic context that if their situation had been different then they
would have been able to gather evidence that would decide among the
[hypotheses]. [Ear93, p. 34]
Perhaps it would be a cold comfort, but only a self-deceived epistemic enterprise
could find warm fuzzies everywhere. For any underdetermination of less-thanmaximal scope it will be true that, if our situation were different, we could find
evidence that would decide among the hypotheses. Consider two sorts of cases:
(1) Where prior scientists faced such underdetermination, they could have tried to
change their circumstances by developing new techniques or instruments.33 It is
an ordinary enough thing not to have the resources just now to settle a question,
but scientists can apply themselves to acquiring and developing new resources. (2)
Alternately, scientists may have had good, systematic reasons to think that no
new techniques would resolve the underdetermination. That they had systematic
reasons shows that the underdetermination was only so discouraging in the context
of a great many background theories— it was one case of underdetermination
among a great many successful determinations.34 The case of stellar composition
illustrates both. Scientists in a context where determining the composition of stars
was impossible developed techniques that made it possible; before 1800, say, one
might reasonably have said that the composition of stars would forever remain a
mystery. Neither situation should give us chills.
3.2.3

Verdict on empirical equivalence
The argument from empirical equivalence fails because of a fundamental

shortcoming: Explications of empirical equivalence that make EEriv plausible
33
It may add little for us to tell them that their efforts will succeed, since they are now characters
from our history. Regardless, it cannot be that distance that makes our reassurance cold comfort.
34
More cases of this sort are discussed in the next chapter.

97
undercut EEbel.
From Ch II: The rivals may be provided as sceptical scenarios like dreams,
demons, or whatall else, but this makes it nothing more than Cartesian scepticism.
The previous chapter develops resources for answering Cartesian scepticism, but
the argument from empirical equivalence misfires even if the sceptic wins out.
Although the underdetermination argument is introduced to say something about
science especially, Cartesian scepticism would sweep away all empirical claims.
From §3.1.2: EEriv might be established by defining empirical equivalence relative to the discriminating power of specific capacities— the limits of our
natural senses, for instance. The limits of these capacities will be fuzzy, however,
and by using the Galilean Strategy we can exploit this to justify instruments and
methods that reach beyond those limits. The Galilean Strategy can give us good
reason to believe one of the theories over its rivals, falsifying EEbel.
From §3.1.3: If the rivals are defined such that choosing one or the other
can make no difference at all, then the argument from practical commitment defuses the alleged rivalry. EEbel is not actually falsified, since we are not given a
reason to believe one rival over the other. Instead, the problem is ill-posed, and
EEbel is shown to be irrelevent.
From §3.2.2: The notion of empirical equivalence (considered sub specie
aeternitatis) depends on our choices in a problematic way. This may be avoided by
pegging equivalence to a specific time and community, but at the cost of weakening
the resulting underdetermination. Either way, EEbel is implausible.
Strictly speaking, these arguments do not show that there is no sense of
‘empirical equivalence’ that can satisfy both EEriv and EEbel. It is difficult to
imagine what this sense might be, however, and the arguments exemplify general
strategies for defeating candidates. Perhaps philosophers’ infatuation with empirical equivalence is a hangover from logical empiricism. Disregarding the headache,
it is neither the only nor the most interesting form of underdetermination.

98

3.3

The road from auxiliaries
The familiar Duhemian argument for underdetermination begins with the

observation that experiments in modern science often require appeal to auxiliary
assumptions for their probative force. For the sake of concreteness, consider the
claim that the Earth is flat and the counter-claim that the Earth is round— less
colloquially, that the Earth is an oblate spheroid. Call these claims TF and TR
respectively. There have been many adherents of TR , of course, and many attempts
to demonstrate its superiority over TF . Copernicus provides a typical argument:
This [spherical] form of the sea is also discerned by sailors, seeing that
land is visible from the top of the mast, even when it cannot be seen
from the deck of the ship. And conversely if a light is held on the top of
the mast, it appears to those on the shore to gradually descend as the
ship moves away from land, until at last it disappears like the setting
sun.35
The idea is simple enough. If the sea were flat, then an observer who
could see a ship clearly should be able to see both the hull and the mast, as in
figure 3.1a. Contrariwise, since the sea is curved, an observer may see the mast
even at a distance at which the hull is not visible, as in figure 3.1b. The latter
of these is observed, and the observation decides between these two depictions.
Nevertheless, an implicit assumption is embodied in figure 3.1. Light is depicted
as travelling in a straight line, but of course the rectilinear propagation of light is
independent of TF and TR .
Without that assumption, the observation may not favor TR . Suppose TF
is true— the Earth is flat— but that light sags slightly between the object and the
observer, curving down toward the surface of the Earth. At a distance, the light
from the hull of the ship may sag down into the water while the light from the
mast reaches the observer. Thus, the observer sees the mast even as the hull has
passed from view. This situation, depicted in figure 3.2, would yield the relevant
35

Book I Ch II of De Revolutionibus. The translation is my own.
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a

b

Figure 3.1: (a) If the Earth were flat, then an observer on the shore would see
both the mast and prow of the ship if he could see either. (b) Since the Earth is
round, the observer sees the mast even when the hull is occulted by water.
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a

b

Figure 3.2: (a) Light beams sag between the ship and the observer, so the prow of
the ship is occulted by water even as the mast is visible. (b) As the ship approaches,
the observer can see both the prow and the mast.
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observation.36
Call the assumption that light travels in a straight line TL , and call the
observation of the mast of the ship when the hull is out of sight O. O is offered as
evidence of TR over against TF , but the best it can do is show that if light travels
in a straight line then the Earth is round. One may conclude that this conditional
is true, but not that TR is true or that TL is false.
Cases like this are used to underwrite what is sometimes called the
Duhem-Quine (or DQ) Thesis that theories are not tested in isolation; as Quine
puts it, they “face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but as a corporate body” [Qui53, p. 41]. The point may be stated as a lesson about underdetermination. The experiment was aimed to decide between TR and TF . This
theory choice is underdetermined for a standard of judgement that denies you the
assumption TL ; such a meager standard allows you only to conclude only TL → TR .
Worse still— since there is a great deal more to optics than the rectilinear propagation of light— the inference involves still other auxiliary assumptions TM , TN ,
and so on. If the DQ Thesis is correct, then the observation allows us only to
conclude the rather uninteresting conditional (TL &TM &TN & · · ·) → TR .
So, O only yields TR given an indefinite number of other assumptions,
where the yield is understood as deductive entailment. We might have arrived
at this conclusion directly. Let L be the set TL , TM , TN , . . .. By hypothesis,
(O&L) → TR , and there is no M ⊂ L such that (O&M ) → TR . We observe O.
These assumptions validly entail L → TR but leave TR indeterminate. Suspiciously,
the conclusion follows without any consideration of the content of L, O, and TR
and without any reflection on methodology or confirmation.
The crux of the matter is whether standards of responsible judgement
should lead you to assume L or treat it as being as much in question as TR . One
might argue that the right standards of judgement are timeless and unchanging.
36
This example appears in Copi and Cohen’s introductory logic, wherein the authors attribute it to
C.L. Stevenson. They invoke it to show that no ‘crucial experiment’ can be deductively binding, but
concede, “Within the framework of accepted scientific theory that we are not concerned to question, a
hypothesis can be subjected to a crucial experiment” [CC90, p. 447].
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TL is a substantive, empirical principle and hence open to revision, and so we
should not bind the timeless, canonical method to it. I am dubious as to whether
method should be timeless, but it is enough to note that method might allow us
to rely on ‘well-confirmed background theories’ de dicto without being committed
to TL de re. One might argue instead that the right standards should promise us
certainty. TL is open to revision, so conclusions drawn on the basis of it are a
fortiori fallible. Since no certain knowledge is to be had, this will not do either.37
Whether we may rely on auxiliary hypotheses to decide between rival
theories depends on their actual content and on our epistemic situation. Little
more can be said in the abstract. The Duhemian, top-down argument seems to
fail.
3.3.1

The Duhem in the Duhemian Argument
Although Quine is often cited as having established the force of underde-

termination, in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ he writes that the “doctrine was well
argued by Duhem” and offers it without much positive argument [Qui53, p. 41
fn. 17]. Admittedly, Duhem does seem to draw a rather strong conclusion. He
writes in summary “that comparison is established necessarily between the whole
of theory and the whole of experimental facts. . .” [Duh54, 208, italics in original].38
It’s important to note that this passage is a quick summary of his position, offered
after it had been developed with greater care in prior sections. Moreover, Duhem
did not see his holism as entailing any pernicious underdetermination. It does
mean that theory choice cannot be a matter of deductive or logical certainty, but
it leaves room for fallible theory choice. Duhem explains that “what impels the
physicist to act thus is not logical necessity. It would be awkward and ill inspired
for him to do otherwise, but it would not be doing something logically absurd. . .”
[Duh54, p. 211]. Theory choice is not a matter of deduction, surely. It lacks even
the plausible pretense of certainty. Duhemian concerns show us that, given a de37
38

The demise of certainty is a modest lesson of the demise of Cartesianism; see §2.5.
The critical turns in Duhem’s argument occur in his Ch VI §§2–3, 8.

103
contextualized standard of judgement, underdetermination is rampant. If there
are standards of good sense that allow querists in a context to decide between theories, as Duhem thought there were, then the underdetermination disappears when
we consider choices relative to those standards. Duhem is, I concede, not always
as clear on this point as he could be, and commentators have often recapitulated
the ambiguity. For instance, Laudan treats what “is known to be true” and what
can “carry logical weight” as issues of whether “a scientist is forced to relinquish”
an hypothesis. If the responsible theory choice is the choice that a scientist is
forced to make, underdetermination will be ubiquitous. Yet Laudan also allows
for responsible choice in a less draconian sense; he concedes that an experiment
he considers “would cause a rational person to cease to expound [the hypothesis]”
and that giving it up “might be more prudent” than holding to it [Lau65, p. 299].
Duhem thinks that “good sense” should save the physicist from awkwardness and ill inspiration, but also that
these reasons of good sense do not impose themselves with the same
implacable rigor that the prescriptions of logic do. There is something
vague and uncertain about them; they do not reveal themselves at the
same time with the same degree of clarity to all minds. Hence the
possibility of lengthy quarrels between the adherents of an old system
and the partisans of a new doctrine, each camp claiming to have good
sense on its side, each finding the reasons of the adversary inadequate.
[Duh54, p. 217]
This reveals possibilities for underdetermination. On the cusp of controversies, the
evidence will be insufficient to settle matters between rival camps— not because
many scientists are undecided between rival views, but because good sense is vague
enough to permit disagreement. Yet, new evidence is collected, old evidence is
reconsidered, and each doctrine is run through its paces. In time, the question
may be settled. There is not some instant in time before which the old theory is
the reasonable choice and after which the contender is triumphant, but agreement
may be secured by an array of new evidence along with the inconstant nudgings
of good sense. Note, however, that this agreement may come about even though
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the theories in question still rely on auxiliaries, and reasonable disagreement may
occur even when the interlocutors agree on the relevant auxiliaries. There is a kind
of underdetermination that, as Duhem might say, follows from the vagueness of
good sense, but it is neither ubiquitous nor established by scientists’ reliance on
background theory.
3.3.2

Turning the tables
In the last decade or so, the prevalence of background assumptions has

underwritten arguments against underdetermination— principally in discussions
following Laudan and Leplin [LL91].39 Scientists utilize a host of auxiliary assumptions and collateral information in performing experiments, as is readily seen
by considering examples like the one in the previous section. Suppose, then, that
two theories L and L0 make no predictions that would allow us to differentiate
between them. This empirical equivalence might be taken to warrant a conclusion that the choice between L and L0 is underdetermined. What would the scope
of this underdetermination be? It would include our present circumstance, but
we may imagine circumstances it would not include. Suppose we learned that
(L → O) and (L0 → ¬O) for some observable phenomenon O. The theories would
not then be empirically equivalent, and our choice between them would not be
underdetermined on that count.40
Of course, suitable revision of the rival theories would repeat the underdetermination at the level of theory cum background theory. We would be
able to decide between L and L0 , but the choice between L&(L → O)&(L0 → ¬O)
and L0 &(L → ¬O)&(L0 → O) would remain underdetermined. Yet why do we
believe (L → O) and (L0 → ¬O)? Surely not merely because they would defuse
the underdetermination between L and L0 ! Say that we believe them because
they are entailed (with some assumptions about initial conditions) by a well39

Although the argument is not original to Laudan and Leplin, they have pressed it with the greatest
vigor. Boyd considers it a “standard rebuttal” to empiricism, but thinks it can be effectively countered
by shifting attention to Total Sciences [Boy82, pp. 650–1]. See also [Chu85, p. 38].
40
I described this briefly and for different purposes in §1.3.1.
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tested and widely-believed background theory X. We may attempt to cook up
some alternate X 0 that would enjoy the same empirical support as X but entail
(L → ¬O)&(L0 → O), but there is no guarantee that this will be possible. The
theory X may have systematic connections to the whole body of science, such that
any X 0 sufficiently different to work here would introduce a panoply of anomalies.
Earman objects to Laudan and Leplin’s argument in this way: Either
the X appealed to is a contestable hypotheses like L and L0 or it is not. If the
former, then the rivals under consideration are no longer L and L0 — the rivals are
instead (L&X) and (L0 &X). “The result is sidestepped. . .but that is changing the
subject since what counts as the hypothesis has been changed.” If the latter, then
X is presumed. This would amount to dogmatism, since auxiliaries like X “must
go beyond the empirical evidence. . .and thus their epistemic status will be just as
open to question as that of the [hypotheses].” [Ear93, p. 35]
Earman may be right that this changes the subject, but that would not
be legerdemain. A determinable theory choice may be substituted for an underdetermined one, a tractable problem for an insoluble one. The problem is soluble,
though, just because X does not stand in the same need of justification as L or L0 .
The auxiliary goes beyond the evidence and so too is open to question— it is not
in principle shielded from scrutiny.41 Nevertheless, a community or an individual
scientist may hold it fixed for the purpose of some investigation.
3.3.3

Total Science
We might ask about the choice not between theories but between packages

of Total Science. A Total Science is the collected body of all scientific knowledge
at a time.42 Adding a theory T to a given Total Science S produces a new, different
Total Science. Thinking of theories as sets of propositions, one might think of a
Total Science as the union of all the theories known to science and think of the
41
Going beyond evidence is actually beside the point, since querists may call the evidence itself into
question as needed.
42
Some authors call this a ‘total theory.’ This is at best misleading; as I argue below a Total Science
is not a scientific theory in any ordinary sense.
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combination as S ∪ T . Thinking of theories instead as sets of models, one might
think of a Total Science as the intersection of known theories and think of the
combination as S ∩ T . In order to remain neutral between these and more exotic
possibilities, let (S ⊕ T ) stand for the resultant Total Science when theory T is
added to Total Science S.
Let the initial state of Science prior to any knowledge of L, L0 , or X
be given by S i . The choice between (Si ⊕ L) and (Si ⊕ L0 ) is, by assumption,
underdetermined. This underdetermination cannot be resolved by appealing to
X. Appeal to X is a non sequitur, since X is not part of the Total Science S i .
If we learned X from some experiment, then we would transition to a different
total science. The choice would be between ((Si ⊕ X) ⊕ L) and ((Si ⊕ X) ⊕ L0 ).
That choice would not be underdetermined, true, but that is a different choice
between different Total Sciences. Perhaps the choice among {(Si ⊕ L), (Si ⊕ L0 ),
((Si ⊕ X) ⊕ L), ((Si ⊕ X) ⊕ L0 )} is not underdetermined, but that too is beside
the point. On this approach, strong conclusions are drawn from underdetermination that obtains between empirically equivalent Total Sciences.
Several authors appeal to Total Science in this way. Quine said, “The unit
of empirical significance is the whole of science” [Qui53, p. 42]. Hoefer and Rosenberg, mindful of Quine, write that “the thesis of underdetermination of theory by
evidence is about empirically adequate total science. . .” and conclude rightly “that
Laudan and Leplin’s arguments for the defeasibility of empirical equivalence have
no application in the context of systems of the world”— that is, in the context of
Total Sciences. [HR94, pp. 594, 598]43
This can be seen as a reformulation of the Duhemian argument, one that
cannot be answered merely by an appeal to fallibilism. Even allowing that it is
legitimate to appeal to background theories, empirically equivalent Total Sciences
cannot be distinguished by some empirical test because all of the available background theories are already included in each Total Science. In Ch I, I defined
43

See also [Kuk98, pp. 63–66]
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underdetermination obtaining for the choice among rival theories. Choices among
Total Sciences fits awkwardly into this schema, but— I argue— this is to the credit
of the schema.
There is something suspicious about the notion of Total Sciences. Querists
never face choices between them. In actual enquiry, there is some matter in question and other matters presumed. It is possible, of course, that a querist should call
some assumption into question. Nevertheless, there is no moment when everything
is up for grabs. Underdetermination about Total Sciences can have no practical
upshot whatsoever. What would a Total Science look like? It is no coincidence
that philosophers’ examples always take the the form of comparing the usual Total
Science with a slight revision of itself; as with the example of flat space versus
curved space with appropriate corrections,44 we are given single theories as standins for Total Sciences. We are invited to think that a Total Science is something
we understand well enough. Since there is a body of scientific knowledge, then its
makes sense to think of it collected at a time— right?45
Consider who we would ask or where we would look if we wished to know
the state of Total Science. Perhaps Total Science includes only matters about which
all scientists agree. Complete consensus is a rare thing, though, so this would count
only the tiniest subset of what might plausibly be billed as scientific knowledge. If
it includes matters about which there is disagreement, then determining the state
of Total Science would be very difficult indeed. This may miss the point, since
the underdetermination of Total Science by evidence is a lesson only about the
situation of an individual querist. Even so, it is hard to know how the beliefs of a
single scientist could be seen as a Total Science. The scientist may have some sense
of which beliefs she believes qua scientist and which ones she believes qua citizen
or consumer, but this will not be a sharp division. Moreover, what she believes
44

The Quine/Poincaré example from §1.2.3. I take it up again in §4.1.2.
Kukla writes that “a total science is nothing more or less than the conjunction of any ‘partial’ theory
and all the auxiliary theories that we deem to be permissible. It does not matter which partial theory we
begin with— the end result will be the same” [Kuk96, p. 143, my emphasis]. Yet there is no guarantee
that this conjunction either exists or is well-defined.
45
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qua scientist may be inconsistent; she believes the theory of relativity, but also
quantum mechanics. It is impossible to sum up the beliefs of any actual querist
as a Total Science— if she does not believe even one Total Science, why should it
matter if she could not decide between several?
Again this may miss the point, since underdetermination of Total Science
is meant to obtain between empirically adequate and equivalent Total Sciences.
These Total Sciences might be thought of as sciences of the end times, sciences
which have answered all questions as adequately as questions might be answered.
Thinking in these terms can give no counsel to methodology. Hoefer and Rosenberg concede that “we can never be in a position to know a purportedly empirically
adequate total theory is in fact a total theory or empirically adequate. But this
epistemological truism does not undercut the conceptual point that two empirically adequate total theories would be nondefeasibly underdetermined by the evidence” [HR94, p. 595].46 This conceptual point that some Total Sciences may be
“nondefeasibly underdetermined” loses its force if no Total Sciences could ever be
defeasibly determined. The underdetermination of Total Science for the abstract
querist is at too far a remove from enquiry and methodology to be of interest to
concrete querists like us.
Kukla treats underdetermination as an issue within the context of debates
over realism. He deploys the notion of Total Science and concludes:
Realists will undoubtedly wish to attack the notion of a total science. Admittedly, this notion has been severely underanalyzed by
both friends and foes of [underdetermination]. But it remains to be
seen whether its obscurities affect the role it plays in the argument for
[underdetermination]. The prima facie case has been stated. The burden of proof is on realists to show why the total sciences version of the
underdetermination argument fails. [Kuk98, p. 66]
This is unsatisfying in several regards. Underdetermination is not merely an issue
between realists and anti-realists, nor have philosophers said so little that speaks
to the issue of Total Science. For the last two decades at least, a growing number
46

They attribute this “truism” to personal correspondence with Leplin.
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of philosophers have argued for a “picture of science as radically fractured and
disunified.”47 And these philosophers do not argue without precedent. Hacking
points out that William Whewell, who coined the world ‘scientist’ as a moniker
for a querist into nature, acknowledged the plurality of the sciences with titles
like The History of the Inductive Sciences and The Philosophy of the Inductive
Sciences, Founded upon Their History [Hac96, p. 37]. Yet in the latter of these
works, Whewell writes that the aim of Science is to bring matters under general
propositions “so as to form a large and systematic whole” [Whe89, p. 104]. There
is a long history of thinking of the sciences as a plurality but also one of thinking
that the sciences might make a Total Science. Without attempting to decide the
matter for once and all, let me only cast serious doubt on Kukla’s assessment
of where the burden of proof lies. Hacking writes that, “The unity of science is
rooted in an overarching metaphysical thought that expresses not a thesis but a
sentiment. Since it is not exactly a doctrine, it lacks straightforward expression”
[Hac96, p. 44]. It is only when we are in the grip of that sentiment that Total
Science seems a plausible enough thing to constitute even a prima facie case.
Note further that the unity of science would not necessarily entail the
existence of a final Total Science. As Paul Churchland suggests: “Just as there
is no largest positive integer, it may be that there is no best theory. It may be
that, for any theory whatsoever, there is always an even better theory, and so ad
infinitum” [Chu85, p. 46]. If possible states of science stand in an ordering relation
such that there is no supremum, then there would be no final sciences— not the
two or more required for underdetermination.
3.3.4

Verdict on auxiliaries
Within the framework of Ch I, there are forms of underdetermination

that result from the reliance on auxiliary hypotheses. Some of these are of narrow
scope: During times of controversy, for instance, specific auxiliary hypotheses may
47
[Dup96, p. 101] On the disunity of science, see also: Dupré [Dup83], Galison and Stump [GS96], and
Cartwright [Car99].
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come into dispute. Others suppose an unreasonable standard: Without trusting
in some auxiliaries, we can never say more than what we observe directly.

3.4

The road from semantics
In considering the Copernican example (from §3.3), I have so far supposed

that the rectilinear propagation of light, TL , is an assumption of a logical kind with
the hypotheses being tested— an assumption of more systematic importance than
those hypotheses, true, but different only in degree. Duhem writes of its centrality:
Was there. . . a clearer or more certain principle for thousands of years
than this one: In a homogenous medium, light is propagated in a
straight line? Not only did this hypothesis carry all former optics. . .
whose elegant geometric deductions represented at will the enormous
number of facts, but it had become, so to speak, the physical definition
of a straight line. [Duh54, p. 212, my italics]
Yet, Duhem adds, it was questioned to the betterment of enquiry.48 If we take the
notion of a ‘definition’ seriously and not merely as a manner of speech, then we
are left with a sort of underdetermination different from the ones we’ve considered
so far.
Consider the moment in gedanken history when it was discovered that
whales are warm-blooded.49 Prior to this, the term ‘fish’ took in all manner of
finned sea life, and common wisdom held the principle, F :
F All fish are cold-blooded.
The extension of ‘fish’ is a matter of definition while F is a commonly held theory
about fish. Querists are faced with an anomaly: a warm-blooded fish. They could
keep the definition of ‘fish’ and give up F . They could instead revise the definition
and stand by F ; they could specify paradigmatic fishiness in part by cold blood,
48

TL returned as an assumption and perhaps definition in General Relativity. Indeed, hay may be
made as to whether TL in a non-Euclidean spacetime is to be preferred over distorted light paths in a
flat spacetime. I defer the matter until §4.1.2.
49
This scenario is offered only to illustrate the confrontation between ‘facts’ and ‘definitions.’ The
immediate point is conceptual rather than historical.
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as we do. One course involves asserting ¬F and the other involves asserting F ;
these mythical querists seem to face a choice between the rival theories F and ¬F .
The choice between the two courses may be determined by good sense, as Duhem
suggests regarding a similar example [Duh54, pp. 210–1], but that is not obviously
so. Melville’s Ishmael, reflecting on the science of cetology, writes
. . . that in some quarters it still remains a moot point whether a whale
be a fish. In his System of Nature, A.D. 1776, Linnaeus declares, “I
hereby separate the whales from the fish.” But of my own knowledge,
I know that down to the year 1850, sharks and shad, alewives and
herring, against Linnaeus’s express edict, were still found dividing the
possession of the same seas with the Leviathan.
The grounds upon which Linnaeus would fain have banished the
whales from the waters, he states as follows: “On account of their
warm bilocular heart, their lungs, their movable eyelids, their hollow
ears. . . .” I submitted all this to my friends. . . and they united in the
opinion that the reasons set forth were altogether insufficient. Charley
profanely hinted they were humbug.
Be it known that, waiving all argument, I take the good old fashioned ground that the whale is a fish, and call upon holy Jonah to back
me. This fundamental thing settled, the next point is, in what internal respect does the whale differ from other fish. Above, Linnaeus has
given you those items. But in brief, they are these: lungs and warm
blood; whereas, all other fish are lungless and cold blooded. [Mel01,
ch. 32]
So we imagine querists faced with whales. Their choice between Linnaean and
Ishmaelean taxonomy— and thus between F and ¬F — is underdetermined with a
scope that includes their present and future circumstances. (They could escape the
underdetermination only by forgetting that whales are warm-blooded.) Because
a suitable redefinition of some terms in F could make the sentence true (or false)
however the world may be, this underdetermination is sometimes taken to entail
that querists may responsibly believe (or disbelieve) any theory come what may.
The querists need only adjust the meanings of the terms in the theory so that their
belief (or disbelief) remains justified.
The weakness of this form of underdetermination may readily be seen in
our mythical story of fish. The two paths open to the querists are not completely
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described as asserting or denying F . The first choice is to keep with the old use
of ‘fish’ and deny the ‘F .’ The second is to self-consciously revise what is meant
by ‘fish’ and to accept ‘F .’ Let Fish1 stand for the sense of ‘fish’ in use among
the querists prior to this crisis: finned creature of the sea. Let Fish2 be the sense
counseled by the second course: gill-breathing, egg-laying, lacking in hollow ears
or moveable eyelids, and so on. We might better express the options open to the
community as F1 and F2 :
F1 Some Fish1 are warm-blooded.
F2 All Fish2 are cold-blooded.
Although F1 is equivalent to one reading of ¬F and F2 is equivalent to one reading
of F , F1 and F2 are not contradictory. We have defined underdetermination in
such a way that the rivals need not be exclusive, and indeed it is best to see the
two courses as genuine rivals of a sort. Good methodology advises against lexical
bifurcations that might leave the querists’ descendents with an indefinite number
of terms Fishn . Nevertheless, the logical compatibility of the rivals suggests that
this underdetermination holds no profound lessons about all theory choice. F1 and
F2 each represent a fact that the querists should acknowledge regardless of which
rival course they take— especially since the extensions of ‘finned creature of the
sea’ and ‘gill-breathing, . . . creature of the sea’ remain the same on either course.
It is tempting to say that the theories held by the querists in either case would
be the same, even though their different jargon would lead them to express the
theories differently. I stop short of succumbing to this temptation, mindful that I
have no general identity criteria for theories.50 It suffices to say that regardless of
how nomenclature is arranged, any theory should allow for discourse about Fish1
and Fish2 under some labels. Such a theory would have advantages over any theory
which had no taxonomic category corresponding to our category ‘fish’ (i.e., Fish2 )
or no way of referring to finned sea life (i.e., Fish1 ). Ishmael, insisting that whales
50

See the discussion in §1.2.3.
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are fish on the ground that they divide the sea with other fish and on the ground
of common usage, insists that ‘fish’ should mean Fish1 . Yet he readily concedes
that whales are different than other fish— that they are warm-blooded and so on—
and so he has the resources to talk about Fish2 . The disagreement is about labels
rather than about concepts.
Quine suggests that querists might save favorite beliefs by revising logical
laws [Qui53, p. 43] and that this would be done by changing the meaning of logical
terms. He later wrote that, in invoking Duhem, he is “not concerned even to
avoid the trivial extreme of sustaining a law by changing a meaning. . .” [Qui76,
p. 132]. His aim, rather, is to show only that there is no fundamental difference
between meanings and facts. However that may be, on Quinean grounds there
are criteria of theory identity, and the two options above offer the same theory.51
Thus, for Quine, underdetermination due to semantic revision would not amount
to underdetermination of theories at all.
The fact that the assertion ‘F’ can be preserved says neither much about
holism nor about underdetermination. The former, because the whole language
is never at issue— it is simply a question of what expressions pick out these two
categories. The latter, because we may judge against theories that lack taxonomic
categories present in their rivals. If the categories are frivolous, then our decision
may go the other way. Regardless, we may decide.52

3.5

The road from voiding observation
The Copernican example from §3.3 can also be used to illustrate a dif-

ferent sort of underdetermination. Treating it merely as a hypothetico-deductive
problem, theory TF and auxiliaries TL entail the negation of some observation O:
i.e., (TF &TL ) → ¬O. We stand on the shore and watch. Most of us are satisfied
that we have observed O. Yet suppose there is one among us— call him Chester—
51
52

See the discussion of Quine on theory identity in §1.2.3
We should have as many categories as we need, but not more. Ockham’s razor cuts both ways.
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who is especially fond of TF . He has heard what has been said so far, and he sees
no point in trying to deny TL . After a moment, he hits on the idea of denying
O. Stepping away from the group, he admits that we and he have been in circumstances that we describe as observing O, but he is under no obligation to accept
our reports as veridical.
In effect, he hopes that the choice between TF and TR is underdetermined
in a way that we had not appreciated before. The scope of the underdetermination
would contain any circumstances in which we could ever find ourselves, because
he denies that any circumstance that seems to be an observation disconfirming TF
is actually such an observation. (The scope includes, Chester hopes, all naturally
possible circumstances.) The standard of responsibility allows one to assume any
auxiliary theories, provided they are not so strong that they determine the question
a priori. Yet the standard is strange, because it permits our recalcitrant friend to
deny that we have observed O, even when he has seen it with his own eyes. As
we saw in Ch II, perverse mistrust of the senses leads to scepticism. Of course,
Chester is always free to raise a particular doubt about what has happened; he
may ask, “How can we be sure what we saw, through all the haze?” or “If that
was a ship going out to sea, why did the image flicker like a projected movie?” If
he claims not to have seen O but offers no such reason for doubt, we would suspect
his eyesight. Suppose, then, that his powers of observation match ours when TF is
not at issue. Absent some reason for doubt, it seems, he should concede O.
Yet, Chester says, he does have a reason for doubt: TF is true, he believes, but O (along with accepted auxiliary theories) entails ¬TF . Since O is false,
Chester argues, he has reason to doubt that any observations of O are veridical.
Chester might offer this analogy: Stage magicians are able to perform many feats
that we are tempted to describe as ‘Making things appear and disappear.’ Nevertheless, we have this background assumption that macroscopic, physical objects
can only move from place to place by following a continuous path; they don’t just
disappear one place and appear another place. We don’t take stage magic as a rea-
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son to seriously question this assumption, even if fellow audience members gawk
and say that the pig has disappeared, that the lady has turned into a tiger, or
whatall else.
There is an important disanalogy here, of course. There is a social convention of magic shows. Part of this convention is that the magician arranges
circumstances such that the audience is deceived. We expect at magic shows that
things will not be as they seem. Indeed, deception is essential to magic of this kind.
Sword swallowers (who actually slide swords down their throats) and fire eaters
(who actually extinguish flames with their mouths) are not considered magicians.
Because of this convention, we have other background knowledge that makes us
suspicious of the magic trick. Even if I do not know how the trick is done, our
community has experts that do know— viz., magicians. And I do know the secrets
of some similar legerdemain.
In these cases, it is important that the observation not be described in a
way that begs the question against one of the rivals. At the magic show, we might
describe our observation in any of several ways:
A1 A woman disappeared in the sense that she could be seen and then moments
later she was gone without having been seen to leave.
A2 A woman was made to appear to vanish by some contrivance.
A3 A woman traced out a discontinuous path in space.
Chester supposes we dismiss A3 simply because we think that nothing traces out
discontinuous paths in space. However, we do not dismiss the possibility of electron
tunnelling on this basis. There must be something more going on here. We say
that A2 is a true description of the situation— it might count as what we observed
under some circumstances— but if we want to consider both rivals we do not
merely describe what we saw in a way that dismisses A3 . If we describe what we
see in a conservative way (A1 ), we may still infer A2 on the basis of our knowledge
about the ordinary world and our knowledge about magic shows.
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Chester’s attempt to void the Copernican observation can be handled in
a similar way. We might describe the observation O in different ways:
O1 When the ship was near to shore, we could see its hull and mast; when it was
further away, its mast seemed lower and we could not see its hull at all.
O2 The ships hull was occulted by the curvature of the Earth when it was far
away.
If we meant the observation to test TR , then we can not say that we directly
observed O2 . Note, however, that there is no analog of A3 here. Chester has no
way of describing the observation that makes it congenial to his flat-earth dogma.53
If he digs in his heels, we might revise O1 to speak of the ship appearing to be near
shore, and so on. Yet he must at some point admit that he observed something.
Chester might then reply in a number of ways. First, he might simply accept O1
but insist that TF is well enough confirmed that this observation cannot overthrow
it. This is fine, but he must at least admit that this is an anomaly and a problem
for TF . One anomaly need not be decisive, but it adds incremental weight against
the theory. Second, he might say that there is no legitimate inference from O1 to
O2 . He would be forced to challenge the background assumptions that underwrite
the inference, so we’d just have the familiar DQ problem. Third, he might dismiss
the observation as a freak error. We may repeat it, however, on other days with
different ships and from different beaches. None of these responses are sufficient
to warrant Chester’s merely throwing out observations of this kind.
The point about observation made here is illustrated in Trevor Pinch’s
study of solar neutrino experiments [Pin85]. Neutrinos only effect other particles
in weak force interactions, so they are hard to detect. The solar neutrino detector
Pinch discusses is a 100,000-gallon tank of dry-cleaning fluid located in a shaft deep
beneath the Earth. The fluid contains an isotope of chlorine that can interact with
neutrinos to produce an isotope of argon (Ar37 ). The argon is collected, and a geiger
53
An account in terms of sagging light beams or whatall else is precluded by his acceptance of TL . If
he reneges on this, then the case is just of the kind considered in §3.3.
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counter is used to detect when it decays. The number of clicks on the geiger counter
indicates the number of Ar37 atoms, which in turn indicates the number of neutrino
interactions, which indicates finally the number of neutrinos passing through the
detector. Pinch points out that observations made using this apparatus may be
characterized in many ways: “(a) Splodges on a graph were observed. (b) Ar37
atoms were observed. (c) Solar neutrinos were observed” [Pin85, p. 9]. Scientists
who built the detector described their observation as (c). Challengers argued that
the observation should not be understood in that way, but could agree to (b) or at
least (a). Specific auxilliary hypothesis came into question and could be explicitly
debated.
Pinch introduces the notion of externality to organize the different reports. Of these three, (a) is of the least externality and (c) of the greatest. An
observation increases in externality the more it relies on background theory— in
Pinch’s idiom, the more the evidential context must be specified. Just as I may
report A2 or O2 as what I observed, the scientists report (c). If and when these
reports are challenged, we withdraw to a report of less externality about which
both we and the challenger can agree. As Pinch notes, this feature of observation
amounts to the DQ Thesis [Pin85, p. 14]. Thus, doubting observations does not
lead to a different kind of underdetermination. (Sorry, Chester.)
This chapter has explored top-down arguments that underdetermination
is ubiquitous and a fortiori important. These arguments, I hope to have shown, either fail to prove that genuine underdetermination is ubiquitous or succeed in doing
so only for uninteresting and a fortiori unimportant kinds of underdetermination.
The fact that woeful underdetermination is not essential to our epistemic situation doesn’t show that there isn’t important underdetermination for all or most
scientific problems, however. The next chapter turns to arguments that begin at
the level of particular examples.

IV

Bottom-up Arguments
“[O]ver-simplification, schematization, and constant obsessive repetition of the same small range of jejune ‘examples’ are. . . far too common to be dismissed as an occasional weakness of philosophers.”
—J.L. Austin [Aus62, p. 3]
Whereas the arguments of the previous chapter concerned underdetermination in the abstract, other arguments begin with particular cases of underdetermination. Then, as Earman writes, “the production of a few concrete examples
is enough to generate the worry that only a lack of imagination on our part prevents us from seeing comparable examples of underdetermination all over the map”
[Ear93, p. 31]. These bottom-up arguments thus consist of two moments. The first
involves showing that some cases of theory choice are underdetermined. The second
involves generalizing from the case studies. Bottom-up arguments can go wrong
at either moment. Some alleged cases of underdetermination are not underdetermined at all— more often, they are underdetermined but only for a narrow scope or
unreasonably strict standard. Other arguments correctly identify interesting cases
in which underdetermination follows from specific features of the rival theories, but
where the specific case may lead us to expect underdetermination in its borough
but not all over the the map. Thus, objections to bottom-up arguments may take
two forms. One is to deny the alleged the underdetermination, leveraging plausible
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commitments where necessary. The other is to contain the underdetermination by
showing that it arises out of special features of particular cases.
In §4.1, I consider several geometrical examples of alleged underdetermination that call for objections of both kinds. The geometrical cases typically offer
single instances of underdetermination.
In §4.2, I turn to arguments that aim to reveal historical patterns of
underdetermination in hopes of underwriting an induction from the history of
science. A great deal depends, of course, on what sample one attempts to provide.
In §4.3, I consider attempts to exploit underdetermination in the cause
of relativism. Exploring an empirical, moderate relativism, I discuss a trio of cases
that might be seen to favor the relativist.
If I have succeeded, I will have shown by the end of the chapter that
none of the cases here underwrite bottom-up arguments. The discussion might be
extended mutatis mutandis to other cases, but there is no way of showing that no
examples could succeed where these fail. That’s life.

4.1

The road from geometry
Geometry, as a mathematical enterprise, is in one sense free from under-

determination. Gödel’s incompleteness result entails something that might count
as underdetermination, of course, but only about the truth of esoteric things like
Gödel sentences. It is possible to prove in Euclidean geometry that the angles of
a triangle add up to two right angles, and there is no further question about it for
Euclidean geometry.
For a claim in the natural sciences, things are never so easy. There is
always a question about whether Euclidean geometry describes anything interesting in the world. It is important, then, to distinguish between a geometry as a
mathematical structure and the actual geometry of the universe. Claims about
actual geometry, about space, and about spacetime are dogged by allegations of
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underdetermination.
4.1.1

Absolute velocity
Start with a simple example from Bas van Fraassen [van80, pp. 46–7].

Consider Newtonian mechanics with its absolute, Euclidean space; call this N .
Now consider a point determined by the configuration of stuff in the universe—
the center of mass for the whole universe, let’s say. Let Mv be the hypothesis
that this point is moving at velocity v. Now (N &M0 ) is the claim that Newtonian
mechanics holds and that the universe— as a composite— is at rest, while (N &M7 )
agrees on the mechanics but entails that the universe is moving at seven feet per
second. Newtonian mechanics is Galilean invariant (that is, the laws are preserved
under uniform changes in velocity), so it looks as if there would be no observable
difference between (N &M0 ) and (N &M7 ). The choice between them seems to be
underdetermined.
We might hope to find evidence that would decide between the two. Suppose we had a device— a sort of übergyroscope— that pinged if it was at rest
in absolute space but remained silent otherwise.1 We need only move the device around and see when it pings. If it pings when it matches velocity with the
universe, then M0 wins out. Two obvious objections suggest themselves.
First, one may object that each (N &Mi ) was meant to be a total theory
in the sense that it could account for all phenomena; since N does not allow for
übergyros, then such a counterfactual gizmo could not decide between them. Total
sciences are dubious things, however; we already have reason to be suspicious of
them.2 Moreover, it would be a mistake to understand (N &M0 ) as being total.
N includes both the laws of mechanics and a collection of force laws— as Mark
Wilson notes, “At no point during the reign of classical mechanics was this set
of [force] laws ever fully established or agreed upon” [Wil80, p. 216]. Thus, the
1

This übergyro is equivalent to hypothetical auxiliary theories entertained by Laudan and Leplin
[LL91, p. 458]. These posit a new kind particle that arises with absolute motion.
2
From the discussion in the preceding chapter, §3.3.3.
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übergyro’s operation might exploit some force law not included in the usual list.
Second, one may object that adherents of M7 could accommodate this
evidence by providing a different account of how the device works— they would
say that it pings only when going in some particular direction at seven feet per
second. This objection supposes that the account of how the device works could be
varied without loss of credibility, but that might not be so. It depends on why we
believed the gyro indicated something about the motion of absolute space in the
first place, and of course the thought experiment is underspecified in this regard.
The device, as described, is rather far-fetched. Regardless, it shows that the scope
of this alleged underdetermination only takes in circumstances where we have got
neither such a device nor an equivalently serviceable theory.
Even so, one must admit that M0 and M7 are underdetermined with respect to one another, given N . To describe the case fully: The rivals (N &M0 ) and
(N &M7 ); the scope takes in all circumstances in which we do not have übergyros
or their equivalent; the standard is (it seems) any plausible one. However, this
scenario will not underwrite a bottom-up argument for the ubiquity of underdetermination. It relies on special features of the rivalry between M0 and M7 . This
can be made clear in two ways.
First, we might think about velocity as relational rather than absolute
and thus insist that the alleged rivalry between M0 and M7 amounts to nothing.
We have already seen Poincaré’s relationalism in §1.2.3, but a relational account
of velocity is open to us even if we maintain contra Poincaré that rotation and
acceleration are absolute.3 The choice between the relationalist analogs of these
two theories is not underdetermined. We are invited to generalize from the rivalry
between (N &M0 ) and (N &M7 ), invited to conclude that all or most theory choices
are underdetermined. Yet we might just as easily generalize from the their relationalist analogs, concluding that there is little or no underdetermination.4 The
3

Earman [Ear89, ch. 2] provides a thorough discussion of these possibilities.
One might even generalize from the two rivalries and conclude that about half of the theory choices
in science are underdetermined. In short, there is no unobjectionable way to generalize from these cases.
4
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original case does not underwrite any robust bottom-up argument.
Second— even if we insist on thinking in terms of absolute velocity— this
underdetermination scenario relies on underdetermination not being ubiquitous. If
we knew N , then we would know quite a lot about the world; our inability to decide
between M0 and M7 would be a rather narrow inability. It would be a kernel of
ignorance on an earful knowledge. In this way, the case would undercut bottom-up
arguments.
4.1.2

Geometry and universal forces
In both M0 and M7 , the actual geometry was assumed to be Euclidean.

Imagine trying to test that assumption. You find two allegedly parallel lines and
measure the distance between them. You then walk thirty meters along one of
the lines, measure the distance between them again, and so on into infinity. If
space were of constant curvature, there would be three possibilities: the distance is
constant, the distance increases, or the distance decreases. These would correspond
respectively to Euclidean, hyperbolic, and elliptical geometry.
This test can only be decisive, however, if your ability to measure length
is unaffected by your tour of the universe. Suppose that the lines move closer
together as you go along, but that your meter stick shrinks by a corresponding
amount each time you move. You would measure the distance as being the same
each time and conclude (wrongly) that the actual geometry is Euclidean.
Your situation would be like the situation of the monkeys in figure 4.1.
The figure has an infinite number of inhabitants, and to them it appears as if they
are on an infinite Euclidean plane. They exist in a finite space, however, because
they shrink as they move away from the center.5
So regardless of whether you measure the distance as remaining constant, as increasing, or as decreasing, the actual geometry might have any constant
5

Their situation is complicated, because their whole world is embedded in the Euclidean plane of the
printed page. Thus they would rightly think that the actual space of their world is Euclidean, but for
the wrong reasons, and they would mistakenly think that their world occupied infinite space.
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Figure 4.1: The monkeys grow smaller the further they are from the center. Since
everything shrinks along with them, they don’t notice the change. It seems to
them as if there is an infinite grid of similarly-sized monkeys.
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curvature— supposing that your meter stick changes appropriately in length as you
move. You would not notice that it was changing in length, because you would
be changing right along with it. Generalizing, we arrive at Hans Reichebach’s
Theorem θ:
Given a geometry G0 to which the measuring instruments conform, we
can imagine a universal force F which affects the instruments in such
a way that the actual geometry is an arbitrary geometry G, while the
observed deviation from G is due to a universal deformation of the
measuring instruments. [Rei58, p. 33]
There does not seem to be any evidence that could show the absence of universal
forces. Appeal to simplicity is, as Reichenbach notes, equivocal. One may say
that it is simpler to suppose that there are no universal forces, but some say that
Euclidean geometry is the simplest geometry [Rei58, p. 34]. So, Theorem θ entails
that actual geometry is underdetermined: The choice between ‘Space has actual
geometry G’ and ‘Space has actual geometry G0 ’ is underdetermined with wide
scope for any standard that does not allow us determine the effect of universal
forces a priori.6
From actual geometry to physical geometry
Let’s grant for the moment that this is a bona fide case of underdetermination. As you wander the universe with your meter stick, you will never be able
to determine the actual geometry of space. However, we might ask whether the
measured distance between the two lines varies as you move along them. Any deformation that effects both the lines, your meter stick, and you would be irrelevant.
Thus, your observations would be sufficient to determine the physical geometry of
space, the system of relations that obtains among objects even as they are moved
around. The question of what physical geometry space has is not underdetermined
in the way that the question of its actual geometry is.7
6

Boyd calls this the paradigm example of underdetermination [Boy73, p. 5].
The term ‘physical geometry’ is probably ambiguous. Hempel (for instance) uses the term to mean
“the theory of the structure of physical space” [Hem49, p. 244] and to pick out what I have here called
7
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One may object that a real meter stick will expand or contract as its
temperature changes. If you infer the physical geometry of the universe from the
behavior of transported meter sticks, then you will say that the physical geometry has variable curvature and depends on the local temperature. However, as
Adolf Grünbaum explains, “Physical geometry is usually conceived as the system
of metric relations exhibited by transported solid bodies independently of their
particular chemical composition.”8 Thermal deformations depend on the composition of the thing deformed— for example, bimetallic strips bend because the two
metals undergo different amounts of expansion or contraction. Thus, we need to
abstract from thermal deformation to determine the physical geometry. This is
possible because we have a theory that governs thermal contraction and expansion. It’s possible to correct for them, using auxiliary theories from dynamics and
thermodynamics. Hempel sees this reliance on auxiliaries as the crux of the issue,
maintaining “that the test of a physical geometry G always presupposes a certain
body P of non-geometrical physical hypotheses (including the physical theory of
the instruments of measurement and observation used in the test), and that the
so-called test of G actually bears on the combined theoretical system G·P rather
than on G alone” [Hem49, p. 247]. Indeed, the reliance on auxiliary hypotheses
is often alleged to engender underdetermination; this is the familiar Duhem-Quine
Thesis. I argued in §3.3 that these worries can be answered. If the arguments
there were insufficient, then underdetermination would tear down everything and
the consideration of geometry would add nothing but a flourish. So let’s set concerns about auxiliaries to one side and see if the underdetermination of geometry
amounts to anything more.
One may object that this talk about physical geometry begs the question
by supposing that there are no universal forces. Indeed, if there were no universal
forces, then physical geometry and actual geometry would be the same. Yet you
the actual geometry of space. I follow Reichenbach and Grünbaum in using the term to pick out concrete
relations between bodies.
8
[Grü60, p. 78, his emphasis], reprinted as [Grü76]; cf. [Rei58, p. 37].
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need not suppose that there are no universal forces. Whatever the universal forces
might be, they interact with the actual geometry to produce some net effect on
measured distances. The physical geometry is thus the sum of actual geometry
and universal forces.9
The underdetermination entailed by Theorem θ only holds if we ask about
actual geometry; it is resolved if we ask instead about physical geometry. The
underdetermination turns on special features of the rivals considered and, thus,
it will not underwrite a bottom-up argument. There is no reason to think that
scientific theory choice in general is more like the choice of a geometry than like
the choice of a physical geometry. Why should we generalize from one rather than
from the other?
The peculiarity of universal forces
What has been said so far would be enough to undercut any bottom-up
argument based on Theorem θ. Even so, let’s reopen the question of whether the
actual geometry of space is underdetermined. Calling uniform deformations of
meter sticks universal forces suggests that they would be phenomena like others
already admitted in science. That is, it suggests that universal forces would be
merely another entry on the list of forces— arranged alphabetically below electromagnetic and gravitational forces, perhaps. This use of the word ‘forces’, however,
is misleading. Classical forces obey and are perhaps even defined by Newton’s
formula F = ma; the acceleration due to gravity or electromagnetism is inversely
proportional to the mass of an object. The universal forces are presumed to affect
all meter sticks and observers equally, regardless of their mass. As you tour the
universe, the universal forces would need to shift around your flesh just to the
degree they shift around your bones. They would warp massive meter sticks to the
same degree as they warp flimsy ones. Thus, universal forces would not be forces
in a strict sense. They would be sui generis deformations. It seems that “in the
9

This point is made by Reichenbach, but developed in greater detail by Glymour [Gly80, ch. 9].
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end, such ‘forces’ are no better than ‘phantom effects’ and we are left with just
another skeptical fantasy” [Sta01, fn. 6 p. S6].10
This point will be clearest if we try to give a formal specification of what
universal forces must be. We might try to describe the universal forces at work
in figure 4.1. If we declare the point (0, 0) to be the center of the monkey-space,
then we can map points (x, y) in the actual geometry of the undistorted plane into
points (x0 , y 0 ) in the monkey’s physical geometry:11
x0 = x(.75x )
y 0 = y(.75y )
Yet this doesn’t tell us about universal forces. For that, we need to understand
the dynamics. This could perhaps be accomplished by finding the distortion of
velocities ~v into velocities ~v 0 and so on, but that would be a tricky business.
Consider instead a simpler example. Imagine a universe with one spatial
dimension and deformations that operate in a narrow band so as to make objects
on the right side twice the size of objects on the left. Now consider a rocket ship
approaching the universal forces from the left. As the nose of the rocket passes
through the universal forces, it must begin to go faster than its tail, such that it
stretches relative to the back end. As the tail passes through the universal forces,
it undergoes a similar acceleration such that the various parts of the rocket are all
moving with uniform velocity when it has cleared the region of universal forces.
See figure 4.2.
When the final length of the rocket is twice the initial length, the final
velocity is twice the initial velocity. Each part of the rocket is accelerated to twice
its prior velocity as it passes through the universal forces; the universal force at a
point exerts an acceleration on things that depends on their velocity. No classical
forces are velocity dependent.12 They could not be without breaking classical
10

This remark is from Kyle Stanford, who attributes the point to David Malament.
(.75) is the rate of shrinkage. There is nothing important about the precise number; any constant
fraction would do. The particular value was selected only so as to make figure 4.1 aesthetically pleasing.
12
Except perhaps friction, but this is sometimes taken as a reason to think that friction is not a
11
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Figure 4.2: At t1 , the rocket approaches the region of universal forces from the
left. At t2 , it has entered the region and its nose is moving faster than its tail. At
t3 , it has left the region and the various parts of the rocket are once again moving
with uniform velocity.
mechanics’ Galilean invariance.
Of course, things passing through the universal forces don’t always double
in velocity. A rocket moving from right to left will have its velocity cut in half,
as in figure 4.3. Since the effect of universal forces has both a magnitude and a
direction, we can express the universal force at a point as a vector. As a particle
passes through a point, the universal force at that point acts so as to increase any
component of the particle’s velocity in the direction of the universal force and to
decrease any component in the opposite direction. For all space, we can represent
the universal forces as a vector field.
So, as a formal matter, we can represent the universal forces at work in
figure 4.1 as a vector field, as in figure 4.4. The vectors correspond to a velocitydependent acceleration. Let ~u be the universal force at a point, let ~v be the velocity
of a particle at the point, and let proj(~v , ~u) be the projection of ~v onto ~u. The
acceleration due to universal forces is then given by


 (|~
u| − 1) proj(~v , ~u)

~a = 

if proj(~v , ~u) is in the same direction as ~u,

 (|~
u|−1 − 1) proj(~v , ~u) otherwise.

fundamental force.
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Figure 4.3: A rocket approaching the universal forces from the right has its velocity
reduced. Since the nose slows down before the tail, the rocket’s length is also
reduced.
It may not be obvious that the equation should take this form, but the reader will
perhaps rest content with applying it to the rocket ships in figure 4.2 and figure 4.3.
Supposing the band of universal forces to be of unit length, then the magnitude
of the universal force is 2. So the rocket moving from left to right undergoes an
acceleration of (2 − 1)v = v and acquires a final velocity of 2v. The rocket moving
from right to left undergoes an acceleration of ( 12 − 1)v = − 12 v and acquires a final
velocity of 12 v. These are the results we arrived at above in considering the case.
The important point is that the so-called universal force turns out to be
an acceleration on every object that depends on the magnitude and direction of
the object’s velocity. They are unlike any other processes admitted in our science.
Unless they were to have some further rôle in our physical theory, they would be
nothing more that sceptical scenarios. Any reasonable standard of theory choice
will allow us— absent further evidence of their existence— to deny that there are
any universal forces.13
13

Snider argues that universal forces in the sense discussed here only make sense in the context of
classical mechanics anyway. She writes, “Considering space-time there is no analoque to self-identical
rods which may be transported or which may undergo deformations” [Sni67, p. 65].
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Figure 4.4: The universal forces at work in figure 4.1 can be respresented as a
vector field.
4.1.3

Multiple connection rivals massive reduplication
As discussed in the previous section, underdetermination about metric

structure may be avoided either by shifting our attention from actual geometry to
physical geometry or by eschewing universal forces as sui generis monstrosities. Yet
the topology of physical geometry remains underdetermined, as a simple thought
experiment demonstrates.
Around the universe in 80 days
Imagine you were to board a rocket ship and fly in a straight line away
from Earth. After some time, you find yourself approaching Earth— or so it seems.
It’s a blue-green planet orbiting a yellow sun, matching the planet you left behind
to any discernible degree of detail. You might think you’ve flown in a circle, but
you check your instruments and conclude that indeed you’ve gone in a straight line
away from Earth. Is this planet Earth? How could you tell?
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Let S1 be the theory that space is a finite cube wherein opposite sides are
identified, such that anything reaching the top side would emerge on the bottom,
anything reaching the back would emerge at the front, and anything passing to
the right side would emerge at the left.14 If S1 were true, then the planet would
be Earth. Like the astronaut in figure 4.5, you’d have flown away from Earth and
arrived back there.
Let S2 be the theory that space is a finite volume with its contents repeated twice over. Space is connected as in S1 but is larger, such that when you
arrive at this blue-green planet you’ve made it half-way across the universe. If S2
were true, you’d have arrived at the likeness of Earth and not at Earth itself. The
situation would be like figure 4.6.
What could you do to decide between S1 and S2 ? You might retrace your
path to Earth and ask if you’d been seen coming the other way— if they saw you
from Earth, then your journey had taken you to Earth and you could conclude
that S1 was correct. Yet how could they be sure it was you that they saw? If S2
were true, the other planet would be an exact likeness, so it too would have sent
out a rocket ship. Your friends on Earth would be unable to tell whether it was
you or an indistinguishable likeness they had seen.
It looks as if your choice between S1 and S2 might be underdetermined
for any evidence. Of course, you might entertain theories S3 , S4 , S5 , . . ., in each of
which space is larger than in the last and there is one more planet sending out one
more rocket. You may even entertain the limit case, Sω , in which space is infinite
and there are an infinite number of indistinguishable planets launching an infinite
number of rocket ships.15
Let S stand for {Sn : 1 ≤ n ≤ ω}. If your selection from {S1 , S2 } is underdetermined, then your selection from S will similarly be underdetermined.
14

This is equivalent to supposing that space is a 3-dimensional torus. You might worry instead that
space is a Klein Bottle or that space is infinite in one or even two dimensions; such variants may be
plugged into the discussion that follows mutatis mutandis.
15
Transfinite theories of the form Sω+n are ruled out; you can travel in either direction, so both the
successor and the predecessor of each element must be defined.
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Figure 4.5: In finite space, the intrepid spaceman travels directly away from his
planet only to arrive back home.

Figure 4.6: Space is larger but still finite. The intrepid spaceman travels directly
away from his planet to arrive at an identical planet, while an astronaut leaving
from the other planet travels to the first spaceman’s home.

Figure 4.7: In infinite space, the intrepid spaceman travels to one of an infinite
series of identical planets while an infinite number of other astronauts do the same.
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Indexicality
In Individuals, P.F. Strawson famously worries about the possibility of
one sector of the universe repeating another down to the last detail. He calls
this possibility “massive reduplication” [Str59, p. 20]. If our Si obtains for i > 1,
then massive reduplication would be realized. We should, then, consider whether
Strawson’s discussion sheds any light on the rivalry between the members of S.
He writes “that we build up our single picture of the world, of particular things
and events, untroubled by possibilities of massive reduplications, content, sometimes, with the roughest locations of the situations and objects we speak of. . . .
This we do quite rationally, confident in a certain community of experiences and
sources of instruction” [Str59, p. 28–9]. This seems to suggest that we might “quite
rationally” accept S1 , but a moment’s reflection will show that this is not so.
Strawson is initially worried about massive reduplication in the context
of considering whether singular reference can be secured by means of descriptions.
For any non-indexical description that we could know to hold of an object, he
notes, we could not rule out the possibility that some other object also matches
that description. Thus, massive reduplication arises as the worry that even a
detailed description of a thing’s environment might fail to individuate it if an indistinguishable thing-cum-environment exists elsewhere in the universe. Strawson
resolves this worry by noting that we can employ indexical descriptions, picking
out the thing as ‘this’ or ‘that’, its environment as ‘here’ or ‘there’, and so on. He
writes that to answer the worry about massive reduplication, “it is sufficient to
show how the situation of non-demonstrative identification may be linked with the
situation of demonstrative identification” [Str59, p. 20]. It is not always possible
to indexically specify an object, for instance if it is far away and out of sight.
Nevertheless, it is possible to say where the thing is and to specify that location
relative to here. We can can pick out a thing by specifying its location in some
sector of space, and the question of how that specification picks out one individual
“may be answered by relating that sector uniquely to the sector which speaker
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and hearer themselves currently occupy” [Str59, p. 20]. Thus, for Strawson, we
can always pick out an object with indexicals because we can place it in a unified
spatiotemporal system.
It is important to notice that Strawson’s argument does not show that
massive reduplication does not obtain, nor does Strawson claim to show that—
Strawson shows, at most, that the possibility of massive reduplication should not
trouble our ordinary practices of identifying individuals. Your situation after flying
across the universe in your rocket ship is extraordinary, however, and may cause
ordinary practice to break down. The morning before you leave on your journey,
you know that you are in your house on your home planet, Earth— that Earth is
the planet here and now. After your rocket journey, you arrive at a planet indistinguishable from your Earth. Imagine you land and go to a house indistinguishable
from your house. Your key (which you brought with you) unlocks the door. You
go inside. You climb into a bed like your bed in every detail and go to sleep.
Strawson argues that the possibility of reidentifying objects in this way is
presumed by our conceptual scheme. For this reason, the sceptic about reidentification is horribly confused; he accepts our concepts in asking whether it is possible
to reidentify individuals, but reneges on them in suggesting that reidentification
is impossible; “He pretends to accept a conceptual scheme, but at the same time
quietly rejects one of the conditions of its employment” [Str59, p. 35]. The rivalry
between the members of S does raise doubts about your attempt to reidentify this
new planet as the one you left, but none of the members of S demand rejection
of our usual conceptual scheme. They all allow for unproblematic intra-planetary
reference.
The fact that you identify your home planet with an indexical— as your
home planet— doesn’t help you resolve whether this planet you arrive at is your
home planet, whether this is your house, or whether this is your bed. In the
scenario we are imagining, indexical reference to things back on the planet you left
is unproblematic. Strawson thinks that having a single, spatio-temporal framework
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is required for referencing particulars. Since each of member of S posits a single
spatio-temporal framework, Strawsonian considerations do not distinguish between
them. The members of S disagree with one another as to what properties the
framework would have, and that is the crux of the issue.
So it looks as if you have no way of knowing whether the bed you sleep in
after you arrive is your bed at all. Of course, the residents of the planet on which
you are sleeping are in no better position to decide between the members of S than
you are.16 You have landed, gone into a house, and gone to sleep. If it is your
house, then you have every right to do so. If it is not, then you are trespassing
on the property of their heroic astronaut. Their heroic astronaut is on the next
planet over sleeping in an identical bed, but what is that to them? If they believe
¬S1 , then they have grounds to arrest you.
If the problem is indeed underdetermined, then they will not have reasonable grounds to decide whether S1 is true or not. They may adopt an agnostic
position and refuse to affirm or deny any of the members of S, or they may adopt
a fideist position and believe one of the members of S on faith.17 If the latter,
they should welcome you if they are charmed by S1 but arrest you otherwise. If
the former, their choice is not so easy. Although they don’t wish to believe any
member of S, they are forced to act toward you in some way or other. They might
reason in this way: Since no considerations could favor a member of S over any
of the others, then they should assume that the members of S are equiprobable.18
They know that if S1 is true, then you are their hero, but if some other member of
S is true, then you should be arrested. S1 is measure zero in S, so they may safely
ignore that possibility. You are arrested for trespassing in the night, and you are
forced to sell your rocket ship to pay legal fees. Tragic, no?19
16

If S1 is true, then the residents are we Earthlings. Otherwise, not.
Fideism and agnosticism are here meant in the sense developed in §1.3.3.
18
This appeal to the principle of indifference would be irresponsible of them, I suppose.
19
The tragedy is acute, since either you were jailed unfairly (if S1 is true) or other poor astronauts are
treated as roughly as you are (otherwise).
17
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Simplicity itself
It seems that in order to avoid arrest, you must show that the choice
between members of S is not underdetermined and that S1 is to be preferred. You
note that if S1 describes the universe as having m objects in it, then Sn describes
the universe as having n · m objects. Invoking Occam’s Razor, you conclude that
S1 wins out. Yet the prosecutor may insist that Occam’s Razor applies to kinds
rather than to individuals and note that the ontological excess of Sω consists of
more things but no more kinds. He insists further that infinite space is sufficiently
simpler than unbounded, finite space to justify believing that space is infinite
whenever possible. Thus, he concludes, Sω is to be preferred. Insofar as simplicity
is an underanalyzed desideratum, it is unclear what the jury should make of these
appeals.
Empirical equivalence
It may be tempting at this point to say that the members of S are all
empirically adequate and that there is no way to decide between them. Whatever
else might be said about empirical equivalence— and a great deal was said in the
previous chapter— the members of S are not empirically equivalent. Suppose we
consider theories empirically equivalent if they entail all the same observation sentences. Given S1 , you can truly say upon arriving to the planet, ‘Here is Earth.’
Given any other member of S, you cannot make this observation. Thus the theories
would not be equivalent. We might instead follow Quine [Qui75] and adopt a behaviorist conception of observation sentences, but on Quine’s account the members
of S are not distinct theories.20
Suppose instead we follow van Fraassen [van80], who considers theories
to be sets of models or structures, and call theories empirically equivalent if they
have the same observable sub-structures. Yet the planets in each of the members of
S are observable, so each of the theories has different observational sub-structures.
20

Regarding Quine and the problem of identical rivals, cf. §1.2.3.
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S1 has a solitary planet Earth, S2 has a pair of distinct planets ‘Earth’, and so
on. This consequence could only be avoided by specifying the members of S in a
language without an identity predicate, but then the theories will be satisfied by
all the same models— they would be the same theory and not genuine rivals.
So the problem of reduplication does not fit well into the rubric of empirical equivalence: If the rivals come out as distinct, they count as empirically
inequivalent. So, the choice simply cannot come out as underdetermined— not
because you could decide between the members of S, but because the language
of empirical equivalence is not up to the task of describing the case. Were you
to make this rocket journey, you would find such an analysis to be frivolous logic
chopping. The sense of underdetermination developed in Ch I can make sense of
that underdetermination in this case, providing a strong reason to favor it over the
usual story about empirical equivalence.
Observational cosmotopology
Abandoning the narrative for a moment, one might respond to this example by noting that it is purely hypothetical. If you travelled away from Earth
and found an Earth-like planet then you would be unable to decide between the
members of S. The antecedent is rather fanciful, so we should not get too excited about the consequent. A bottom-up argument that relies on a complicated,
counter-factual scenario shouldn’t lead us to expect underdetermination all over.
The argument goes wrong— one might say— not because the choice fails to be
underdetermined, but because the underdetermination follows from features of the
particular, fictional case.
This reply simply won’t do. The example of your rocket journey is simpler
than actual cosmology in several respects, of course, but similar difficulties may
arise in the context of relativistic cosmology. You will never get in a rocket ship and
travel across the universe, but spacetime might be multiply connected in detectable
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ways.21
At the end of the 19th century, Karl Schwarzschild suggested that we
might look for distant images of our own galaxy [Sch00]. Suppose we looked out
with our telescopes and saw images of the Milky Way repeated out into infinity—
we might think either that a distant galaxy strongly resembles our Milky Way or
that, because of the geometry of space, a galaxy that appears to be in the distance
is our Milky Way. Schwarzschild explains:
One could imagine that as a result of enormously extended astronomical experience, the entire Universe consists of countless identical copies
of our Milky Way, that the infinite space can be partitioned into cubes
each containing an exactly identical copy of our Milky Way. Would
we really cling on to the assumption of infinitely many identical repetitions of the same world? In order to see how absurd this is consider
the implication that we ourselves as observing subjects would have to
be present in infinitely many copies. We would be much happier with
the view that these repetitions are illusory, that in reality space has peculiar connection properties so that if we leave any one cube through a
side, then we immediately reenter it through the opposite side. [Sch00,
p. 2544]
He identifies an intuition that infinite repetition without identity is absurd. Interestingly, he thinks we would find finite space reassuring, since it would give us the
prospect of having surveyed all of space just as we have surveyed all the Earth.
Yet this reassurance carries no logical force, and the absurdity of infinite repetition is not a manifest contradiction. Sω is consistent and as much in agreement
with the imagined evidence as S1 . Nothing Schwarzschild says disarms the prima
facie underdetermination between S1 and Sω . He speaks elsewhere in the essay of
what is true or real, but here he speaks of our happiness with a certain view. This
suggests fideism: Because the choice between S1 and Sω is underdetermined, we
may believe whatever will make us happiest. Schwarzschild says nothing further
to dispel the many worries one might have about this resolution to the problem.22
21

Luminet, et al. provide an excellent informal introduction to these issues [LSW99].
As we saw in §1.3.3, fideism might disrupt the scientific community or lead scientists to develop poor
habits of thought.
22

139
Subsequent work has taken up Schwarzschild’s suggestions, but attempts
to identify multiple images of the Milky Way face considerable obstacles. Because
the images that travel further would take longer to arrive, the images we could
see now would portray the Milky Way at different times. Further, each successive
image would be shifted and show the galaxy from a different angle. Attempts to
reidentify quasars and galactic clusters have faced similar difficulties. Phenomena like gravitational lensing complicate matters further, because there would be
multiple images of some objects even if space is simply connected. A recent review concludes that there is “little chance to recognize different images of a given
object” [ULL00, p. 7].
Recent work has attempted to develop statistical tests to distinguish between observations of independent objects in simply connected space and repeated
observations of the same objects in multiply connected space. The so-called crystallographic method analyzes catalogs of astronomical objects of a given type and
plots the pairwise distances between them. For each multiply connected geometry,
there is a characteristic distance between images of the same object. If the universe were a billion lightyears across, for instance, every object would repeat with
a billion lightyears between repetitions. When the distances between all objects of
that type were plotted on a histogram, the repetitions would create a spike in the
graph at a billion lightyears.
Unfortunately, the crystallographic method relies on the catalog of astronomical objects. These catalogs are problematic in themselves, since the position
of each object in real space must be inferred from angular position and redshift
[ULL00, p. 7]. Inferring from redshift to distance requires making cosmological
assumptions. Also, problems with gravitational lensing and the motion of objects
remain, although one may hope that these effects are not so large as to wash out
the repetition.23
Other methods aim to find evidence of multiple connection from the
23

Hopefully, these effects would blunt rather than eliminate the spike in the histogram.
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Figure 4.8: In multiply connected spacetime, the cosmic background radiation
would overlap with itself. The phenomenon would appear as rings in the background to an observer on Earth.
record of the cosmic microwave background. The cosmic background has expanded
from the birth of the universe at the speed of light and comprises the edge of what
we can observe; analysis of it thus does not rely on problematic inferences from
redshift to distance. If space were multiply connected, then the background surface would eventually cross itself. The sphere would overlap to form circles, as in
figure 4.8 [CSS98] [Wee98]. Our observations of the cosmic background are still
too imprecise to discern whether such overlapping is present [Ino01].
There is no denying that work being done in this area is ingenious, but it
does nothing to speak to the issue of underdetermination. If the correlated pairs
in our astronomical catalog exhibit certain features or if rings can be distinguished
in the cosmic microwave background, physicists are prepared to conclude that the
universe is multiply connected. In this, Schwarzschild correctly predicted what we
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would happily infer. Underdetermination scenarios like Sω go unmentioned. Is this
because contemporary physicists are fideists, as Schwarzschild seems to have been?
Non-demonstrative geometry and rules of repetition
We saw two responses above to Reichenbach’s Theorem θ, either one
of which would be sufficient to defeat bottom-up arguments based on it: Theories
about physical geometry were not underdetermined, and universal forces proved to
be more bizarre posits than they at first appeared. We can make similar responses
to massive reduplication.
First, consider physical geometry stripped of any indexicals— call this
non-demonstrative geometry. It would be a catalog of things and spatial relations:
A planet of a certain local description is in such-and-so a configuration with respect
to planets of identical local descriptions, and so on. By hypothesis, all members of
S have the same non-demonstrative geometry. Just as Theorem θ was insufficient
to make our choice of physical geometry underdetermined, the possibility of massive reduplication is insufficient to make our choice of non-demonstrative geometry
underdetermined. We may not be terribly interested in non-demonstrative geometry, but that’s beside the point. It’s enough to show that the underdetermination
of physical geometry on account of possible reduplication doesn’t show that all
theory choice is underdetermined. Why should we suppose that other scientific
theory choices are more like the choice of a physical geometry than like the choice
of a non-demonstrative geometry? This is rather like the question that concluded
§4.1.2, so one might suspect that there will always be further underdetermination
that forces a retreat to weaker and weaker theories: we retreat from actual geometry, to physical geometry, to non-demonstrative geometry, to something weaker
still. Yet this retreat is prompted first by problems with metrical structure and
then by problems with topological structure. There is no further kind of structure
involved in specifying a geometry, and so there is no further structural argument
that could force our retreat. It ends here.
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Second, we note that a demonstrative geometry requires both a specification of the underlying geometry and a rule of repetition. Each member of S (except
S1 ) thus presumes a law-like connection between events on each of the Earths that
preserves the reduplication: Each planet sends out an astronaut, each astronaut
behaves in the same way, and so on. Since S1 posits only one Earth, it does not
require a rule of repetition. Note also that the underlying topology of space in S1
and S2 is the same; they’re both toruses. Since S2 requires this topology and a rule
of repetition, S2 is just logically stronger than S1 . Thus, S1 will always be better
confirmed.24 Applying the same reasoning, S1 is to be preferred over S3 , S4 , · · ·.
In this way, we can dispose of all the Sn ’s for 1 < n < ω. Since Sω has a
different topology than S1 , it remains in contention. This justifies Schwarzschild’s
intuitions that S1 and Sω are the only real contenders. How can the physicists’
implicit preference for S1 be motivated? There has, historically, been a presumption of infinite, simply connected space (the topology of Sω ). Since geometry has
come to be an empirical matter, both simply connected and multiply connected
space are contingent possibilities. The crucial difference isn’t there. Sω posits an
infinite repetition of the entities posited in S1 , and the difference between Sω and
S1 amounts to the difference between believing or not believing in infinite repetition. That is the crux of the matter; if scientists have good reasons for eschewing
claims of infinite repetition, then they have good reasons for preferring S1 .25
The point is clearest if the universe is indeterministic. Suppose, for instance, that radioactive decay is a genuinely random phenomenon. You travel to
a distant planet that might be Earth (if S1 is true) or it might not (if Sω is true).
You make a series of observations of radioactive decay and share your results with
the denizens of this planet. You then return to Earth— where an astronaut has
come and performed similar experiments— to see how the experiments on Earth
24

There may be reasons to prefer logically stronger theories in some cases (e.g., if they are predictively
more accurate), but no such reasons are present here.
25
Reichenbach concludes, similarly, that “the topological properties of space are closely related to the
problem of causality; we assume a topology of space that leads to normal causal laws” [Rei58, p. 80,
emphasis in original].
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went. The results of your experiment always match the results of the experiment
on Earth, so either they were the same experiment (and S1 is true) or there is
a law-like connection between the different experiments.26 A law-like connection
contradicts the assumption that the phenomena studied are genuinely random, so
S1 must be true.
Sω ’s requirement of infinite repetition amounts to a causal constraint
that the infinitely many copies of each thing will behave in the same way. This
constraint would necessarily be deterministic— otherwise the resemblance between
the infinitely many planets would break down over time. If we think that the
universe is indeterministic, this rigid parallelism is a non-starter. Even if the
universe is deterministic, however, the law of repetition is still unlike other claims
that scientists accept. Like the universal force in Reichenbach’s Theorem θ, a law
of infinite repetition is a sui generis kludge.
Relativity requires that the laws of physics be Lorentz invariant— that
is, they must hold the same way for you regardless of where you’re going or how
fast. The laws of physics aren’t supposed to have a preferred reference frame.
The conflict is this: Infinite repetition stipulates that what is happening here is
happening in the same way just at this moment on all the other Earths. But
according to relativity there is no general answer to what is happening ‘just at this
moment’ at two space-like separated points; simultaneity is relative to reference
frames. Thus, Sω picks out a special reference frame, the frame in which repetition
occurs.
A different way of seeing the point: Relativity is usually taken to prohibit
superluminal influences— that is, it’s impossible to send a message at faster than
the speed of light. Yet, given Sω , you can send a message instantaneously across
space. Imagine you arrive at the next planet and want to send a message home.
A radio message would take a very long time to cover that distance. So, instead,
you write a message on a piece of paper and drop it on the ground. Because of
26

Note that if the results do not match, then no member of S is true.
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infinite repetition, you know that another astronaut has dropped the same message
(although not the same sheet of paper) back on your planet Earth. Your message
is sent.
Scientists thus have good reason to reject Sω .
A few attempts at defending rules of repetition
One might try to defend Sω by noting that there’s no Lorentz invariant
way to formulate quantum mechanics, either. Since physicists accept quantum
mechanics, why not infinite repetition? The relation between relativity and quantum mechanics is a complicated subject,27 the cases are very different. First, we
have independent reasons for accepting quantum mechanics. It’s been successful
in many experimental domains. Sω has no independent motivation. Second, there
is no Lorentz invariant alternative to quantum mechanics. There is a Lorentz invariant alternative to Sω ; viz., S1 . Third, quantum mechanics does not allow for
super-luminal messaging. According to Sω , we send superluminal messages all the
time. Finally, although quantum mechanics picks out a preferred reference frame
metaphysically, it does not do so epistemically. There is no way we could learn
which reference frame is preferred.28 Determining the preferred reference frame in
Sω is trivial.
One might defend rules of repetition in a different way. In a deterministic
universe, repetition need not be posited as a persistent causal law. Rather, it might
obtain on account of special initial conditions— the contents of the universe were
repeated i times over at the beginning. Yet, a peculiar initial condition of this
kind is as odd a duck as a law of infinite repetition. Perhaps it is even the same
duck— as Craig Callender suggests [Cal], special initial conditions of this kind are
tantamount to a law.
27

Maudlin provides a thorough discussion of these issues [Mau94].
Although this is not true of all interpretations of quantum mechanics, when true it is considered a
virtue.
28

145
4.1.4

Spacetime and clothesline arguments
The last section concerned rivalry between members of S– the argument,

if correct, shows that S1 is to be preferred over other the members of S. This
set of rivals made sense in the story. The question was whether you had arrived
at Earth or a dopplegänger Earth, because you had ex hypothesi travelled away
from Earth and found a planet indistinguishable from Earth. Concentrating on
this set of rivals would also make sense if astronomers observed rings in the cosmic
background (as we above saw in §4.1.3).
You have not gone on a rocket journey, however, nor have astronomers
made detailed enough observations of the cosmic background radiation to say
whether rings are present or absent. It makes sense then, to consider the possibility
that spacetime is simply-connected and that there are no law-like repetitions of
the stuff in the universe. This would entail that if you can travel away from Earth
in any direction, then you will neither come to another planet just like it nor will
you come upon it again (without having gone in a circle). Call this possibility S0 .
Given the state of present evidence, we should consider both S1 and S0 to be live
options. The choice between them is underdetermined with a scope that includes
at least our present situation.
If the universe were Newtonian, then it would be possible for us to escape
the underdetermination. As Clark Glymour explains,
Many topologically different Newtonian models can be distinguished
empirically either by making global journeys through space or by observing systems that have made such journeys. The possibility of such
journeys results not solely from the fact that Newtonian theory allows
arbitrarily fast causal signals, for even very slow signals can make transits of the universe, given enough time. [Gly77, p. 50]
In a non-Newtonian universe, we have no such guarantee. Indeed, general relativity
entails that there are some global features of spacetime that— were they to hold—
would preclude our learning that they held.
David Malament [Mal77], extending results due to Glymour [Gly77], sum-
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marizes some of these properties. One such property is causality, which is said to
hold if there are no closed, future-directed causal curves; that is, if causal loops are
not possible. If causality is violated, then perhaps there is some path through space
time which, if you followed it, would lead you to your own third birthday party.29
Malament argues that “if causality is violated in a space-time, some observer will
know about it; if on the other hand it is not violated, no observer will ever know
for sure one way or the other.” To put this in terms of underdetermination, let
the two rivals be Loop and NoLoop:
Loop Causality is violated, and there are causal loops; and
NoLoop Causality is not violated, and there are not causal loops.
Malament’s proof turns on showing, for a spacetime M in which NoLoop holds,
there is another spacetime M 0 in which Loop holds such that no observer in M
could tell that they weren’t in M 0 .
The construction [Mal77, pp. 69–70] goes in this way: For each spacetime
point x, define P (x) as the causal past of x. P (x) contains all the points from
which signals could possibly have been sent to x; that is, all the points in the past
lightcone of x. Now take a countable set of points X = {xi } such that the causal
pasts of the member of X cover M ; that is, ∪{P (xi )} = M . We can then extend
each P (xi ) with some suitably chosen spacetime filler. Finally, we add a causal loop
to the spacetime filler. Malament calls this a “clothesline construction”, because
each of the members of X is hung like laundry on the spacetime filler— see figure
4.9.
If NoLoop obtains, then each observer occupies some point in a causal
spacetime M . Any observations possible from a point x must be of things in the
causal past of x— Malament calls the set P (x) the “observational past” of x. Yet
for all x ∈ M , P (x) is isomorphic to some region of the constructed ‘clothesline
space’ M 0 . So any observations possible from x are compatible with being in M
29
No paradox would threaten, because you could only go on to influence your younger self in this way
if your older self did in fact influence you at your third birthday party.
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‘spacetime filler’

P(x0)

P(x1)

P(x2)

a causal
loop

Figure 4.9: The construction of M 0 , a space in which each of the possible past
histories P (xi ) can be embedded isometrically.
or being in M 0 ; that is, they are compatible with NoLoop and with Loop. So an
observer in M could not tell if she was in M or in M 0 ; she could not tell which of
NoLoop or Loop was true.
Conversely, if Loop obtains, then a causal loop exists in the causal past
(and future) or some point x. An observer at x could, in principle, detect the
causal loop and thus demonstrate that Loop obtains.
So, the choice among {NoLoop, Loop} is underdetermined with a scope
that includes all circumstances in which NoLoop is true and some (but not all)
circumstances in which Loop is true. Other properties of spacetime can be shown
to be underdetermined by similar constructions; Malament claims that underdetermination of this sort “is so widespread in the class of spacetimes as to be of
epidemic proportions” [Mal77, p. 69]. What conclusions can be drawn from this
sort of underdetermination?
It may be that the underdetermination involves an overly strict standard
for responsible theory choice. One may argue that there are non-observational
factors that should decide between Loop and NoLoop. One might perhaps even
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argue that there is a sort of observation that reaches outside the observer’s past
lightcone. Nevertheless, these routes do not seem promising. In general relativity,
questions of the geometric structure of spacetime are an empirical matter, and the
invention of a supra-luminal chronoscope seems like a longshot.
Underdetermination of “epidemic proportions” might seem like good support for a bottom-up argument for the ubiquity of underdetermination. Yet the
epidemic infects the class of possible spacetimes in the context of general relativity. One of two things may be the case: Either we may responsibly rely on general
relativity or we may not. If we may, then general relativity is not underdetermined
relative to its rivals. The case would thus undercut bottom-up arguments by providing a powerful example of a theory choice that is not underdetermined. If we
may not rely on general relativity, then the clothesline contruction is just so much
hemming and hawing— without the background theory, the construction shows
nothing.
One might still think that the case does show something general. The
background theory here entails that certain theory choices are underdetermined.
If we consider the selection of background theories, then perhaps similar underdetermination will arise. Just as the existence or nonexistence of causal loops is
underdetermined given general relativity, the truth or falsity of general relativity
might be underdetermined given the background for that theory choice. Yet this
worry is the familiar Duhem-Quine problem with auxiliary hypotheses that concerned us in §3.3. We worried there the rectilinear propagation of light (TL ), even
though no further underdetermination is entailed by TL . DQ worries can be raised
whether or not general relativity leaves particular choices underdetermined.
4.1.5

Verdict on geometry
The chapter so far has considered geometrical features of space or space-

time that allegedly exhibit underdetermination. In some cases, the underdetermination arguably does not obtain at all (§§4.1.2, 4.1.3). The formal nature of
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M0 or M7?
Universal forces?
Massive
reduplication?
Causal loops?
Figure 4.10: Specific cases from geometry fail to support bottom-up arguments.
geometry makes it especially recondite in certain respects, but that shows nothing about biology, psychophysics, geology, hydrostatics, or the rest of the sciences.
Even were we to grant that the above cases were legitimately underdetermined, the
underdetermination would prove too specialized to show anything about science
in general. Where the underdetermination does not plague some related theory
choice (§§4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3), there is no clear reason to generalize from one choice
rather than from the other. In some cases, the very demonstration that there is
underdetermination requires presuming a determined background theory (§§4.1.1,
4.1.4). These results are summarized in figure 4.10.

4.2

The road by induction
The geometrical bottom-up arguments discussed so far generalize from a

single example or a carefully selected set of examples. One might instead attempt
to survey the history of science, look at a sample of past theory choices, and
generalize from them. This sort of induction, one might hope, would support the
bottom-up move better than isolated case studies. One such argument is already
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saturated in the literature, the so-called pessimistic induction against realism.
Another, the aptly named new induction, has been offered as a proof of “the kind
of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and
genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” [Sta01, p. S12].
4.2.1

The old induction
Worrall [Wor89b] calls the pessimistic induction the main consideration

against realism. Although the general argument goes back at least to Duhem and
Poincaré, contemporary discussions typically cite Larry Laudan’s ‘Confutation of
convergent realism.’ Laudan writes:
I daresay that for every highly successful theory in the past of science
which we now believe to be a genuinely referring theory, one could find
half a dozen once successful theories which we now regard as substantially non-referring. [Lau81a, p. 35]
The historical record is taken to show that most widely-believed past theories were
successful but ultimately false, so we are encouraged to think that our present
successful theories will turn out to be false as well. The fate of the pessimistic
induction need not concern us, because the induction shows nothing about underdetermination.30
Consider some theory from the past, such that past scientists believed it
but that we now reject it. This does not show that the belief in the theory was
underdetermined. It is possible that, given the circumstances of earlier scientists,
relevant considerations picked out the theory uniquely and that, given our circumstances, relevant considerations pick out one of its rivals. The choice need not
be underdetermined in either circumstance. One may object that this overlooks
the issue of truth: If the pessimistic induction is sound, then we have reason to
believe that our present theories are false. Since they could be shown to be false,
30

There are many objections to the pessimistic induction in the literature. Many authors have attempted to show that the historical record provides little ground for pessimism, e.g. Kitcher [Kit93] and
Psillos [Psi99]. Peter Lewis has recently argued that the inference from a history of failures to pessimism
relies on a statistical fallacy [Lew01]; I have (with Craig Callender) discussed Lewis’ objection elsewhere
[MC].
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however, believing them to be true would be determined against and a fortiori not
underdetermined. This mismatch between the pessimistic induction and the problem of underdetermination should not come as much surprise. Laudan, without an
air of contradiction, argues both pro the pessmistic induction [Lau81a] and contra
underdetermination [Lau90] [LL91].31
4.2.2

The new induction
Kyle Stanford, following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, has called for a

new induction [Sta01].32 The historical record, Stanford thinks, is full of episodes
that fit this schema: At some past time, scientists accepted a theory T that was
superior to all its acknowledged rivals. Subsequently, a rival U was developed that
came to replace T . The evidence that favored T over its acknowledged rivals also
favored U . The choice between T and U was underdetermined, even as scientists
assented to T — T was underdetermined relative to a rival that scientists hadn’t
yet imagined.
As Stanford notes, T and U would not be empirically equivalent; later
scientists find evidentiary grounds to prefer U . The underdetermination is, to
use a term Stanford takes from Sklar [Skl85b, p. 30], transient. We may put it
this way: The scope of the underdetermination includes only a specific historical
period. Outside of that period, standards favor one theory over the other. The
rivals are the dominant theory in this period and a theory which had yet to be
formulated. Thus, one of the rivals was not available to scientists within the scope
of the underdetermination.33 The standard is left implicit for now.
One might worry about Stanford’s insistence on equal confirmation of T
and U ; if degree of confirmation were a function from evidence and a theory to the
real numbers, then we should expect that two different theories would never be
31
Although it appears that Laudan does endorse the pessimistic induction, his essay might instead be
read as providing counter-examples to the realists’ no-miracles argument. Read in that way, the essay is
straight-forwardly about something besides underdetermination.
32
I am indebted to Stanford for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this section.
33
The unformulated rival would thus not have been a live option for the scientists; cf. §1.2.1.
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equally well-confirmed.This objection, however, would be spurious. As Stanford
notes, two theories may have different evidential successes and different anomalies.
During periods where the old theory is weighed down by anomalies but the new
theory is yet to score a panoply of successes, the choice between them is underdetermined. Such a period may be protracted, especially as conservative scientists work
to extend the old theory and reformers refine the new one. Thus, it is implausible
to insist that confirmation is on a knife edge. Two theories may be remain (nearly
enough) equally well-confirmed over a period of time even as evidence changes.34
Stanford admits that he is “unable to do more. . . than suggest. . . the verdict of the historical record” [Sta01, p. S11], but he nevertheless provides a flurry of
examples. He mentions mechanics, chemistry, embryology, thermodynamics, electromagnetic theories, theories of disease, theories of light, theories of inheritance,
theories of evolution, “and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for each of which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined
competitors just as well.” He concludes: “Thus, the history of scientific inquiry
offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there typically are
alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when
we are unable to conceive of them at the time” [Sta01, p. S9, my emphasis].
Suppose, as Stanford suggests, that we look to the history of science
and find many cases that match the schema. We might conclude from this that
our present theories are underdetermined against some as yet unimagined rivals.35
Why does the fact that U is unformulated make any great difference? Imagine
that T instead faces a rival S, one that scientists are mindful of at a time when T
is reasonably preferred. New evidence is collected such that the choice between S
and T is underdetermined, and when more is collected S is determined univocally.
(Alternately, there is a theory ascendant in some related discipline such that S
34

In what follows, for reasons of readability, I write ‘as well-confirmed’ without adding ‘effectively’ or
‘nearly enough’.
35
One may worry that instances of this schema being common is insufficient to support an inductive
generalization. One would further need to know something about how observed instances relate to the
population of past and present theories; cf. [Lew01] and [MC].
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wins out on systematic grounds.) The case of T and S is the familiar scenario
in which one theory dominates for a time, it is underdetermined relative to some
rival during a period of controversy, and its rival wins out. What difference does it
make that U is unimagined when T dominates but that S is already imagined? The
asymmetry is that the choice between U and T had always been underdetermined,
that reasonable standards would never have picked T over U . If U is actually
developed when T begins to strain under the weight of anomalies, however, doesn’t
that suggest that the choice is only underdetermined once those anomalies are
manifest? Plausibly so, and for that reason the new induction doesn’t show that
our present theories (the ones not in crisis, at any rate) are underdetermined
relative to as yet unimagined rivals.
The underdetermination between the decline of a preceding theory and
the ascension of a successor is not sufficient to support the new induction; that
is the familiar underdetermination during times of legitimate (and often open)
controversy. The problem is only acute if the successor is just as well-confirmed
as the predecessor at all times before the successor is proposed. At the very
least, the underdetermination must obtain well before the predecessor theory is in
crisis. Is this ever plausibly the case? Take the example of classical and relativistic
mechanics. There was clearly a period in the late 19th century— with irregularities
in the perihelion of Mercury, the absence of ether drift, and so on— when classical
mechanics faced anomalies unlike ones it had faced previously. Surely, there is
some time before the actual introduction of special relativity when it would have
been a viable contender. (This could only fail to be the case if special relativity
was proposed at the first instant in history in which it would have been viable.
Even if this was so, it would be far-fetched to imagine that such extreme timing
characterized all or even most of Stanford’s examples.) Yet to be an instance for
the new induction, special relativity must have been as well-confirmed as classical
mechanics before the anomalies developed. Is it reasonable to think that special
relativity was well-confirmed in the late 18th century, even as Kant penned a
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metaphysical foundation for classical mechanics?
It’s unclear how we should even go about answering this question of
counter-factual history. For myself, I find it ridiculous to suggest that Kant should
have given as much credence to Einstein as to Newton, imagining that he had entertained relativity but considered only the evidence available at his time. Intuitions
may differ about this, and it may be that no amount of historical evidence will
make the same intuition salient to all philosophers.
Regarding these cases, Stanford takes his cue from Sklar. Yet Sklar does
not suggest, as Stanford does, that Einstein and Newton were ever on equal footing.
Rather, he thinks that the history of science shows us how “the wealth of data
previously taken to support Newtonian theory was, when taken in conjunction with
new data incompatible with the older theory, equally supportive of novel theories
incompatible with the Newtonian” [Skl85a, p. 149, my emphasis]. Sklar’s point,
then, is that present evidence may form part of the body of evidence that eventually
favors a different theory than the one we favor now. This is true, but it does not
follow that the present body of evidence favors the future theory.
For us fallibilists, the new induction yields only old news. We are prepared
to admit that our best present theory might lose out to some future contender, and
it seems only a small corollary that some future contenders might be in fighting
shape even now to fight our present theories to a tie. It is hard to see how the new
induction amounts to anything more than this.
Aside: Realism and the new induction
Perhaps I’ve missed the point of the new induction. As a weapon against
realism, it need not show that selection from among imagined alternatives is irresponsible. It need only show that selection from among imagined alternatives
is unlikely to get us the truth. If Kant’s epistemic situation left him accepting
Newtonian mechanics— either because he had not thought of relativity or because
relativity would not have had as much warrant as Newtonianism— then we might
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think that he was simply in no position to know the truth. Yet contemporary
realists will protest both that Kant did have warrant for accepting Newtonian mechanics and that Newtonian mechanics was approximately true. Just so, the realist
says, we now have warrant for accepting relativity and it is both approximately
true and closer to the truth than Newtonianism. Insofar as the realist can appeal
to somesuch story about approximate truth, the new induction gives him nothing
to worry about. If the story about approximate truth fails, the realism would fall
apart— yet it would then fall apart whether or not the new induction was in play.
For this reason, the new induction puts no new pressure on the realist. It can at
most underscore the already acknowledged dependence of realism on an account
of approximation.36

4.3

The road to relativism
“You know what the truth is? It’s some crazy thing my
neighbor believes. If I want to make friends with him, I
ask him what he believes. He tells me and I say ‘Yeah,
yeah—ain’t it the truth?”’
—Rabo Karabekian [Von73, p. 209]
The relativist begins by noting that scientific standards can themselves

be contested. If theory choice were often or always underdetermined relative to
uncontested standards, then the only way to decide between rival theories would
be to adopt a contested standard. Without further constraint, one might choose
any standard at all: Anything goes.
The relativist might hope to offer a general argument to show that underdetermination is rampant and that standards are unfettered in this way. A naı̈ve
top-down argument suggests itself:
For any set of rival theories, there is some standard such that the
36

In order to say that relativity was a respectable option in the time of Einstein but not in the time
of Kant, the realist must say that scientific respectability is contextual and historical. But savvy realists
already acknowledge this; cf. [Boy82].
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choice between the rivals is underdetermined with arbitrary scope.37
Thus there will always be an underdetermination scenario that shows
how disputes over scientific standards could become central.
The premise of this argument is trivial to prove:
For a set of rivals {α, . . . , ω} and a scope C, let the standard be, “If you
are in a circumstance in C, remain agnostic; otherwise accept α.” For all
and only circumstances in C, this standard is insufficient to distinguish
between the rivals— i.e., the choice between them is underdetermined.
QED
The proof, however, is ridiculous. The only thing to be said for this ad hoc standard is that it provides the example needed for the proof. Nothing recommends
adopting it, and only a madman or a philosopher would be willing to do so. This
should be no surprise— it should by this point be familiar that there are many
cases of underdetermination which present no actual barrier to theory choice.38
Thus the conclusion of the naı̈ve argument does not follow. There is no a priori
assurance that standards can be contested and that credible rival standards will
be available. Actual examples will be needed to show that significant underdetermination actually obtains in science.
One might employ a variant of the naı̈ve argument to outline a schematic
underdetermination scenario and then supply examples to show that scientific
episodes instantiate this schema. The remainder of this chapter concerns attempts
to do this.
Moderate relativism
Gerald Doppelt argues that scientific standards are historical— in the
sense that they change over time— and thus that scientific judgment is always
relative to the standards of some particular scientific community. He calls this
position moderate relativism. It is moderate in the sense that there always are
standards that govern theory choice, even if those standards change over time and
37
38

This point was made previously in §1.4.
We have seen inter alia sceptical Cartesian scenarios (Ch II) and cases of meaning change (§3.4).

157
vary between communities. Doppelt originally offered moderate relativism as an
interpretation of Kuhn [Dop78] and still sees it as a corollary of “Kuhn’s most
important claim” [Dop01, p. 160].39 This is a characterization that Kuhn would
have resisted (cf. [Kuh77]), but let that be as it may. What Doppelt took away
from Kuhn was that
which of the various good reasons for and against each of the rival
paradigms is ultimately perceived as compelling (and thus determining for choice) itself depends on which paradigm’s internal criteria are
embraced. This latter choice is itself bounded by reasons but underdetermined by them: equally rational, scientific, and responsible practitioners of an established paradigm confronted by a revolutionary rival
in a period of crisis make opposite choices at every point in the process through which the new paradigm gradually comes into dominance.
[Dop78, p. 54]
Doppelt argues further that “every new paradigm— no matter how successful and
well-established it becomes— involves losses as well as gains with respect to its
predecessor(s) in terms of the kinds of data and problems it. . . can in fact handle” [Dop78, p. 44]. In this early work, Doppelt claims the choice of paradigm is
underdetermined, but in subsequent work he drops that notoriously obscure term.
He continues to maintain, however, that “in the course of its development, science
changes. . . its conception of the very kinds of evidence, empirical data, theories,
explanations, reasoning, and standards which are, and are not, genuinely scientific
and conducive to genuine scientific knowledge” [Dop01, p. 160, emphasis in original]. Disputes between rival conceptions of science leave fewer standards shared
by both sides. Given this small pool of shared standards, choice between the rival
theories is underdetermined.40 The choice between rival theories is not underdetermined given either set of contested standards; rather, each set of standards favors
a different rival. Of course, these self-consciously historical arguments will stand
or fall with an examination of the history of science.
39

Doppelt has developed moderate relativism in a series of papers, usually attributing the central
insight to Kuhn— e.g.: [Dop81] [Dop83] [Dop88]
40
The scope of the underdetermination— the range of circumstances across which theory choice is
underdetermined— is left unspecified for now.
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Moderate relativism should not be confused with radical methodological
anarchism. Doppelt does conclude that “the reasons which drive commitment
to standards are practical and interest-laden” [Dop01, p. 162]. Nevertheless, he
does not see this as underwriting the direct engagement of interests and values in
deciding which theory to believe. It is not as if scientists may legitimately appeal to
any shared values to justify the choice of one theory over another. According to the
moderate relativist, scientists justify their choice of theory by providing evidence,
explanations, and what-not that they deem legitimate in light of their conception
of science. It is only in changing their conception of science that scientists invoke
their extramural interests.
In the course of history, our conception of science changes and with it
the standards that count as scientific. All manner of contingent and parochial
interests can underwrite changes in the prevailing conception of science, says the
moderate relativist, but at each moment the standards for what will count as
good or scientific theory choice will be determined by the prevailing conception of
science. Thus, moderate relativism entails value-freedom of a certain sort; given
a conception of science, standards for explanation, and so forth, contextual values
have no direct rôle to play when scientists choose between rival theories. Values
come into play when standards of theory choice are themselves in flux— not to
settle the choice between theories, but to settle the choice between rival conceptions
of science.
If it were always permissible to dispute standards and if anything could
count as a potential conception of science, then moderate relativism would collapse
into anarchism. It would always be possible for parties to a scientific controversy to
propose ad hoc standards that would permit contextual values to decide between
theories directly. If a scientist finds intelligent design theory to be congenial to
his values, he could stipulate a standard that allows explanation by design; in the
Kuhnian idiom, he could take intelligent design to be paradigmatic of good science. The problem with allowing such stipulation may be highlighted by choosing
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an even more outré example: The scientist may as easily take as paradigmatic a
cosmology on which the universe is a twelve-dimensional sculpture of Hello Kitty, if
he found that congenial. Doppelt imposes no formal or explicit constraints on what
counts as a legitimate conception of science; it’s not clear how he could without
giving up his moderate relativism. Doppelt says— as he must— that conceptions
of science are constrained by “practical reasons, interests, and investments” that
explain “how and why individual scientific practitioners became interested in and
identified with a particular practice of inquiry and a particular community of inquirers bound together by relations of trust. . .” [Dop01, p. 162]. So it’s not always
permissible to invoke a novel conception of science, but the constraint on such
invocation is not a formal one. The case that shifting conceptions of science make
for substantive underdetermination— the case for moderate relativism— can thus
only be completed by citing episodes from the history of science in which the relevant sort of underdetermination actually arose. Doppelt appeals to the rise and
fall of phlogiston and æther as episodes of this kind. I’ll consider those cases in a
moment.
Social knowledge
Helen Longino argues that scientific knowledge must be understood not as
the mere aggregate of responsible individual judgments, but instead as the outcome
of a responsibly constituted scientific community. The warrant for scientific claims,
she thinks, comes from the structure of the community that licenses the claim.
Longino’s position can be seen as a species of moderate relativism: Which factors
figure in responsible theory choice is determined by the shared standards of the
scientific community. The shared standards themselves, however, change in the
course of history and cannot be motivated merely by epistemic considerations.
Longino appeals to underdetermination to motivate her position, discussing underdetermination of two kinds. One kind results from the reliance on
background assumptions, the other from the flexibility of epistemic considerations.
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The ubiquity of background assumptions
Longino first appeals to a version of the argument from auxiliaries, discussed in the previous chapter (§3.3). A particular fact, Longino notes, only stands
as evidence for a theory in light of other assumptions. Since those assumptions may
turn out to be false, the inference from the evidence to the theory may turn out to
be unjustified. The background assumptions may themselves be investigated, but
any evidence for them will only stand as evidence in light of other assumptions.
These background assumptions may also be debated, and so a regress begins. So,
once science moves beyond things which can be seen directly, theory choice is underdetermined. The regress of justification will be stopped by further background
assumptions, and perhaps these further assumptions will rest on non-epistemic
values. Examples are required to show that it does so in important cases.41 We
can see, then, why Longino concludes:
The argument so far has established that contextual values, interests,
and value-laden assumptions can constrain scientific practice. . . . This
is not yet to show that contextual values are always or necessarily
implicated in scientific reasoning. . . . [Lon90, p. 83]
The flexibility of epistemic considerations
Longino also argues: Although we can list off factors like empirical adequacy, consistency, breadth, simplicity, and fecundity, such a list is insufficient
to tell us which theories to accept. There may still be disputes about what these
mean and how they should be weighed. Reasonable scientists can disagree about
which of two theories is simpler, for instance, and furthermore about whether fecundity should trump simplicity. Here, values enter the process: “The particular
weighting and interpretation assigned these standards will vary in different social
and historical contexts as a function of cognitive and social needs” [Lon90, p. 77].
41

Elizabeth Anderson suggests that the theory of relativity, functionalist sociology, and marginal utility
theory provide examples that would serve Longino’s needs. She writes, “When the data run out, values
legitimately step in to take up the ‘slack’ between observation and theory” [And95, p. 29]. Unfortunately,
she offers no reason to believe that the slack in these cases was taken up by value-laden assumptions.
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One might worry that this argument is altogether too weak. Perhaps
the differing application of scientific values provides, as Kuhn suggests, “an indispensable means of spreading the risk which the introduction or support of novelty
always entails” [Kuh77, p. 332]. In this way, the vagueness of these values is
their strength. It allows for disagreement, true, but without disagreement either
every scientist would assent to a new theory or everyone would remain with the
received view. The community would face the false dilemma between anarchy and
orthodoxy. A reasonable disagreement allows individuals to pursue separate lines
of research. One line will only become the dominant view if it gathers so much
evidence that most everyone agrees to it, even with varying concern for and understanding of the standards by which a theory is judged.42 This concedes that theory
choice is underdetermined, but the scope of that underdetermination includes only
circumstances of legitimate controversy and of transition from one theory to another. When a single theory is dominant in the community, it meets even the vague
standards of practitioners. The moderate relativist needs underdetermination of
a broader scope— underdetermination that affects even theories accepted by the
whole community. (Longino might find this reply congenial. Although she can be
read as a moderate relativist, her central aim is to show that science is necessarily social. This reply defuses the underdetermination by appealing to the social
organization of science, thus admitting that science is a collective enterprise.)
One might worry instead that this argument is altogether too strong. If
values were never sufficient to decide theory choice, then Longino would be right
to think that theory choice is underdetermined on the basis of epistemic values.
However, the situation would be no better for social values.43 They are values,
after all, so we could not decide between theories by appeal to them. Yet Longino
suggests that the social resolves underdetermination! She may be forced to say
that we should not worry about rivalry between theories which equally satisfy all
42
This line of argument, present in Kuhn, has been advanced more recently by Kitcher [Kit93, ch. 5],
Haack [Haa98, pp. 107-8], and the present author [§3.3.1].
43
In Longino’s terminology, epistemic and social values are constitutive and contextual values
respectively.
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our values. If we can be untroubled by such rivalry, though, why should we be
troubled by rivalry between theories which equally satisfy epistemic values? It
must still be shown that underdetermination occurs in matters which we think
science can settle.
Neither of these ways in which theory choice might be underdetermined
are sufficient to show that it indeed is underdetermined in actual scientific practice.
Longino’s general considerations are thus best read not as top-down arguments,
but rather as considerations to soften us up for a bottom-up argument. Longino,
like Doppelt, needs substantive examples.
Underdetermination of standards
The moderate relativist wants to make a distinction between theories
(which are chosen on the basis of standards) and standards (which are chosen on
the basis of values). So one might try to answer the relativist in this way. Let
the rival theories be Sylph and Gnome. Suppose that Sylph is favored by one
conception of science (call it Sylph-science) and that Gnome is favored by another
conception of science (call it Gnome-science). Let Mere-science be the minimal
shared conception of science, one insufficient to allow a responsible choice between
Sylph and Gnome. The choice between Sylph and Gnome is underdetermined
given Mere-science, but determined given either Sylph-science or Gnome-science.
So how do we choose between Sylph-science and Gnome-science? If this rivalry
can be settled by metatheoretic standards, then the underdetermination between
Sylph and Gnome can be resolved.
Unfortunately, the metatheoretic standards required by this answer are
fantasies. If there are metatheoretic standards that justify a shift from Merescience to Mere-science+Sylph-science, then the standards must either be part of
Mere-science or part of Sylph-science— they must either be part of what is agreed
upon or part of what is contested between the rival groups. If the former, then
the choice between Sylph and Gnome was never underdetermined. If the latter,
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then the standards beg the question in favor of Sylph. If Sylph-science is allowed
to establish its own bona fides, why shouldn’t Gnome-science be allowed the same
latitude? Twelve-dimensional sculptures of Hello Kitty cannot be far behind.
One might say in this case that that there is underdetermination between Sylph-science and Gnome-science, but these are standards rather than theories. We should distinguish this underdetermination of standards (by what?) from
underdetermination of theory by evidence. The latter is the usual sort of underdetermination and the one at issue here.
4.3.1

The case of phlogiston
Doppelt, who attributes moderate relativism to Kuhn, maintains that the

chemical revolution of the 18th century is the example in which Kuhn “offers the
clearest and most powerful illustrative evidence of his incommensurability thesis”
[Dop78, p. 81, fn. 13]. The new chemistry, developed by Lavoisier and Dalton,
could account quantitatively for the weight relations and proportions in chemical
reactions. Yet this success, on Kuhn’s account, was accompanied by a loss of
explanatory power. Prior chemistry had been able to explain why metals were
metallic, why acids were acidic, and so on for qualitative features and changes.
The old chemistry was successful according to the prior conception of science on
which these qualitative properties were the primary explananda. The victory of the
new chemistry thus relied on the ascension of a new conception of science. Doppelt
concludes that “the two paradigms seek to explain different kinds of observational
data, in response to different agendas of problems, and in accordance with different
standards of success” [Dop78, p. 43].
Perhaps the only underdetermination at stake in the example is an underdetermination of standards: The question, one may think, is whether quantitative
or qualitative explanations are to be privileged and nothing more. Yet Doppelt
admits that adherents of the old paradigm could appreciate the victories of the
new one. He writes that “the old chemistry could recognize the success of the new

164
chemistry with the problem of weight-gain in combustion as a. . . good reason on
the latter’s behalf because the two shared this problem though they did not give
it the same epistemological weight” [Dop78, p. 53, emphasis in original]. Thus,
there was some continuity between the standards of the old and new chemistry. If
we consider the standards which are shared by the two— for instance, that weight
gain is a problem of some importance— then we may ask whether these were sufficient to decide between them. The problem, then, is one of underdetermination
of theory by evidence. The theories are the old and new chemistry; the scope
includes circumstances at the time of the chemical revolution; and the standard is
the minimal, shared standard. So, was the case actually underdetermined?
Kuhn’s claim, which Doppelt repeats, is that the new paradigm “ended
by depriving chemistry of some actual and much potential explanatory power”
[Kuh70, p. 107] [Dop78, p. 43]. What is the status of this potential explanatory power? Neither Kuhn nor Doppelt claim that it justifies a return to the old
chemistry, nor do they attempt to show that the explanatory loss is what stopped
diehards from adopting the new chemistry. Responding to Doppelt, Philip Kitcher
writes that
the debate between Lavoisier and his opponents does not involve phlogistonian claims to the effect that the new chemistry fails to explain
what all metals have in common. . . . Phlogistonians such as Priestly,
Kirwan, Cavendish, and Gren do offer many arguments, appealing to
a diverse set of empirical findings, but the invocation of explanatory
successes of the kinds that Kuhn and Doppelt see as critical to their
case is absent. [Kit93, p. 276]
Indeed, the example will not do for the moderate relativist if none of Lavoisier’s
contemporaries saw qualitative explanation to be the winning virtue of the old
chemistry. He needs an historical instance in which scientists were faced with
overt underdetermination. Although Doppelt still lists the chemical revolution
among cases that speak in favor of moderate relativism [Dop01, p. 166], he has
not made an effort to show that Kuhnian considerations held actual sway with
adherents of the old chemistry.
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4.3.2

The case of æther theories
In recent work, Doppelt provides the example of 18th and 19th-century

æther theories [Dop01, pp. 169–71]. In the 18th century, æther theories were
deployed to explain electrical, gravitational, chemical, and mental phenomena.
Scientists of the period postulated subtle fluids in almost every domain. Some,
most notably Scottish natural philosophers such as Thomas Reid, resisted. In the
19th century, Fresnel’s wave theory of light gained wide acceptance. It seems that
the same scruples that made some scientists resist 18th-century æther theories
should have made them resist the wave theory of light as well. These scruples
reflect different standards of evidence and, Doppelt suggests, different conceptions
of what counts as a permissible scientific theory.
As Doppelt presents it, the case involves a conflict between a Newtonian,
inductivist conception of science retained by Reid and an ætherial, hypotheticodeductive conception advanced by Fresnel and others.44 The two conceptions involve different standards which are, in themselves, equally “consistent, rational,
and scientific” [Dop01, p. 170]. Reid and the Scottish contingent had good reasons,
Doppelt thinks, for keeping to the old ways. There was no tension in their position
that would have forced them to give up their trenchant inductivism. First, they
did not count the explanations of the æther theories as legitimate and, thus, they
saw no explanatory loss in refusing to accept them. Second, they shared with other
scientists the view that explaining gravitational, mental, and chemical phenomena
was a legitimate aim. They felt rather that the aim could yet be accomplished
within the constraints of Newtonian methodology. Third, they had good reason
to rule æther hypotheses out of court. Doppelt writes, “The method of hypothesis could not distinguish between what was regarded as the very paradigm of
scientific knowledge— Newton’s laws— and the very paradigm of non-science—
the unsavory, ad hoc, empirically vacuous hypotheses of Cartesian physics, such as
vortex theories, which could always be arbitrarily manipulated at will to save the
44

Doppelt follows Laudan’s [Lau81b, ch. 8] description of the case.
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phenomena” [Dop01, p. 170, emphasis in original].
This case is meant to support moderate relativism in this way: The acceptability of æther theories was relative to the operative standards of what should
count as scientific. There were rival conceptions of science which had different standards. For each conception of science, there were reasons in favor of adopting it.
All scientists recognized as legitimate the aims of explaining phenomena and avoiding a return to vortex theories. Yet, which reasons scientists took to be persuasive
depended on what was important to them.
Hartley’s nervous æther
Reid’s inductivism is at work in his discussion of David Hartley’s vibratory theory of brain function [EIP, ess. 2 ch. 3, pp. 248–53].45 Hartley proposed
that a person’s nerves are filled with some subtle fluid that vibrates in response to
stimuli at the person’s sensory periphery. Cognition, perception, and mentation
consist— according to Hartley— in the vibrations of this fluid.
In responding to Hartley, Reid presents Newtonian methodology as demanding that a causal explanation must do two things: First, causes figuring in
the explanation must be shown to exist; they must not be “barely conjectured”
[EIP, p. 250]. Second, the causes must be sufficient to produce the effect that
they are enlisted to explain. Laudan claims that “Reid’s first condition amounted
to the rule that the scientist is allowed to postulate only those entities which are
observable. Ethers and other imperceptible fluids are thus, by their very nature,
disqualified from legitimate scientific status” [Lau81b, p. 126, emphasis in original].
According to Doppelt and Laudan, Reid refused to even consider æther theories
because they posited entities that could not be shown to exist and were, therefore,
unscientific. If this were the case, we should expect Reid to apply the first Newtonian criterion and be done with Hartley. Indeed, Reid does denounce the method
of hypothesis. He writes:
45
The citations are from Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of 1785; page references follow his
Philosophical Works [Rei67].
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. . .Dr Hartley [says], ‘supposing the existence of the æther, and of its
properties, to be destitute of all direct evidence, still, if it serves to account for a great variety of phænomena, it will have an indirect evidence
in its favour by this means.’ There never was an hypothesis invented
by an ingenious man which has not this evidence in its favour. The
vortices of Des Cartes, the sylphs and gnomes of Mr Pope, serve to account for a great variety of phænomena. When a man has, with labour
and ingenuity, wrought up an hypothesis into a system, he contracts a
fondness for it, which is apt to warp the best judgement. [EIP, p. 250]
Yet Reid is not a hyper-empiricist. Despite Laudan’s suggestion that the first
condition countenances only observable causes, interia is Reid’s paradigm case of
a cause that can be shown to exist [EIP, ess. 2 ch. 6, pp. 260–2]— yet inertia is not
observable in a strict sense. Reid was also willing to countenance Franklin’s fluid
theory of electricity and the particle theory of light. [Cal99, p. 21] Although Reid
does denounce Hartley’s æther as a spurious hypothesis, he thinks that different
evidence might justify the claim that there is an æther. As he writes, “we ought
to hold the existence of such an æther as a matter not established by proof, but
to be examined into by experiments. . .” [EIP, p. 250].
Before suggesting that an æther is tantamount to a gnome, Reid considers
Hartley’s ground for claiming that there is an æther. Reid reconstructs Hartley’s
reasoning in this way: Sensations persist for a span of time. Since these sensations
reside in a brain, they must be vibratory, “because no motion, besides a vibratory
one, can reside in any part for a moment of time” [EIP, p. 250]. If the impression
from a sound were transmitted through the nervous system as linear motion, then
the auditory sensation would not persist— it would impact and pass on. Hartley
further infers from vibratory motion to a vibratory medium, an æther. Reid resists
this inference, of course. He writes:
other kinds of motion, besides that of vibration, may have some continuance—
such as rotation, bending or unbending of a spring, and perhaps others
which we are unacquainted with; nor do we know whether it is motion
that is produced in the nerves— it may be pressure, attraction, repulsion, or something we do not know. This, indeed, is the common refuge
of all hypotheses, that we know no other way in which the phænomena
may be produced. . . . [EIP p. 250]
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Reid thus objects that Hartley infers an æther from vibrations and vibrations from
the mere persistence of sensations— a phenomenon that is not itself vibratory.
Reid goes on to apply the second Newtonian criterion and ask if Hartley’s vibrations explain the phenomena of consciousness. They do not, Reid argues,
pointing to several inadequacies of Hartley’s theory. First, we have good reason
(according to Reid) to think that thought is not identical with any material process. Even if we find Reid’s dualism objectionable, we should note that it is not
motivated by inductivism— Reid saw it as a distinct reason to reject Hartley’s account of the mind. Second, mental events exhibit many differences in kind. There
are many kinds of thoughts. Even just among sensations: sounds, sights, smells,
and the rest “differ totally in kind” [EIP p. 252]. Within each kind, there are further variations that are not mere differences in degree. Vibrations may vary with
respect to speed or strength, but that is all. Reid concludes, then, that vibrations
cannot account for the great variety of mental events. Third, sound is supposed to
be heard when it causes a vibration in the ear, light seen when it causes a vibration
in the eye, textures felt when they cause vibrations in the skin, and so on. Yet
this explanation provides not reason why sound should not be seen if it causes a
vibration in the eye, why texture should not be heard, and why light should not
be felt.
Thus, Reid does not dismiss Hartley’s theory primarily on the basis of
an inductivist demarcation criterion. Instead, he makes objections that even have
weight given a hypothetico-deductive conception of science: There is no independent reason to think that mental phenomena are vibratory or that the nervous
system is a vibratory medium. Positting vibrations provides (at best) a poor explanation of mental phenomena. So (contra Doppelt) we should not see Reid’s
rejection of Hartley’s æther as requiring the invocation of incommensurable standards.46
46

Callergård reaches a similar conclusion about Reid. He writes that Reid should not be seen as
“rejecting the ether because of methodological principles.” Instead, “Reid simply points out that Hartley
has not made a contribution to the body of scientific knowledge since he hasn’t discovered or explained
anything” [Cal99, p. 24].
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As discussed above, Doppelt claims that Reid needed to reject æther hypotheses, lest Cartesian vortices be readmitted to scientific debate. Yet Cartesian
vortices were not ruled out merely by inductivist scruple, either. Newton eschews
hypotheses, but only after revealing explanatory inadequacies of the vortex hypothesis. The General Scholium in the Principia begins with a discussion of these
inadequacies [New99, p. 939–40], and only later yields the dictum Hypothesis non
fingo. Newton rejects Cartesian vortices because there is no evidence for them
besides phenomena which they are insufficient to explain; Reid rejects Hartley’s
vibrations for the same reason.
Doppelt’s discussion of æther theories concentrates on what Laudan calls
the first phase of the debate, the period 1740–1810 in which Reid resisted theories
like Hartley’s. Reid is a sympathetic character for us in the 21st-century who
consider neural and gravitational æthers to be frivolous. As Laudan tells the
story, Reid was on the side of right in this debate. Yet, Laudan suggests, the
standard Reid used to defeat frivolous, 18th-century hypotheses was too strong.
Laudan writes of Reid,
His very narrow observational construal of the ground for warrentedly
asserting the existence of a thing left Reid completely unable to give
an account of the success of the many deep-structural theories of his
time. By demanding too much, his epistemology was altogether unable
to come to grips with the contemporary theoretical sciences. [Lau81b,
p. 127]
Unfortunately, it is unclear which theories he has in mind when he speaks of
successful “deep-structural theories” of Reid’s time. These cannot be the æther
theories like Hartley’s— as we have seen, Reid had serious doubts that these were
even explanatorily successful. Laudan goes on to discuss Fresnel’s wave theory of
light and the optical æther. These were not of Reid’s time, however, but of half a
century later.
To recap the action so far: The moderate relativist is ill served by the case
of Reid’s rejection of Hartley’s æther. Although Reid does, in some sense, have a
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different conception of science than Hartley, his conception does not peremptorily
strike æther theories. Reid offers reasons to think that Hartley’s theory is not
successful, not even on its own terms. Reid needs a unilateral conception of science
neither to defuse Hartley’s theory nor to hold Cartesian bogeymen at bay.
Luminiferous æther
In 1819, A.J.Fresnel won the French Academy prize competition by showing how the assumption that light is a wave could account for all known diffraction
phenomena. One of the prize judges— no less a luminary than S.D.Poisson— attempted to provide a reductio of Fresnel’s account. Considering a small disc held
in the path of light emanating from a pinhole, Fresnel’s account entails that the
center of the shadow should be as brightly lit as if the disc were absent. D.F.Arago,
Fresnel’s champion on the prize committee, performed the experiment. The reductio proved ad verum. Fresnel won the prize, and in the decades that followed the
wave theory of light came to preëminence. Many scientists who accepted the wave
theory accepted its postulated medium, the luminferous æther.
Laudan portrays this as launching the second phase of debates over the
æther (1820–1850), another stage in the conflict between inductivist and hypotheticodeductive conceptions of science. According to Laudan, the rule of predesignation
(the requirement that hypotheses make novel predictions) was the great innovation
of 19th-century hypothetico-deductivism. William Whewell, defending the wave
theory and the method of hypothesis, introduced the rule of predesignation so as
to address worries about spurious hypotheses. Hypotheses must not only explain
known phenomena, but must also yield novel predictions that are subsequently
confirmed. Only then should we believe a theory.
Doppelt might do better to concentrate on this second phase. We recognize the wave theory, in retrospect, as a great scientific success. And so we might
anticipate being less sympathetic to the 19th-century inductivist than to his 18thcentury counterpart. Concretely, this means being less sympathetic to John Stuart
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Mill than to Thomas Reid. Although Mill claims to take his cue from “the writings
of the Scotch metaphysicians, and especially of Reid” [Mil74, p. 236] and Laudan
includes Reid on the list of classical empiricists (along with Locke and Hume)
[Lau81b, p. 113], there are striking differences between Reid’s views and Mill’s.
Reid strongly resists Hume’s sceptical conclusions about causation and the external world; Mill seems to embrace them. Reid believes that we have knowledge of
external objects directly through perception; Mill believes that objects are nothing
more than the permanent possibility of particular sensations. And so on. Thus, it
would be naı̈ve to read Mill’s answer to the wave theory of light as if it were also
Reid’s. Yet attempting to say what Reid himself would have said about Fresnel’s
successful wave theory would inevitably involve considerable reconstruction, and I
decline to speculate. (In print, at any rate.) So let’s begin with Mill.
Mill resists both the wave theory of light and the method of hypothesis
[Mil74, esp. bk. 3 ch. 14 §6]. Mill insists that, just as a false theory might explain
known phenomena, a false theory might entail true novel predictions. Responding
to the novel predictions of the wave theory, Mill writes:
Such predictions and their fulfillment are, indeed, well calculated to
impress the uninformed, whose faith in science rests solely on similar coincidences between its prophecies and what comes to pass. . . .
Though twenty such coincidences should occur, they would not prove
the reality of the undulatory ether; it would not follow that the phenomena of light were the results of the laws of elastic fluids, but at
most that they are governed by laws partially identical with these. . . .
[Mil74, p. 356]
Whewell differs with Mill on just this point. He replies to the passage just cited,
writing that “there is no doubt that the most scientific thinkers, far more than the
ignorant vulgar, have allowed the coincidence of results predicted by theory with
facts afterwards observed, to produce the strongest effects upon their conviction. . .”
[Whe89, p. 294]. Whewell then appeals to the “undulatory theory of light” as an
example. So this case might be seen to favor moderate relativism: If we think
of science as an hypothetico-deductive enterprise and recognize the rule of pre-

172
designation, Fresnel’s wave theory of light was to be accepted on account of the
celebrated bright spot. If we cleave to inductivism, then Fresnel’s wave theory was
to be rejected on account of its postulating an unsavory æther.
The relativist story is weakened somewhat if the rule of predesignation
did not play a central rôle in the acceptance of the wave theory. The fact that it
did follows from the common view that the celebrated white spot was the crucial
experiment of the wave theory and also from Whewell’s description of the case.
Yet, as John Worrall details, the prediction of the white spot was not what swayed
the prize committee [Wor89a]. Instead, the commissioners seemed most impressed
with Fresnel’s ability to handle straightedge diffraction— a previously known phenomenon. Moreover, they were unconcerned to experimentally check for a central
dark spot in light from a small circular opening— a prediction of Fresnel’s theory
that was as much unprecedented as the bright spot.47 So, Worrall argues, predesignation was not the touchstone of scientific virtue for scientists accepting the
wave theory. In this respect, the exchange between Whewell and Mill may be a
poor indication of which factors actually swayed scientists.
Nevertheless, there is no denying that Whewell and Mill disagreed as
to whether the evidence warranted belief in an æther— and that they did so
because of differing methodological commitments. It would not be too pedantic,
however, to distinguish between the wave theory of light and the æther theory.
The former involves the claim that the behavior of light is described by Fresnel’s
wave equations. The latter is the claim that light is a disturbance that propagates
in a subtle fluid. In a footnote to the passage cited above, Mill writes:
What has most contributed to accredit the hypothesis of a physical
medium for the conveyance of light, is the certain fact that light travels
(which can not be proved of gravitation); that its communication is
not instantaneous, but requires time; and that it is intercepted (which
gravitation is not) by intervening objects. These are analogies between
its phenomena and those of the mechanical motion of a solid or fluid
substance. But we are not entitled to assume that mechanical motion is
47
Indeed Whewell appeals not to constructive interference predictions like the bright spot, but to “the
production of darkness by two luminous rays interfering in a special manner” [Whe89, p. 294].
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the only power in nature capable of exhibiting those attributes. [Mil74,
fn. p. 356]
The argument for the existence of the luminiferous æther (as Mill reconstructs
it) parallels Hartley’s argument for the nervous æther (as Reid reconstructs it)
[EIP, p. 250, cited above]. The phenomena are observed to have a certain features,
the only known systems in which these features are instantiated are vibratory or
mechanical systems, so the phenomena must be vibratory or mechanical in nature,
and so there must be a medium in which the phenomena propagate. Mill and
Reid object to this kind of eliminative inference. The fact that we know of no
other systems that instantiate the relevant features may be due only to our lack
of knowledge and imagination. Strictly speaking, Mill’s argument undercuts the
æther theory but not the wave theory. Mill seems to concede that light is governed
by the wave equation (on p. 356). The claim that luminous phenomena obey wave
equations may be tested directly by experiment and need not rely on eliminative
inferences of the contested kind.
We are prone to think of the wave theory and not the æther as the great
development of 19th-century optics. Since hypothetico-deductivism and inductivism both warranted accepting the wave theory, then the case seems not to favor
the relativist. Yet the relativist may object that this reply presumes our present
science— and in so doing presumes whatever values underwrite our present practice. The claim of incommensurability (the relativist might say) was never meant
to entail that querists with differing commitments could never agree on anything,
rather that there are some things about which they could never agree.48 By excluding æther theories from consideration, inductivism embodied an importantly
different methodology than hypothetico-deductivism.
Yet this would misrepresent the case. Mill allows the possibility that different kinds of evidence might be able to establish the æther theory. Commenting
48
That is: For rival standards, there exist rival theories such that there are no circumstances in which
both standards warrant belief in the same theory. This seems to be the sort of incommensurability that
Doppelt commends.

174
on anomalies in the return of a specific comet, he allows that it may be due to
the resistance of the æther. If such an effect could be observed in the motions of
other comets and planets as well, Mill suggests, “the luminferous ether would have
made a considerable advance toward the character of a vera causa” [Mil74, p. 355,
italics in original]. Even Mill did not rule out æthers entirely.
4.3.3

The case of hormones and gender-linked behavior
The final example I will take up involves causal models of how hor-

mone levels affect gender-linked behavior. Although the Doppelt does not consider
this case, it is Longino’s central example of underdetermination [Lon90] [Lon02,
pp. 126–7, 183, 199–200].
A recent news item heralding British research on the source of boyish
behavior in young girls announces, “Forget nurture, the tendency for a girl to behave like a tomboy is all up to nature— specifically, the amount of testosterone
a baby is exposed to during pregnancy.” Quoted in the story, a researcher says,
“Because hormones influence basic processes of brain development, they also exert
permanent influences on behaviour” [ABC02].49 This research and the uncritical
reporting of it presuppose that chemicals effect behavior by effecting brains. Differentiation of behavior between the sexes is taken to be the result of differing brain
chemistry, and this in turn is presumed to result from differing levels of hormones.
Whatever rôle environment plays in the differentiation of behavior is (according to
the model) independent of hormone levels and brain development. Longino calls
this the Linear-Hormonal (LH) model. It posits a causal structure like the one in
figure 4.11.50
Two sorts of evidence are used in support of the LH model: animal and
49

The study touted is [HGR+ 02]. The assumption of the LH model, although exhibited in the researcher’s comments to the press, does not appear explicitly in the published study.
50
This is Longino’s figure 2 [Lon90, p. 138]. The arrows should not be taken to imply immediate
causation without an intermediate causes playing a rôle, but only to imply that the elements represented
in the graph do not, according to the model, causally influence one another except where there are
arrows. The graphs as I employ them here can be understood as directed, acyclic graphs in the manner
of Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines [SGS93] [Gly98].
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Figure 4.11: The LH model.
human studies. In the animal studies, hormone levels are manipulated directly
and behavior is then observed. For example, testosterone correlates with fighting
behavior in rats. In the human studies, groups with hormone disorders are observed
and compared to control groups. For instance, girls with abnormally high levels of
prenatal androgens are observed to exhibit more boy-like behavior than girls with
normal levels. Longino responds separately to the two sorts of evidence.
Animals, she argues, are sufficiently unlike humans that the animal studies should not be assumed to describe how the hormones being studied affect human
behavior. She makes several arguments for this conclusion: Hormones are known
to cause different effects on different species, so the presumption should not be that
some particular laboratory species responds just as humans do. Humans exhibit
a degree of intentionality not seen in rats and have more complicated brains. Human behavior occurs in contexts more complicated than the laboratory situations
that confront rats. Even monkeys, who lack many of the complications present
in humans, have been shown to react differently to hormones than rats. [Lon90,
p. 157] I find Longino’s arguments here convincing, but they don’t speak to the
issue of moderate relativism. She argues that the animal evidence should not be
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used to underwrite conclusions about humans, but she does so without appealing
in any obvious way to a rival conception of science. She does not argue from the
premise that she is a feminist to the conclusion that humans are different than rats,
but rather she argues against the analogy by pointing to disanalogies. Would the
disanalogies be unconvincing to anyone working within the LH model? Wouldn’t
LH partisans be unreasonable if they were unconvinced?
The human studies, Longino believes, only stand as evidence for a particular hormonal connection if one begins with the LH model. Longino suggests as
an alternative a selectionist model developed to explain human memory, learning,
and self-awareness. On this model, she explains, “experience... and self-image...
play a primary role in the biological explanation of the behavior-action of species
with a highly developed cortex” [Lon90, p. 148].
Although this model “is not in use to explain any particular category
of behavior” [Lon90, p. 143], Longino suggests that it may provide an alternate
explanation for the results of human studies that observe a correlation between
androgens and boy-like behavior. First, the girls with abnormally high levels of
prenatal androgens were aware that they had such a condition. This medical history might make them feel self-conscious, feel unlike other girls, and feel uncertain
of their femininity. These factors could result in behavior seen as more boy-like.
Second, testosterone is known to affect muscle development. More rambunctious
behavior by the girls might simply have been an expression of the consequent need
for exercise. [Lon90, p. 150] Research employing the LH model cannot be criticized
as bad science, Longino thinks, because constitutive values alone give no reason to
prefer the selectionist model.51 She writes:
Both rest on explanatory models that involve metaphysical assumptions about causality and human action. Neither theoretical perspective can muster constitutively based arguments sufficient to exclude
51

That values influence the actual scientists in this instance does not show that science ought to be
value-laden. If the value-free view is correct, then dogged adherents of either theory are doing bad
science. If one appeals only to constitutive considerations and constitutive considerations are insufficient
to decide between the two theoretical perspectives, then the situation demands agnosticism. ‘Perhaps
both mechanisms are at work.’
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the other— thus both can continue to generate studies that are used to
support microhypotheses about the etiology of particular forms of behavior that are consistent with one or the other broader model. [Lon90,
p. 161]
Rather than deciding based on strictly scientific concerns, Longino thinks we should
prefer the selectionist model because it accords with political ideals of autonomy
and responsibility. Whereas the LH model connects behavior to a simple biological
variable, the selectionist model emphasizes “the enabling rather than the limiting
aspects of biology” [Lon90, p. 175-6].
Perhaps breadth of scope might lead us to favor the selectionist over the
LH model. As Longino notes, the former derives from very broad considerations
of human consciousness and action, while the latter promises to explain only the
connection between hormones and sex-linked characteristics. However, as Longino
also notes, for the selectionist account “gender role behavior is removed from the
theoretical umbrella of the hormonal model that does explain other aspects of
[sexual] differentiation” [Lon90, p. 161]. Breadth of scope differently understood
might lead us to prefer the LH model, so this attempt to marshal constitutive
considerations falls prey to underdetermination.52
Longino laments that “work on cognition shows no sign of reflection or
analysis on the part of researchers. Correlation after correlation is produced with
no attempt to understand just what it is that is being measured or its relation
to associated phenomena” [Lon90, p. 167]. Indeed, she is right to insist that
an observed correlation alone does not establish any particular causal connection.
Nevertheless, a correlation is something to be explained— Longino admits as much
by providing a rival explanation. She accepts, just as adherents of the LH model
do, that the general causal structure is such that prenatal hormone levels are at one
end of a causal chain that has gender-linked behavior at the other end. Longino
offers only schematic and complicated depictions of the selectionist model, but she
offers specific causal hypotheses:
52

Underdetermination resulting from the flexibility of values, discussed above.
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Figure 4.12: Longino’s selectionist model.
As for the. . . children who provide the strongest evidential base for the
hormonal model, one can say that their behavior is a specific response
to their situation as they perceive it. They are. . . persons who (1)
have a medical history productive of greater self-consciousness and selfknowledge than is usual for young people, (2) are quite aware of their
uniqueness, and (3) are very likely uncertain of their “femininity” and
possibly of their femaleness as well. This combination of circumstances
may account for their choosing as children behavior less restrictive in
its implications for adult life than traditional girllike behavior is. Finally, such direct effects of testosterone as do exist could be on muscle
development, with a consequent need for exercise. [Lon90, p. 150]
These are the specific hypotheses summarized above and in figure 4.12.
Longino makes much of the causal loops in the selectionist model. For
instance, a child’s psychological state both effects and is effected by her actions.53
Yet there is no possibility of reciprocal causation between prenatal hormone levels
and gender-linked behavior, since the former plays its rôle years before the latter
53

Cf. her figures 6 and 7. [Lon90, pp. 147, 149]
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occurs. If there is some causal connection, it must flow one way and not the other.
The correlation might result from some other causal structure— e.g., if both were
effects of a common cause— but, provided one is a causal ancestor of the other,
it must be hormone levels causing childhood behavior and not vice-versa. The
only question is, What is the mechanism? Longino suggests that hormone levels
effect the girls’ personal history in ways that effect, in turn, their self image. The
girls then make different choices than other girls. Choices are causes of actions, of
course, so this means that self image is taken to be one causal factor controlling
behavior. There is an additional causal pathway from hormones to behavior, one
that goes through muscle development. It is this causal scenario— and not the
selectionist model tout court— that is represented in figure 4.12.
Is Longino right to think that the choice between the causal account represented in figure 4.11 and the account represented in figure 4.12 is underdetermined
on the basis of evidence and that this determination could only be made on the
basis of contextual values? It is true that the mere correlation between hormone
levels and gender-linked behavior does not favor one over the other, but there are
testable differences nonetheless. Notice that on the selectionist account (figure
4.12), hormones only influence behavior through intermediate causes of personal
history and muscle development. Two children with identical histories and muscle
development should thus exhibit the same degree of gender-linked behavior regardless of their prenatal hormone levels. Contrast this with the LH model (figure
4.11), in which there is a causal path from hormones to behavior which goes only
through brain organization, such that gender-linked behavior should be strongly
correlated with hormone levels even among children in identical environments with
identical muscle development.
Imagine an experiment, then, in which one each out of pairs of identical
twins is treated with hormones in utero. The twins are never told which was which.
They are not even told that they are part of a medical study. As they grow up,
careful records are kept of their muscle development, using some objective measure
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like muscle mass. When they reach school age, case workers judge whether the
childrens’ behavior is boyish or girlish. The question here would not be simply
whether or not prenatal hormone levels correlate with behavior, but whether they
do so conditional upon history and muscle development. If a correlation remains
conditional on these other factors, then it could not be explained by a causal
structure like figure 4.12; some other causal path would have to exist between
hormone levels and behavior. Conversely, if no significant correlation remains
after conditioning on history and muscle development, then a causal structure
like figure 4.11 could be ruled out. Neither result would prove what the causal
structure actually is in an absolute sense, but either would eliminate one of the
two rivals. Controlling directly for personal history and conditioning on muscle
development would eliminate the correlation between those variables and prenatal
hormone levels. If a correlation remains between prenatal hormone levels, then
there must be some other causal path between the two. Some variable X may
intervene— perhaps brain organization. This situation is represented in figure
4.13.
There may be concerns about this experimental design; there are familiar
worries about twin studies that there are never enough natural twins and that
there are sample selection biases. We may imagine a more extreme version of the
experiment in which twins are forcibly harvested and raised in a clinical facility to
fully control for history, however, and some variation on this double-blind structure
should yield robust results. The underdetermination yields no significant conclusion if further evidence can close the inferential gap. This is just the ordinary
situation of enquiry underway. Cost might make such a study impractical, but
more importantly moral considerations would make it reprehensible. What this
shows, though, is that there are things we are not willing to do in the name of
science. Empirical considerations could decide between the two theories, if we were
willing to pay the price for the knowledge.54
54

It’s not clear that such an extreme study is necessary. The study mentioned above [HGR+ 02] involved
healthy children rather than children with hormone disorders. One of the factors that Longino appeals
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Figure 4.13: The experimental situation.
Of course, these empirical considerations do not settle the matter deductively. There are still assumptions that, as Longino says, “establish the evidential
relevance of data to hypotheses” [Lon02, p. 126]. Yet the assumptions are not
morally charged assumptions about humanity and agency. It is unclear how the
assumptions involved in a suitably designed experiment would have a controversial
sociopragmatic dimension.
4.3.4

Verdict on relativism
To summarize: The historical examples of phlogiston and various æthers

are insufficient to establish moderate relativism, because conflicting standards did
not obviously preclude agreement. The contemporary example of hormone/behavior
research does not show that there are distinct, defensible, value-laden standards;
it shows only that some present scientists are insufficiently critical. Nothing said
to (peculiar medical history) is absent.
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here precludes the moderate relativist from offering further examples. The cause
might be better served by looking at debates over methodology in natural history—
debates in 19th-century geology and evolutionary biology, for instance. Whatever
examples are offered, however, they must do more than show scientists disagreeing about methodology. Considering inductivism and the luminiferous æther, it’s
unclear what values were supposed to have motivated Mill’s work. Mill seems to
have been motivated more by empiricist arguments than by values. So instances
in support of moderate relativism must not only involve some disagreement over
methodology, but they must also exhibit the rôle of differing values in fostering
such disagreement.
There is a mitigated sense in which moderate relativism is no doubt correct. Our conception of science is a historical product and thus is open to change
over time. How it changes will be effected by what we do and see— effected, that
is, by what projects we pursue. Yet this alone does not entail that different projects
will yield incommensurable or even importantly different conceptions of science.
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